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PREVENTATIVE V. PUNITIVE: How GENETICALLY MODIFIED
RICE LITIGATION SHAPED REGULATION AND REMEDY
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I. INTRODUCTION
As agricultural technology develops, new issues emerge. While
genetically engineered crops can increase yields and productivity, they can
also increase new legal concerns that had not previously existed. One such
concern is the comingling of non-engineered crops with genetically
engineered varieties. The corruption of plants that are not engineered is a
problem not only because of the loss of that original plant itself if the entire
plant population were to become comingled, but also because of the inability
to sell a crop that has been intended as a non-engineered crop when it is
infiltrated by genetically engineered material.
The infiltration of LLRICE60 1, a genetically engineered variety of rice,
into the U.S. rice supply is an example of the problems that can occur when
a regulated genetically engineered product is introduced into the non-
engineered supply.' This piece will explore the events that gave rise to the
resulting litigation, the regulations that are in place to prevent such events,
and the remedies available when such an event occurs.
* B.A., University of Arkansas Honors College (2007), J.D., University of Arkansas
School of Law (2010), LL.M., University of Arkansas School of Law Program in
Agricultural & Food Law (2014).
1. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
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II. LIBERTY LINK LITIGATION
In January 2006, Riceland Foods, Inc., the largest miller and marketer
of rice in the world based in Stuttgart, Arkansas, discovered genetically
engineered material in some of its rice. 2 Although the United States
produces corn, soybeans, canola, and cotton with a genetically engineered
herbicide resistance trait, there is no domestic commercial production of
genetically engineered rice.3 Accordingly, Riceland hypothesized that the
genetically engineered material could be residual fragments transferred from
the other genetically engineered crops that were transported in the same
containers or vehicles.4 Riceland collected rice samples from various
locations for testing, and the results indicated that several samples tested
positive for the herbicide resistance trait genetically engineered by Bayer
CropScience.
Bayer CropScience describes itself as "an innovation-driven company
with a long tradition in research and development."6 Bayer developed many
genetically engineered products for herbicide tolerance, and the engineered
protein in those products was called Liberty Link.7 Three of those products
were rice, and one of those rice varieties was LLRICE601, the regulated line
of genetically engineered rice found in the samples provided by Riceland.'
"Regulated" articles are defined as organisms that have been altered or
created by genetic engineering and can be considered "plant pests."9 The
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS"), which is
responsible for protecting domestic agriculture from pests and diseases,
makes the determination of whether an article is regulated.'° Additionally,
an organism can become deregulated after a petition process and approval
2. Bill J. Reed, Statement Regarding Genetically Engineered Material in Rice (Aug.
18, 2006); see also Andrew Pollack, Unapproved Rice Strain Found in Wide Area, N.Y.





6. Bayer: Science for a Better Life, BAYER CROPSCIENCE,
http://www.cropscience.bayer.com/en/Company/Our-Mission.aspx (last updated Nov.
6,2013).
7. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
8. Id
9. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2014).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions, USDA.GOV,
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=BIOTECHFAQ&navtype=R
T&parentnav=BIOTECH (last visited Sep. 28, 2014).
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from APHIS. 1 APHIS regulates genetically engineered organisms that could
threaten plant health through its Biotechnology Regulatory Services
program.
12
APHIS conducts two analyses in order to determine whether a
regulated article can be deregulated. 3 First, APHIS considers whether the
organism is a "plant pest," which is defined in the Plant Protection Act
("PPA")"4 as anything that can "injure or damage plants or plant products.'
15
Second, if the organism is not a plant pest, then APHIS will move forward
with deregulation, which includes evaluating potential environmental
impacts. 16
Of Bayer's three genetically engineered rice products, none had been
commercialized, but two were deemed safe for consumption and deregulated
under the APHIS guidelines, LLRJCE62 and LLRICE06. 7 LLRICE60 1, the
genetically engineered rice found in Riceland's supply, was regulated. 8
On August 17, 2006, Bayer filed a petition with the U.S. Department
of Agriculture ("USDA") to deregulate LLRICE601, which would remove
liability for contamination. 9  The petition asserted that "[a]gronomic
evaluation has demonstrated that there were no morphological, beneficial
organism, disease susceptibility or pest susceptibility differences observed
when comparing the events to cultivated rice. °20 The following day, the
11. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, Permits,
Notifications, & Petitions, APHIS.USDA.GOV, http://www.aphis.usda.gov
(last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
12. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,
Biotechnology, APHIS.USDA.GOV,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology (last visited Sept.
28, 2014).
13. Press Release, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA Seeks
Public Review and Comment on Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Herbicide-
Resistant Corn and Soybeans (Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://www.usda.gov.
14. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012) (gives the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture the authority to issue regulations that prevent plant pests from
being introduced into or disseminated within the United States).
15. Press Release, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA Seeks
Public Review and Comment on Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Herbicide-
Resistant Corn and Soybeans (Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://www.usda.gov.
16. Id.
17. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
18. Id.
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USDA announced that unapproved genetically engineered rice was detected
in commercial long grain rice.2
The USDA's release stated that both the USDA and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") "reviewed the available scientific data and
concluded that there [were] no human health, food safety, or environmental
concerns associated with this [genetically engineered] rice."22
The international backlash began two days later, when Japan banned
long grain rice from being imported from the United States ("U.S.").23 The
European Union ("EU") followed, and while the EU did not issue a long
grain rice import ban like Japan, it did require imported American long grain
rice to be certified as free from LLRICE601. 24 The certification required
rice to be tested at an accredited laboratory using validated testing methods
and a certificate issued guaranteeing the absence of the genetically
engineered rice. Rice futures plummeted, eventually costing U.S. rice
farmers $150 million in lost profits.26
Rice producers across the country began filing lawsuits against Bayer.27
LLRICE601 was detected at levels of six grains per 10,000 in Cheniere rice,
a popular long grain rice in the country. 28 On November 14, 2006, the
Arkansas State Plant Board Seed Committee 29 unanimously voted to
recommend that Arkansas ban Cheniere rice from planting in 2007.30 Ten
days later, the USDA deregulated LLRICE601, issuing a "Finding of No
21. Press Release, USDA, Statement by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns
Regarding Genetically Engineered Rice, USDA Release No. 0307.06 (Aug. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.usda.gov.
22. Id.
23. Japan bans 'contaminated' US rice, BBCNEWS.COM,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/science/nature/5271384.stm (Aug. 21, 2006).
24. Press Release, Commission requires certification of US rice exports to stop
unauthorized GMO entering the EU (Aug. 23, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1120.
25. Id.
26. Joe Whittington & Andrew M. Harris, Bayer Must Pay Farmers for Contaminated
Rice Crop, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001 &sid=a8VxRrYyH6Ls.
27. Lawsuit filed over genetically modified rice, ARKANSASNEWS.COM (Aug. 29,
2006, 11:00 PM), http://archives.arkansasnews.com/2006/08/29/lawsuit-filed-over-
genetically-modified-rice/.
28. David Bennett, No CL 131 rice in Arkansas in 2007, DELTA FARM PRESS (Mar. 5,
2007), http://deltafarmpress.com/no-cl- 131-rice-arkansas-2007.
29. In the interest of full disclosure, the author's father was the chairman of this
committee at the time of this vote.
30. David Bennett, No easy answers in clean-up of GM rice situation, DELTA FARM




Significant Impact" stating Bayer's petition for nonregulated status was
granted because deregulation "[would] not have a significant impact on the
quality of the human environment."3 1
Despite the deregulation of LLRICE601, the litigation had already
begun. And all rice-related cases against Bayer CropScience were ordered
to be consolidated.32 Plaintiffs in an action in the Eastern District of
Arkansas requested that the litigation be centered in that district, but the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation3 3 decided the action should be
located in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
due to the locations of other plaintiffs.3 4
At the time of consolidation, those actions consisted of seven cases in
the Eastern District of Arkansas, four in the Western District of Louisiana,
and two in the Eastern District of Missouri.3 5 The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the cases and stated that the actions,
"several of which are brought on behalf of nationwide, multistate or
statewide classes of rice farmers, allege negligence on the part of Bayer for
causing the contamination of commercial rice stocks with LLRICE601, a
variety of genetically modified rice."36
Judge Catherine D. Perry of the Eastern District of Missouri issued an
order titling the case In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation and set forth
schedules requiring class representatives to complete Plaintiff Fact Sheets
and serve initial disclosures.37
31. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,
FINDING OF No SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: EXTENSION OF NONREGULATED STATUS TO RICE
LINE LLRICE601 (Nov. 24, 2006).
32. Transfer Order, In re LLRICE 601 Contamination Litig., 466 F.Supp.2d 1351,
1352 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
33. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1407
to transfer civil actions involving common questions of fact to any district for
consolidated pretrial proceedings. The statute authorizes the panel to choose the district
that is convenient for parties and witnesses "and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions." Upon the panel's request, ajudge may be assigned temporarily
and can exercise the powers of a district judge in any district in order to consolidate the
pretrial proceedings. The statute provides two methods for transfer to be initiated: the
judicial panel can do so on its own initiative, or a party in any action who is seeking to
consolidate the proceedings may file a motion to do so in the district court where its own
action is pending. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2014).
34. Transfer Order, In re LLRICE 601 Contamination Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1351-
52 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id at 1352.
37. Case Management Order No. 1, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, No.
4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2007).
20141
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
Plaintiffs filed their Class Action Complaint on May 17, 2007. 3" In the
Complaint, Plaintiffs made numerous factual allegations, including that
Bayer knew LLRICE could contaminate the U.S. rice supply because Bayer
ded the same thing with the U.S. corn supply in the past.39 Plaintiffs also
alleged that Bayer contaminated the U.S. Rice Supply with LLRICE601,4 °
specifically the nationally popular Cheniere variety,4' and that the
contamination caused significant and continuing harm.42 Specifically,
Plaintiffs alleged that "U.S. rice export partners-including the EU, Japan,
Korea, Canada, Russia, and many other countries-[had] prohibited or
otherwise refused shipments of U.S. long-grain rice" as a result. 43
Additionally, restrictions imposed by those jurisdictions caused the price to
plummet in other jurisdictions.44 Plaintiffs also stated that the price of rice
futures dropped approximately fourteen percent upon the news of
contamination, consequential bans, and new testing requirements, and trend
analysis conducted by the U.S. Rice Producers Association indicated that as
a result of the contamination, the decline in prices in only two days cost
American rice producers roughly $150 million.45
The Complaint described the Defendants as "members of a single
business enterprise ("SBE") known generally as 'Bayer CropScience,' which
is organized and operated to achieve a common business purpose. "46 Bayer
CropScience and its collective Bayer defendants answered the Complaint on
June 21, 2007. 47 The Answer responded to the majority of the Complaint's
allegations by stating that the Bayer defendants were "without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations...
and therefore deny the same."
'4 8
38. Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Genetically Modified Rice
Litigation, No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. May 17, 2007).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 19.
41. Id. at 27.
42. Id. at 32.
43. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, In re Genetically Modified Rice
Litigation, No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP at 11 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2010).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Answer and Defenses of Bayer CropScience LP, Bayer CropScience Holding
Inc., Bayer CropScience LLC, Bayer CropScience Inc., and Bayer Corporation to
Plaintiffs' Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Genetically Modified Rice
Litigation, No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2007).
48. Id. at 2-6.
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The litigation lasted for two more years before the first verdict was
reached.49 On December 4, 2009, a jury awarded almost $2 million in
compensatory damages to two Missouri farmers.50 The farmers' attorneys
had requested punitive damages, stating that an $80 million punitive
judgment was "not too much to send a message," but the jury rejected that
request.5 The following February, a federal jury ordered Bayer to pay $1.5
million in compensatory damages to farmers in Arkansas and Mississippi,
again declining to award punitive damages.52
Judge Perry ruled that plaintiffs were not allowed to seek damages for
emotional distress, pointing out that they made no claim for physical injuries,
they did not specifically request emotional distress damages, and they only
stated they would seek damages for emotional distress at the final pretrial
conference four days before trial, citing lack of notice under Rule 953 as the
basis for her decision.54
The first award of punitive damages occurred on March 8, 2010, when
Bayer was ordered to pay $532,643 in compensatory damages and $500,000
in punitive damages to an Arkansas farmer. 55 From there, punitive awards
increased dramatically; for example, the following month twelve Arkansas
farmers were awarded $5.9 million in compensatory damages and $42
million in punitive damages.56 In July 2010, a Louisiana farmer was awarded
49. Joe Whittington & Andrew M. Harris, Bayer Must Pay Farmers for Contaminated




52. Bayer Crop Science loses another case in genetic rice dispute,
WRALTECHWIRE.COM,
http://wraltechwire.com/business/tech-wire/news/blogpost/6981094/ (last updated Feb.
7, 2010, 2:25 PM).
53. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) states, "If an item of special damage is
claimed, it must be specifically stated."
54. Memorandum and Order, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, No. 4:06
MD 1811 CDP (E.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2010).
55. Alison Sider, Bayer Ordered to Pay Farmer $1 Million in Tab for Modified Rice,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.saynotogmos.org/ud20l0/umar10b.php.
56. Jan Cottingham, Update: Riceland A warded $136.8 Million In Suit Against Bayer
Cropscience, ARKANSAS BUSINESS (March 19, 2011, 3:15 am), available at
http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/34865/update-riceland-awarded-1368-
million-in-suit-against-bayer-cropscience. Bayer CropScience LP et al. v. Schafer, 2011
Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822 (affirming the jury's verdict and the amount of damages
awarded).
2014]
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$500,248 in damages, and in August 2010, six Arkansas farmers were
awarded $940,000 in damages.57
. Bayer settled for the first time in October 2010, agreeing to pay three
Texas farmers $290,000 and avoid going to trial. 8 At this time, a jury has
yet to find in favor of Bayer CropScience.
11. ANALYSIS
In reviewing the facts leading up to the LLRICE601 infiltration into the
U.S. rice supply and the subsequent litigation, two primary questions arise.
First, how can infiltration be prevented? Second, what is the appropriate
remedy when infiltration occurs? This analysis will evaluate prevention
through regulation of genetically engineered crops and consider remedy
through available nuisance law causes of action.
A. Preventing Infiltration: Regulating Genetically Engineered Crops
According to the USDA, the Coordinated Framework for Regulation
of Biotechnology, established as formal policy in 1986, "describes the
Federal system for evaluating products developed using modem
biotechnology."59 The Coordinated Framework synthesizes the existing laws
that apply to biotechnology ("biotech") related products. 60 Those laws and
regulations come from the APHIS, FDA, and Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA").6 1
In the Framework are numerous regulations, and in the LLRICE601
situation, the most applicable is found at Title 7, Part 340 of the Code of
Federal Regulations and is titled, "Introduction of Organisms and Products
57. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Loses Fifth Straight Trial Over
U.S. Rice Crops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 14, 2010), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=newsarchive&sid=axmCsYlz4h 1 c.
Stephanie K. Jones, $750M Settlement Reached with U.S. Farmers over Genetically
Modified Rice, Insurance Journal (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2011/07/07/205488.htm.
58. Alison Frankel, Bayer Agrees to 'Watershed' Settlement in 7,000-Case Rice Crop
Contamination Litigation, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.theamericanlawyer.com.
59. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE,
Regulations. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology? 1 dmy&urile=wc
m%3apath%3a%2FAPHISContent Library%2FSAOurFocus%2FSABiotechnolo





Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or
Which There Is Reason to Believe Are Plant Pests"; 62 this particular
provision in the Code of Federal Regulations was introduced in 1987.63 It
was revised in 1993, when a provision was added for a notification process
for the introduction of certain plants with which APHIS had experience. The
1993 revision also added a petition process to allow certain plants to be
deregulated.64 In 1997, it was again revised when amendments were added
to allow regulated articles to be introduced under notification procedure and
enable APHIS to extend nonregulated status to regulated articles if closely
related to an organism that was already determined as nonregulated. 65 The
1997 revisions also simplified procedures for introduction of genetically
engineered organisms, requirements for nonregulated status, and procedures
for reporting of field tests. 66 The provision was revised most recently in
2001, when the regulation changed to reflect the enactment of the Plant
Protection Act and removed references to plant protection and quarantine
statutes that no longer existed as a result of the PPA.67 The statute was the
subject of proposed amendments in 2009,68 arguably as a result of the
LLRICE601 litigation. However, after an open comment period and a public
meeting held by APHIS for feedback on the proposed amendments, those
amendments did not come into effect.69 Over four thousand comments were
submitted, many of them consistent with one comment that states, "the
current proposed rule does little to close the loopholes in the regulations the
62. 7 C.F.R. pt. 340 (1987).
63. Id.
64. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Notification Procedures for the
Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for Nonregulated Status, 58 Fed.
Reg. 17044-01 (Mar. 31, 1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
65. Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Simplification of Requirements
and Procedures for Genetically Engineered Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg. 23945-01 (May 2,
1997) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
66. Id.
67. Plant Protection Act; Revisions to Authority Citations, 66 Fed. Reg. 21049 (Apr.
27, 2001).
68. Keller & Heckman LLP, USDA APHIS Proposes Amendments to Regulations
Regarding Genetically Engineered Organisms, KELLER AND HECKMAN ALERT (July 14,
2009), available at http://www.khlaw.com/3092.
69. Id.; Plant Protection Act; Revisions to Authority Citations; Technical
Amendment, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,265 (Mar. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330).
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rule is designed to replace and it creates more gaps than it fills."7° The
regulation stands as last amended in 2001." 1
The regulations in 7 C.F.R. pt. 340 can be circumvented by petitioning
APHIS to grant "nonregulated status" to a genetically engineered
organism. 72 Comingling an approved or "deregulated" genetically
engineered crop with another crop does not create risks for health or the
environment.73 Because the deregulated crop itself has been approved by a
regulatory system, for example, APHIS, the deregulated crop has been
determined to be safe.74 It follows that the safe deregulated crop comingled
with a non-engineered crop would also be safe; however, the same assurance
cannot be applied to a regulated crop. If a regulated crop is comingled with
a non-engineered crop, potential economic, health, and environmental
concerns may arise.75
While health and environmental risks are addressed by federal
regulations and approval procedures, economic impact of biotech crops is an
emerging issue with fewer established guidelines. 76 The LLRICE601
litigation provides the early framework for eventual economic parameters
that will control future biotech commingling issues.
Many authors who encountered this topic before the litigation's
resolution forecast such a result. In their article "Litigating the Economic
Impacts of Biotech Crops," Thomas P. Redick and A. Bryan Endres
predicted that the "economic loss doctrine" might foreclose tort recovery for
rice farmers who purchased, albeit unknowingly, seed that was already
contaminated because they could have required a contract provision assuring
that the seed was not genetically engineered.77 In another piece,
70. Angela Robinson, Comment on the APHIS Proposed Rule, REGULATIONS.GOV
(May 11, 2009), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2008-0023-
5374.
71. Plant Protection Act; Revisions to Authority Citations; Technical Amendment, 69
Fed. Reg. 12,265 (Mar. 16, 2004) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 330).
72. Keller & Heckman LLP, USDA APHIS Proposes Amendments to Regulations
Regarding Genetically Engineered Organisms, KELLER AND HECKMAN ALERT (July 14,
2009), available at http://www.khlaw.com/3092.
73. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
Precautionary Containment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 210 (2008).
74. See Drew L. Kershen, Legal Liability Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology,
NAT'L AGRIC. L. CTR., Nov. 2002, at 7, available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/kershen biotech.pdf.
75. D. L. Uchtmann, StarLinkTM - A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159,198 (2002).
76. Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Litigating the Economic Impacts of




"Coexistence Through Contracts: Export-Oriented Stewardship in
Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's Precautionary Containment,"
Redick identified the conflict between the defendant's argument that the
experimental contaminant was later deregulated and the plaintiff's argument
that the economic harm was already incurred despite LLRICE601 later being
approved.78 To elaborate, the plaintiffs position that the harm was already
incurred is the result of financial harm that was sustained before the plant
was deregulated; subsequent deregulation would not have changed the fact
that when the crop was initially contaminated, it instantly failed to meet the
standards of other countries that regulate the genetically modified crops
imported from the United States. 79 Countries responded by demanding an
expensive certification processes or halting importation altogether, both of
which caused rice revenue to drop dramatically.8" Therefore it follows that
deregulating the contaminating matter after the fact would have no effect on
the economic losses that was already.
Prevention can be improved through review of the pertinent
regulations, negotiation of particular seed contracts, and voluntary effort on
the part of producers of genetically engineered seed, as well as those who
cultivate it. With stronger attention paid to prevention, remedy may be less
frequently necessary.
B. Remedying Infiltration: Nuisance Law
The LLRICE601 litigation is an example of how the current regulations
do not always prevent the harm of comingling. Although Bayer was subject
to 7 C.F.R. pt. 340, LLRICE601 still made its way into the food supply.
Accordingly, if regulating genetically engineered crops is the best method to
prevent comingling, nuisance laws and regulations may be an alternative to
address harm once it has already happened. It is here that the law may be
able to strike a balance between preventing prospective harm versus a
remedy for actual harm.
Importantly, not every plaintiff will be able to recover under a nuisance
claim. In Sample v. Monsanto Co., a biotech crop that was approved for use
in the U.S., but not in the European Union, infiltrated the supply.8' Plaintiffs'
claims were for lost revenue because the EU boycotted American soybeans
and corn after the contamination; however, the plaintiffs own property was
78. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
Precautionary Containment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 212 (2008).
79. See generally id.
80. See generally id.
81. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
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not contaminated or injured.82 Accordingly, the economic loss doctrine
precluded a nuisance claim.83 A grower whose non-engineered crop is
affected may have to demonstrate a physical injury in order to meet nuisance
law standards.84
However, the economic loss doctrine differs from state to state. For
example, Arkansas does not have the economic loss rule.85 The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that pure economic losses are covered by strict tort
liability.86 Interpreting Arkansas law, federal courts have upheld the
approach that recovery under strict liability is permitted by Arkansas law
"even when the only damages sustained are to the defective product itself."87
Since many of the plaintiffs in the LLRICE601 litigation were Arkansas
farmers, this important distinction shaped the recovery not only in this
litigation, but also in future application of these precedents.
C. Prevention or Punishment
While punitive damages might deter companies like Bayer
CropScience from future unintended comingling, it is unclear how effective
punitive damages are at curbing future incidents. How much money in
punitive damages is enough to change Bayer's future behavior? Bayer
CropScience reports its 2013 annual net income as E3.2 billion, which is an
increase of 32.7% over their previous annual net income for 2012.88 At an
exchange rate of 1 Dollar to 1.37 Euro, Bayer's 2013 annual net income is
approximately $4.39 billion.
In the first award of punitive damages resulting from LLRICE601
litigation, Bayer was ordered to pay $500,000,89 which is .0114 percent of
Bayer's annual net income. To put that in context, if Bayer operates a 40-
hour workweek for 52 weeks a year, it takes the company just under 15
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
Precautionary Containment, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 220 (2008).
85. Glenn S. Ritter, Economic Loss Rule in Arkansas: Everyone Else Has It, Why
Don't We?, 64 ARK. L. REV. 455, 456 (2011).
86. Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Ark. 1981).
87. Alaskan Oil, Inc. v. Cent. Flying Serv., Inc., 975 F.2d 553, 555 (8th Cir. 1992).
88. Continuous Growth in Bayer's Anniversary Year, BAYERCROPSCIENCE.COM,
http://www.annualreport2013.bayer.com/en/overview.aspx (last visited May 14, 2014).
89. Alison Sider, Bayer Ordered to Pay Farmer $1 Million Is Tab for Modified Rice,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.gpplaw.com/settlements.html.
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minutes to make $500,000. 90 This amount did not persuade Bayer to settle
its remaining cases, as it proceeded to trial on the next case, in which twelve
farmers were awarded punitive damages of $42 million,91 amounting to .96
percent of Bayer's annual net income. Bayer then began to settle, offering
$290,000 to avoid trial.92
The question of punitive damage significance has been addressed with
large companies before. Courts have handled "pain and suffering" damages
that functioned more like punitive damages against the pharmaceutical
company Janssen.93 Similarly, Ford Motor Co. was ordered to pay $52
million in punitive damages for "punishment and deterrence. 9 4 The question
remains whether these awards are more than a mere slap on the wrist or
actually cause large corporations to reevaluate their approaches. The
Supreme Court has stated punitive damages are often "wholly unpredictable
amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused." 95
IV. CONCLUSION
The commingling of genetically engineered crops with non-engineered
crops can be addressed by two different approaches: prevention and
punishment. Prevention is most likely to manifest itself in the form of
regulations, while punishment is best meted out by the imposition of punitive
damages. Ideally, an effective regulatory scheme would lead to adequate
prevention and make punishment the exception, rather than the rule.
However, in those cases where preventative methods have failed, a standard
of punishment should be in place to deter similar conduct in the future.
These two methods can work in tandem to reduce the risk of commingling.
A regulatory framework, whether a new scheme or the current
regulations that are in effect, may be bolstered by strict consequences for
those who fail to adhere. It is important that regulations not create an undue
burden on the very entities they are designed to protect. As demonstrated by
90. Calculated by 40 hours per week, multiplied by 52 weeks per year, then divide
$4.39 billion per year by that amount, which comes to $2,110,576.92 per hour; divide
$500,000 by that amount & multiply that by 60 minutes to determine that it takes Bayer
14.214 minutes to generate $500,000.
91. Alison Frankel, Bayer Agrees to 'Watershed'Settlement in 7, 000-Case Rice Crop
Contamination Litigation, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.theamericanlawyer.com.
92. Id.
93. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering
Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 65-6 (2002).
94. $52 Million Punitives Neededfor 'Punishment and Deterrence,' Plaintiffs Say, 25
No. 19 Andrews Automotive Litig. Rep. 3 at 2 (2006).
95. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
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the Liberty Link contamination, an overly restrictive regulatory system can
add expense and negatively affect agribusinesses that are forced to comply
with extensive, and expensive, certification requirements or other
burdensome measures. Rather than create extra regulations that impose upon
those who have not yet transgressed, a minimally restrictive regulatory
framework should provide protection through prevention and rely on
significant punishment to motivate compliance.
This means that punitive damages must go beyond a mere slap on the
wrist. Punitive damages in these accidental contamination cases must be
severe enough that companies are compelled to take more care and avoid
commingling. In the litigation surrounding Liberty Link rice, the first two
judgments did not include punitive damages.96 While the compensatory
damages were high at $2 million for two farmers in Missouri and $1.5
million for three farmers in Arkansas and one in Mississippi, the damages
made up for the farmers' losses, but did not impose any type of punishment
on Bayer CropScience. 97 It was not until punitive damages were awarded
that Bayer began making settlement offers.98 Even then, the first award of
punitive damages was for $500,000, which takes Bayer less than 15 minutes
to generate. 99 While those are technically punitive damages, they are not of
the severity that would cause Bayer to adjust its behavior to prevent future
incidents.
Substantial prevention through knowledge of potential punishment can
only be effectuated by high punitive damages. While punitive damages can
vary and sometimes have little relationship to the value of compensatory
damages, genetically engineered crop contamination is one example of a
type of case in which a direct relationship to economic loss should be a
secondary consideration. Rather than focusing on the loss of the plaintiff,
punitive damages should be implemented with the purpose of deterring not
only that specific defendant, but also future potential defendants from
making the same costly errors.
Not every defendant should be punished with crippling punitive
damages, and it does no good to annihilate an otherwise viable business by
forcing it to pay exorbitant punitive damages. However, the damages are not
punitive if they can be generated in 15 minutes of company time. The later
verdict of $42 million in punitive damages awarded to Arkansas farmers with
96. Whittington & Harris, supra note 49.
97. Thomas P. Redick & A. Bryan Endres, Jury Verdict Against Bayer for Liberty
Link Rice Breaks New Ground in Biotech Liability, 26 AGRIC. LAW UPDATE 2, 2 (2009).
98. Frankel, supra note 91.
99. See calculations in footnote 90.
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$5.9 million in compensatory damages illustrates a better solution for the
type of punishment that will lead to future prevention. l0 0
The litigation surrounding LLRICE601 provides an unprecedented
opportunity to evaluate both preventative and punitive measures to ensure
that non-engineered crops are protected while genetically engineered crops
are experimentally developed. With the proper preventative regulations,
coupled with appropriate punitive responses, both types of crops can
continue to coexist in a marketplace that has increasing demand for each.
100. Cottingham, supra note 56.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONTOURS OF THE LATE CAPITALIST
FOOD REGIME AND ITS NEOLIBERAL MYTH
United States agricultural policies incentivize the growth and
consumption of industrial foods. Industrial foods are linked to a host of
social and ecological ills. However, agricultural policies are insulated from
political criticism, in part, by the myth that consumers freely and rationally
choose industrial foods. This neoliberal myth is congruous with the
American preferences for "stealth democracy."' That is, the neoliberal myth
is an elegant, but ultimately erroneous, reconciliation of conflicting political
preferences: Americans do not want to be involved in politics, but they also
* Mr. Lichtenberger would like to thank Professors Nicole Civita, Susan Schneider, and
Christopher Kelley for their thoughtful and kind encouragement, advice, and insight
while writing this paper.
1. See generally JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH
DEMOCRACY, AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 130
(2002).
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do not want the political process to be used by special interests or politicians
to take advantage of ordinary people.2
But, agricultural special interests are taking advantage of ordinary
people, and agricultural policy is increasingly, and appropriately, depicted
as producing unacceptable negative externalities. The Food Justice
movement, broadly defined, is the leading critic of the agricultural status
quo. Additionally, the fields of biology, psychology, and social theory
question how free consumer choices can be in a neoliberal regime.
Consequently, the political currency of the neoliberal myth and related
policy images are depreciating as government solutions and agricultural
institutions are increasingly viewed as creating new food and agriculture
problems. This presents a window of opportunity for the Food Justice
movement to mobilize around a new policy image and a corresponding set
of political institutions that empower citizens and consumers to grow and eat
healthy, sustainable, and just foods.
A. The Punctuated Equilibrium Model of Policy Change and the
Late Capitalist Food Regime: A Policy Monopoly Buttressed
by the Neoliberal Myth
Changes in United States political institutions follow a punctuated
equilibrium model of policy change, wherein rapid and drastic policy
changes become ensconced within political institutions, thereby obtaining
the status of policy monopolies. The current American food and agricultural
policy monopoly has been labeled the "corporate food regime" by Food
Justice advocates, but could also be described as the "late capitalist" food
regime.3 This regime is buttressed by the supporting core political value of
neoliberalism. The neoliberal ideal itself is advertised and supported by
vested interests in the current policy monopoly.
Political scientists Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones argue that
long periods of institutional stability in America are maintained amongst
citizen indifference by "two major devices: the existing structure of political
institutions and the definition of the issues processed by those institutions."4
Specifically, Baumgartner and Jones argue that institutional stability is
maintained until the "alarmed discovery" of a problem is coupled with a
potential government solution. 5 Attention then naturally fades as the costs
2. Id.
3. See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM ( Stanley Fish & Fredric Jameson eds., Duke University Press 1991).
4. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER AND BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS, 15 (Benjamin I. Page ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1993).
5. Id. at 86.
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of solving the problem become too high, the difficulties of action are
revealed, or a new issue takes hold.6 However, brief periods of agenda
access may create institutional legacies and policy monopolies.7
Policy monopolies are then a fundamental aspect of the American
political landscape and generally "have two important characteristics:"8
First, a definable institutional structure is responsible for
policymaking, and that structure limits access to the policy
process. Second, a powerful supporting idea is associated
with the institution. These buttressing policy ideas are
generally connected to core political values which can be
communicated directly .and simply through image and
rhetoric.
9
In this way, political institutions can be seen as "'congealed tastes,' changing
more slowly than preferences, but changing nonetheless.""
Issue definition is then an important mechanism for politicians and
policy entrepreneurs to create and destroy policy monopolies, and policy
images are often as important as substantive policy. Symbols and rhetoric
are used to keep issues out of the media and off the congressional or policy
agenda.'2  But, a new cycle of mobilization often begins when "the
government is already involved in the solution, and some have begun to see
the solution as the problem. Hence the issue must be expanded beyond the
confines of the existing policymaking system.
' 3
Food Justice advocates have coined the term "corporate food regime"
to describe the American agricultural policy monopoly. 4 The corporate food
regime is characterized by "unprecedented market power and profits of
monopoly agrifood corporations, globalized animal protein chains, growing
links between food and fuel economies, a 'supermarket revolution,'
6. Id. at 86-7.
7. Id. at 86.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Baumgartner and Jones, supra note 4, at 7 and 26. ("In those cases where
monopolies of control have been established, there tends to be a single understanding of
the underlying policy question. So policy monopolies are often supported by the
acceptance of a positive policy image and the rejection of possible competing images.").
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at42.
12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. at 89.
14. Eric Holt Gimenez & Annie Shattuck, Food crises, food regimes and food
movements: rumblings of reform or tides of transformation?, 38 J. OF PEASANT STUDIES
109,111 (2011).
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liberalized global trade in food, increasingly concentrated land ownership,
[and] a shrinking natural resource base." 5 The corporate food regime also
includes "interpenetration of government and big business," such that it
might be better termed the "late capitalist food regime."16 For instance,
billions of dollars in United States' grain subsidies incentivize large-scale
corporate ownership of farmland, as well as the growth and consumption of
industrial foods.
17
The late capitalist food regime is buttressed by neoliberalism as a core
political value. 8 That is, the neoliberal myth-that consumer choices are
free, rational, and drive demand-insulates from political change
government policies that reproduce incentives to grow and eat industrial
foods. 9 The neoliberal myth is perhaps most obvious in "Cheeseburger
Bills."2 These statutes are now in place in twenty-four states, and protect
fast-food restaurants from litigants claiming obesity-related damages.21
Similar legislation has been proposed three times at the federal level.22 In
support of the federal legislation, one Congressman argued, "This bill is
about self-responsibility. If you eat too much, you get fat. It is your fault.
Don't try to blame somebody else."
'23
This idea is heavily promoted by big food companies through lobbying
and their non-profit arms, such as the Center for Consumer Freedom, which
was started by tobacco company Philip Morris,24 and now attacks public
health activists like Michael Pollan as "food fascists."25 Food companies
15. Id.
16. Fredric Jameson, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM, xviii (Stanley Fish et al. eds., Duke University Press 1991).
17. Lauren Servin, How Our Government Incentivizes the Overproduction of Junk
Food, The Next New Deal: The Blog of the Roosevelt Institute (Oct. 24, 2014,
12:35PM), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/new-guard/how-our-govemment-incentivizes-
overproduction-junk-food.
18. Jameson, supra note 16, at xviii-xix.
19. Id. at xxi.
20. Jennifer L. Harris, et al., A Crisis in the Marketplace: How Food Marketing





24. Verlyn Klinkenborg, The Story Behind a New York Billboard and the Interests It
Serves, N.Y. TIMES (July 24 2005),
www.nytimes.com/2005/07/24/opinion/24sun3.html? r=0.
25. Juliet B. Schor & Margaret Ford, From Tastes Great to Cool: Children's Food
Marketing and the Rise of the Symbolic, 35 J.L. Med. & Ethics 10, 18 (2007).
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also naturalize individualism through advertisements.26 For instance,
McDonalds uses slogans such as "I'm lovin' it" and "We do it all for you,"
which manipulates the public's "ideas of individual liberty and personal
choice" while at the same time actively encouraging "consumers to believe
that they are in the driver's seat, that they are independent agents, and that
they are the ones exercising their liberty interests to freely choose
McDonald's because it provides them with what they already want or, as
'I'm lovin' it' suggests, even love."2 7
The seeming mismatch of using neoliberal ideals to support a state-
business partnership is well-explained by political theorist Michael
Harrington.28  Harrington observes that the market myth serves to
delegitimize government intervention on behalf of workers, the poor, and the
environment, while the government does intervene on behalf of industry and
business elites.2 9 Nowhere is this more apparent than in food and agriculture
policy, which has from its inception enjoyed "agricultural exceptionalism"-
the idea that agriculture is both too important to be regulated (such as under
the Fair Labor Standards Act), and too important to not receive government
assistance (such as loan guarantees, cash subsidies, and insurance
subsidies).3"
B. Neoliberalism in a Stealth Democracy
The neoliberal myth is particularly alluring in America because it
comports with Americans' preferences for a stealth democracy.31 That is,
the neoliberal myth is an elegant, but ultimately erroneous, reconciliation of
conflicting political preferences: Americans do not want to be involved in
politics, but they also do not want the political process to be used by special
interests or politicians to take advantage of ordinary people.
32
Political scientists Hibbing and Morse's study of American political
preferences reveals that:
26. See Prof. Caroline Forell, Mctorts: The Social and Legal Impact of McDonald's
Role in Tort Suits, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 105, 110 (2011).
27. Id
28. See Video: Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal
Statement. Video 1: The Power of the Market, PUB. BROADCASTING CO. (1980), available
at www.youtube.com/watch?y-D3N2sNnGwa4 (beginning at approx. 47:00).
29. Id.
30. Id. at approx.. 42:30.
31. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY,
AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 130 (2002).
32. Id.
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[t]he last thing people want is to be more involved in
political decision making: they do not want to make political
decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much
input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and
they would rather not know all the details of the decision-
making process ... people want what we call stealth
democracy.33
While "people do not want to make political decisions themselves ... they
want those who do make the decisions to be unable to make them on the
basis of selfish motivations."34  Specifically, people would rather have
empathetic, non-self-interested, elite decision makers arrive at well-
measured neutral policy decisions to achieve seemingly universal political
goals.35
Americans then possess conflicting political preferences: they do not
want to be involved in politics, but they also do not want the political process
to be used by special interests or politicians to take advantage of ordinary
people.36 Neoliberalism suggests a reconciliation of these preferences.37 As
social theorist Frederic Jameson argues, "[m]arket ideology assures us that
human beings make a mess of it when they try to control their destinies
('socialism is impossible') and that we are fortunate in possessing an
interpersonal mechanism-the market-which can substitute for human
hubris and planning and replace human decisions altogether," and further
"[w]e only need to keep it clean and well oiled, and it now-like the monarch
so many centuries ago-will see to us and keep us in line." 38In theory,
neoliberalism is an anti-normative set of laws that operates procedurally
fairly and maximizes substantive welfare without conflict, governance, or
political participation.39
Agricultural policy is increasingly understood as taking advantage of
ordinary people and producing unacceptable negative externalities.4" Food
Justice movements, defined broadly, are leading this change of view.4" For
instance, Food Justice scholars at Yale's Rudd Center for Food Policy and
33. Id. at 1-2.
34. Id. at 85.
35. Id. at 130.
36. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, supra note 31, at 130.
37. Id. at 824.
38. Jameson, supra note 16, at 272.
39. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, supra note 31, at 139.
40. Alison Hope Alkon, Conf. Paper 38, Food Justice, Food Sovereignty and the
Challenges ofNeoliberalism, J. OF PEASANT STUDIES 1, 6 (Sept. 14-15, 2013).
41. Id. at 2.
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Obesity argue that obesity and food problems are unfairly interpreted
through the neoliberal lens as "failures in personal responsibility," and that
this "avoids discussion of solutions at the population level. 42
At least two additional points strongly contract the neoliberal myth in
food and agriculture: (1) market failure and distorting subsidies permeate
every aspect of agriculture in both the production and, as discussed in the
following section, the consumption of food and fiber, and; (2) as
jurisprudence scholars Margaret Jane Radin and Frank Michelman argue,
''economic analysis can do no more than provide a cover of legitimacy to
political choices otherwise decided. '43  In other words, markets
communicate, structure, and incentivize societal goals, but markets should
not be considered goals in themselves, and the neoliberal myth, over time,
has produced market dogmatism often to the detriment of higher societal
goals.
II. FOOD JUSTICE AND A CRITIQUE OF CONSUMPTION
Food choice, as consumption, may now be as important a site of
political resistance and social change as production. As media scholar John
Fiske observes, "in our society the conditions of production are ones over
which people have no control, no choice about if or where to work, or about
the conditions under which to work; consumption, however, offers some
means of coping with the frustration of capitalist conditions of production."' 4
Or, as Jameson argues, political impotence "must be dealt with in another
way, a way that, acknowledging its persistence and inevitability, disguises,
represses, displaces, and sublimates a persistent and fundamental
powerlessness," and further stating "[t]hat other way, is of course,
consumerism itself, as a compensation for an economic impotence which is
also an utter lack of any political power." '45
Or, from another perspective, the socio-political importance of
consumption is indicative of the vertical integration of food and
agriculture-as "the needs invested by the individual consumer today are
just as essential to the order of production as the capital invested by the
capitalist entrepreneur and the labor power invested by the wage laborer. It
42. Harris et al., supra note 20, at 218.
43. Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist
Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019, 1033 (1990).
44. John Fiske, Shopping for Pleasure: Malls, Power, and Resistance, in THE
CONSUMER SOCIETY READER 306, 315 (Juliet B. Schor and Douglas B. Holt, eds., 2000).
45. Jameson, supra note 16, at 316.
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is all capital. ' The other side of the coin is that it is all consumption, and
the postmodern or late capitalist regime is "capable of staging a virtual
delirium of the consumption of the very idea of consumption: in the
postmodem, indeed, it is the very idea of the market that is consumed with
the most prodigious gratification; as it were, a bonus or surplus of the
commodification process."47 It then follows that the vertical integration of
the late capitalist food regime also reflects "the profound need of the modem
corporation to dominate and control all the conditions and variables which
affect its viability,"48 both capital and consumption, as counterparts.
49
Consequently, consumer needs themselves are incorporated into the
folds of the capitalist food regime.5° The late capitalist turn of the screw thus
produces a Foucauldian bio-political disciplining of the self, replacing the
concept of citizen with the identity of consumer.51 As food policy
researchers Julie Guthman and Melanie DuPuis argue, "we have all but
abandoned notions of citizenship as participation in the public sphere for a
more individualist notion of self as the citizen consumer whose contribution
to society is mainly to purchase the products of global capitalism[.]"52
Therefore, social movements, for better or for worse, are often recast in a
"market as movement" model.53 The focus on individual eating preferences
here is then, in part, to examine the dimensions of such a movement.
In opposition to the late capitalist food regime, Food Justice
movements emphasize the socially contingent nature of food markets.54 For
instance, Food Justice advocate Patricia Allen argues that the 'free market'
is [a] historical and contingent social construct, rather than something that is
'natural' or independent of political decision making."55 Allen then argues
for political change-" [s]ince the agrifood system is socially organized,
problems are the product of social choices, embodied in traditions,
institutions, and legal and economic structures."56
46. Jean Baudrillard, The Ideological Genesis of Needs, in THE CONSUMER SOCIETY
READER 57, 73-4 (Juliet B. Schor & Douglas B. Holt, eds., 2000).
47. Jameson, supra note 16, at 268.
48. Dick Hebdige, Object as Image: The Italian Scooter Cycle, in THE CONSUMER
SOCIETY READER 117, 131 (quoting Paul Sweezy, On the Theory of Monopoly
Capitalism).
49. Id.
50. Alkon, supra note 40, at 5.
51. Id. at 6-7.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id.
54. Patricia Allen, Mining for Justice in the Food System: perceptions, practices, and
possibilities, 25 AGRC. HUM. VALUES 157, 160 (2008).
55. Id.
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Similarly, Food Justice advocates argue that consumption choices are
not themselves free, and that choice is not always synonymous with
empowerment." In contrast to the neoliberal myth, food choices are highly
malleable and overwhelmingly irrational.58 That is, the meanings of foods,
and consequently food preferences, aren't rational or absolute, but are
ideologies and institutions, which are constantly fought over and in flux.
59
This assertion, that food preferences are malleable and environmentally
structured,
is not, of course, to say that we enter the market as mere
automatons; clearly, we have and exercise choices, and we
(apparently) have more things to choose from than we once
did. But we exercise those choices in a world of structured
relationships, and part of what those relationships structure
(or shape) is both the arena and the process of choice itself60
The malleability of, and conflict over, food identities and food preferences
can be seen throughout the food chain, and has been studied through the
lenses of, inter alia, biology, psychology, and social theory.
6'
A. The Biological Dimensions of Food Choice
The biological component of food choice often manifests as biological
imperative, undermining "rational" food decisions.62 That is, biology studies
contradict the neoliberal myth of rationality in food choice.
63
For instance, sugar's elative and pain-reducing properties make sugar-
laden foods, such as soda, attractive "because we have been genetically
designed to love it. More accurately, it has been designed to love us .... ,
Deprived of sugar, sugar-addicted rats "go through withdrawal: their body
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Allen, supra note 54, at 160.
60. William Roseberry, The Rise of Yuppie Coffees and the Reimagination of Class
in the United States, in THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF FOOD AND EATING 122, 137 (James
L. Watson & Melissa L. Caldwell, eds., 2005).
61. Id.
62. Nicole M. Avena, Pedro Rada, & Bartley G. Hoebel, Evidence for sugar
addiction: Behavioral and neurochemical effects of intermittent, excessive sugar intake,
32(1) Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 20 (2008), available at
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2235907/ (summarizing the evidence for sugar
addiction).
63. Id. (arguing that food addiction is in fact plausible).
64. BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING 180 (2010).
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temperature will change, they'll become more agitated, they'll be more
aggressive, and they'll start having body tremors."65 Studies suggest that
sugar can be addictive for humans too because sugar, like more potent
addictive substances, excites dopamine transmitters and reward centers in
the human brain.66 The effects of sugar are so strong that it can be used to
reduce pain from minor medical procedures in infants.67
B. The Psychological Dimensions of Food Choice
Psychology research suggests that, contrary to the neoliberal myth,
most food decisions are made out of habit or "mindlessly," and without
rational forethought. 68  For instance, food psychology researcher Brian
Wansink estimates that "the average person makes well over 200 decisions
about food every day"-most being out of habit.
69
Wansink's research confirms some of the pitfalls, as well as the
opportunities, of mindless food consumption.70 For instance, Wansink has
demonstrated that package size is a significant determinant of how much
people eat.7 In one experiment, Wansink gave moviegoers free buckets of
popcom. 72 Individuals given larger buckets consistently ate more popcorn-
an average of 53% more, or 173 calories worth 73-- even though the popcorn
was five days old and stale.74 Wansink concludes that "[p]eople eat more
when you give them a bigger container. Period. 7 5 Even when preparing
food at home, "people eat 20-25 percent more on average from the larger
packages."76
Convenience is also a significant determinant of what and how people
eat.77 For instance, Wansink's research demonstrates that "[i]f people have
65. Ashley Gearhardt, Lecture 6, Culture and the Remarkable Plasticity of Eating,
OPEN YALE COURSES, PSYC-123: THE PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGY AND POLITICS OF FOOD
(September 22, 2008), available at http://oyc.yale.edu/transcript/782/psyc-123.
66. Robert H. Lustig, The Sugar-Addiction Taboo, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2014),
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/01 /the-sugar-addiction-taboo/282699/.
67. Univ. of Mich. Health Sys., Pain and Your Infant: Medical Procedures,
Circumcision and Teething, UNIV. OF MICH. HEALTH SYS.,
www.med.umich.edu/yourchild/topics/paininf.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
68. Wansink, supra note 64, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 180.
71. Id. at 16-18.
72. Wansink, supra note 64, at 16.
73. Id. at 18.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 59.
77. Wansink, supra note 64, at 73 (emphasis in original).
[VOL. 10
TOWARD A JUST FOOD REGIME
to go to a separate lunch line to pay for candy and potato chips, they buy
less."78
The illusion of variety also prompts people to "mindlessly" eat more.
79
For example, a Penn State study found that "if people are offered an
assortment with three different flavors of yogurt, they're likely to consume
an average of 23 percent more than if offered only one flavor."8
Psychologists believe this is because of "sensory specific satiety" wherein
senses numb to repeated stimuli."1 Importantly, "we also eat more if we
simply think there is more."82
Moreover, mental impressions of foods significantly alter their appeal
and flavor.8 3 For instance, in one experiment Wansink provided samples of
yogurt to participants in the dark, so the participants could not see the
yogurt.84 Wansink told the participants that the yogurt was strawberry
flavored, but in fact it was chocolate.85 Still, the majority said they liked the
yogurt, and the "suggestion that they were eating strawberry yogurt led 19
of the 32 people to rate it as having a good strawberry taste."86 Psychologists
believe this is because of "expectation assimilation" and "confirmation
bias"-"[i]n the case of food, it means that our taste buds are biased by our
imagination. Basically, if you expect a food to taste good, it will."87
Wansink' s research shows that the environment, as mediated by human
psychology, shapes food consumption patterns." But, as Wansink notes,
most people believe that their individual preferences and consumption
patterns are independent and autonomous: "In the thousands of debriefings
we've done for hundreds of studies, nearly every person who was 'tricked'
by the words on a label, the size of a package, the lighting in a room, or the
size of a plate said, 'I wasn't influenced by that."' 89
Because most food "decisions" are made "mindlessly," consumption
habits are easily influenced by container size, convenience, variety, and
expectation assimilations.90 Consequently, collective action to reshape the
environment is significantly more likely to produce healthy and sustainable
78. Id. at 87.
79. Id. at 71.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 71-2.
82. Wansink, supra note 64, at 73.
83. ld. at 118.
84. Id. at 119-20.
85. Id. at 120.
86. Id.
87. Wansink, supra note 64, at 120, 122.
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 23.
90. Id. at 122.
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eating patterns than reliance on the "rational" choices of isolated individuals.
This insight contradicts the neoliberal myth, and could be highlighted by
Food Justice advocates who confront the late capitalist policy monopoly.
C. The Sociological Dimensions of Food Choice
Social theory also offers a host of arguments against the neoliberal
myth of rational food choice.91 As food anthropologists James Watson and
Melissa Cardwell summarize, "[F]ood practices are implicated in a complex
field of relationships, expectations, and choices that are contested,
negotiated, and often unequal. Food everywhere is not just about eating, and
eating (at least among humans) is never simply a biological process." 92 That
is, food preferences are structured by cultural, as well as previously-
discussed biological and psychological forces. 93 Or, as anthropologist Paul
Rozin notes, "Most of our food choice, in the ancestral environment and in
the contemporary developed world, is based on learning. For modern
humans, most of this learning is done second hand, by cultural
transmission.
'" 94
One aspect of cultural transmission is socioeconomic status, and food
consumption is often about indicating and reproducing class.95 As social
theorist Pierre Bourdieu observes, "Taste classifies, and it classifies the
classifier." 96  That is, consumption is "predisposed, consciously and
deliberately or not, to fulfill a social function of legitimating social
differences."97 This is particularly problematic with regards to food and
agriculture because cultural capital is correlated with access to healthy
91. James L. Watson & Melissa L. Caldwell, Introduction to THE CULTURAL POLITICS
OF EATING 1 (James L. Watson& Melissa L. Caldwell eds., 2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Paul Rozin, The Meaning of Food in Our Lives: A Cross-Cultural Perspective on
Eating and Well-Being, 37 J. NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAVIOR S 107 (2005).
95. PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE
6 (Harvard University Press 1984).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 7.
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foods.98 For instance, a recent study of school children in Norway suggests
that cultural capital is a stronger predictor of health than material capital.99
The transmission of cultural capital is mediated by power and politics
as corporations and individuals fight to "exert control over the meanings
such systems can produce." '  Of particular concern here is how food
companies gain the ideological upper hand by manipulating images to
increase sales. 1  As social theorist Ronald Barthes observes, "[T]he
development of advertising has enabled the economists to become quite
conscious of the ideal nature of consumer goods," and furthermore, "by now
everyone knows that the product as bought-that is, experienced-by the
consumer is by no means the real product; between the former and the latter
there is a considerable production of false perceptions and values."'
0 2
Wansink's psychology studies of expectation assimilation, discussed above,
confirm Barthes' insight into false perception, and Jean Baudrillard pushes
this reasoning to its limits.0 3 Baudrillard argues:
The empirical 'object,' given in its contingency of form,
color, material, function and discourse .. .is a myth. It is
nothing but the different types of relations and significations
that converge, contradict themselves, and twist around it, as
such - the hidden logic that not only arranges this bundle of
relations, but directs the manifest discourses that overlays
and occludes it. 04
98. See Anne-Siri Fismen, Oddrun Samdal, and Torbjorn Torsheim, Family affluence
and cultural capital as indicators of social inequalities in adolescent's eating
behaviours: a population-based survey, BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 2012, 12: 1036 (Nov.
2012), available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3533876/ (finding that
"cultural capital was a stronger predictor than material capital of disparities in
consumption of fruit and vegetables and in the regular eating of breakfast and dinner,
and it was the only significant predictor of consumption of sweets and sugared soft drinks
among young people in Norway. The analyses support the argument that cultural capital
and material capital are distinct dimensions of SES that work through different
mechanisms to make unique and separate contributions to health").
99. Id.
100. Fiske, supra note 44, at 320.
101. Ronald Barthes, Toward a Psychology of Contemporary Food Consumption, in
FOOD AND CULTURE 21
(Carole Counihan & Penny Van Esteril eds., 2013).
102. Id.
103. Wansink, supra note 64, at 122; Baudrillard, supra note 46, at 58.
104. Baudrillard, supra note 46, at 58.
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While Baudrillard's claim seems like hyperbole, food advertising suggests
its truth, as the marketer's role is:
based on a process of routinely unhinging signifiers from
signifieds so that new signifier-signified relationships can
be fashioned. This process occurs with such rapidity and
frequency that we scarcely notice it anymore. But slow
down the videotape and the process becomes blatant as
advertisers associate meaning systems that otherwise would
not occupy the same space: for example, the sleek, phallic
grace and power of a fighter jet in a steep climb is joined to
an image of a female diver in a Diet Coke ad.'015
Social theorists Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson argue that
"[a]dvertising contributes in this way to a postmodern condition in which
disconnected signs circulate at ever increasing rates, in which signifiers
become detached from signified and reattached to still other signified."1 °6
However, the signifying chain here is not made of one-to-one
relationships between signifiers and signifieds. °7 Instead, as Jameson
argues, meanings are "generated by the movement from signifier to
signifier," explaining that "[w]hat we generally call the signified-the
meaning or conceptual content of an utterance-is now rather to be seen as
a meaning-effect, as that objective mirage of signification generated and
projected by the relationship of signifiers among themselves."'
08
This relationship between ideas and meaning is both a cause and effect
of late capitalism. As Jameson notes, "[T]he culture of the simulacrum
comes to life in a society where exchange value has been generalized to the
point at which the very memory of use value is effaced."'0 9 Or, as social
theorist Guy Debord argues of America in the 1960s, "the image has become
the final form of commodity reification."" 0  What we are left with then,
according to Jameson, is a "rewriting of one form of narrativization in terms
of a different, momentarily more powerful one, the ceaseless
renarrativization of already existent narrative elements by each other.""'
105. Robert Goldman & Stephen Papson, Advertising in the Age of Accelerated
Meaning, in THE CONSUMER SOCIETY READER 81, 85 (Juliet B. Schor & Douglas B. Holt
eds., 2000).
106. Id. at 87.
107. Jameson, supra note 16, at 26.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 18.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 88.
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Skepticism does not call off this "sign war" or the complex cultural
manipulation of taste. Instead, as Bourdieu argues, "each taste feels itself to
be natural."' 12 Or, as social theorist Thorstein Veblen observes, "the fact that
[instinct] may under stress of circumstances eventuate in inanities no more
disproves the presence of the instinct than the reality of the brooding instinct
is disproved by inducing a hen to sit on a nestful of china eggs."' 
1 3
At this level of abstraction, anthropologist Daniel Miller warns against
"postmodern assertions about nothing referring to anything in particular any
more." " 4  Miller argues that Coca Cola, as consumed in 2 0 ' century
Trinidad, is not just an abstraction or a meta-symbol." 5 Instead, local
consumption parses new specific meanings from mass culture and corporate
products." 6 In Trinidad, Coca Cola is often a mixer in a "rum and coke,"
commonly referred to as a "black sweet drink," or just a "black."' 7 Miller
argues that the introduction of Coke, as a "superficial globality," in Trinidad
didn't diminish an existing "authentic" discourse about a black sweet drink,
but that the image of Coke was redeveloped and honed through local
conditions and contradictions." 8 In this way, the products and dialogues of
international food companies are often constrained and repurposed by local
people and their narratives. However, as Miller points out, local narratives
are often constrained and repurposed by corporate structures, and "semiotics
without structuralism was never much use."'1 19
One trend in the cultural transmission of food taste is the use of
traditional pastoral agricultural images to market industrial food products.'20
The agrarian image has been a productive signifier to appropriate because
consumers have grown almost immune to, and highly frustrated by, ceaseless
112. Pierre Bourdieu, The Aesthetic Sense as the Sense of Distinction, in THE
CONSUMER SOCIETY READER 205, 205 (Juliet B. Schor & Douglas B. Holt eds., 2000).
113. Thorstein Veblen, Conspicuous Consumption, in THE CONSUMER SOCIETY
READER 187, 201 (Juliet B. Schor & Douglas B. Holt eds., 2000).
114. Daniel Miller, Coca-Cola: A Black Sweet Drink from Trinidad, in THE CULTURAL





118. Id. at 62-4.
119. Miller, supra note 114, at 68.
120. The Monsanto Corporation continues to misappropriate the agrarian myth. See,
eg., Marion Nestle, Monsanto's PR campaign "begins with a farmer," FOOD POLITICS
(Dec. 20, 2013), available at www.foodpolitics.com/2013/12/monsantos-pr-campaign-
begins-with-a-farmer/.
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sign reappropriation' 21 The disarming logic of the agrarian image is the
exploitation of nostalgia for an imagined past-a past prior to the
postmodern condition of accelerated meaning. 122 That this past never existed
does not reduce its charm. As Daphne Berdahl observes, "[N]ostalgia is
about the production of a present rather than the reproduction of a past."123
Moreover, anthropologist Purnima Mankekar, in her study of Indian grocery
stores in California, observes that Indian shoppers often enjoy traditional
foods because they create a nostalgic feeling, but the same shoppers do not
actually want to return to India.1 24 Mankekar concludes that nostalgia is
"enamored of distance, not of the referent itself," 125 and that "gustatory and
national memories" serve as "cultural mnemonics" and allow for the
consumption of particular narratives of the past.126  Similarly, the
reappropriation (or misappropriation) of the agrarian image manipulates
nostalgia and allows for the consumption of a de-problematized narrative of
America's agricultural past: free of labor exploitation, ecological
destruction, racism, and misogyny. 
127
The late capitalist food regime also manipulates animal ideologies.
28
The animal sciences strongly suggest that animals possess cognitive and
emotional abilities that make animals' torture in factory farms morally, and
perhaps constitutionally, unacceptable.1 29  However, the corporate food
regime actively opposes the idea that animals have rights, feelings, or
deserve dignity. 3 This opposition is not a cruel conspiracy, but the other
side of the neoliberal ideological coin. As feminist activist Silvia Federici
argues, "[C]apitalism must justify and mystify the contradictions built into
its social relations-the promise of freedom vs. the reality of widespread
coercion, and the promise of prosperity vs. the reality of widespread
penury-by denigrating the 'nature' of those it exploits: women, colonial
121. Purnima Mankekar, "India Shopping ": Indian Grocery Stores and Transnational
Configurations of Belonging, in THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF FOOD & EATING 202, 205
(James L. Watson & Melissa L. Caldwell eds., 2005).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 205.
125. Id.
126. Mankekar, supra note 121, at 203, 206.
127. Id. at 205.
128. Id. at 206.
129. Phillip Low, Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, FCMCONFERENCE (July
7, 2012), http://fcmconference.org/img/cambridgedeclarationonconsciousness.pdf.
130. HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, SPYING ON DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE,
CORPORATE POWER, AND PUBLIC RESISTANCE 150-51 (2013).
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subjects, the descendants of African slaves, the inunigrants displaced by
globalization."'' 31 Federici's list could also include industrial farm animals.
Moreover, the capitalist food regime has commandeered state police
powers to exclude compassionate voices from the dialectic construction of
animal rights.3 2 As National Lawyer's Guild president Heidi Boghosian
reports, the FBI listed animal rights organizations "as top domestic terrorist
threats in 2005,'m and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act criminalizes
many peaceful animal rights protest activities that should be protected by the
First Amendment. 
34
D. A Case Study: Junk Food Advertisements and Children,
Why Apple Jacks don't Taste like Apples
The marketing of unhealthy food products to children highlights the
ability of "big food" to use "big data" to understand and influence connected
environmental, psychological, and sociological relations for increased
consumption and profits.' 35 For instance, big food companies manipulate
the relationship between biological craving and food identity when
advertising to children.'36 As one food marketer explained, children
consistently, "say they use sugar like adults use coffee-to give them a boost.
Since coffee isn't allowed, and they have no other means to 'get them going'
or 'give them energy,' they use soda, chocolate, candy and sugary fruit
drinks. It gives them the jolts they say they need throughout the day."' 
37
Food companies then remind children of products' energy-producing effects
in targeted advertisements.' 38
Additionally, marketers rely on emotional advertising content to
override rational food choices---especially in ads targeted at children.'39 As
a recent analysis of over 800 ad campaigns concluded, "The more emotions
dominate over rational messaging, the bigger the business effects. The most
131. SILVIA FEDERICI, CALIBAN AND THE WITCH: WOMEN, THE BODY AND PRIMITIVE
ACCUMULATION 17 (2004).
132. Boghosian, supra note 130, at 150.
133. Id. at 151-52.
134. Id. at 150-52.
135. Schor & Ford, supra note 25, at 11-12.
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; Anyone who has marveled at the mental contortions of a child deprived of a
cookie can attest to David Hume's insight that intellect is a slave of the passions-at
least in children. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 415 (L.A. Selby-
Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1978).
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effective advertisements of all are those with little or no rational content.' 40
Instead of focusing on the relative merits of products, food companies "use
psychological techniques to design advertising that triggers powerful
emotional responses in consumers.' 4  For instance, advertisements
associate "fun, happiness and being 'cool' with consumption of their
products. 42  As a market research company explained, "[T]he initial
connection and affinity to a brand is made on an emotional level-and that
when purchase decision time comes nearer, the young consumer is looking
for affirmation for the emotional choice they have already solidified.' 43
Food advertisers also use "symbolic messages" to "associate products
with children's sense of identity.' 44 Or, as one sociology scholar recently
explained, marketing based on identity persuades children to eat certain
foods "not on the basis of their tastiness, or other benefits, but because of
their place in a social matrix of meaning."'' 45 Consequently, food brands
"come to occupy an increasingly central position in children's sense of
identity, their relationships to other children and adults, and the construction
of meaning and value that structures their lives.' ' 146 For instance,
advertisements depict unhealthy food products as "antiadult" or
oppositional, and their consumption as rebellious. "4' This type of
advertisement "aligns the marketer (or the company) with the audience, and
against adults[,]' 48 who are depicted as "stupid, uncool, boring, nerdy, out
of touch, controlling, or evil.' 49
For instance, in an advertisement for Apple Jacks cereal, a group of
adolescent boys sit in a garage eating Apple Jacks while a father figure is
busy with chores. 5 ° The father figure reminds the boys to clean the garage,
and the boys mock the father's ignorance about why the boys would instead
140. Jennifer L. Harris & Samantha K. Graff, Protecting Young People From Junk
Food Advertising: Implications of Psychological Research for First Amendment Law,
102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 214, 216 (2012) (quoting Les Binet & Peter Field, Empirical
Generalizations About Advertising Campaign Success, 49 J. ADVER. REs. 130, 130-33
(2009)).
141. Harris& Graff, supra note 140, at 216.
142. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Television Food Marketing to Children Revisited: The
Federal Trade Commission Has the Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Regulate,
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 98, 103 (2010).
143. Harris & Graff, supra note 140, at 217.
144. Harris et al., supra note 20, at 215 (quoting Schor & Ford).
145. Schor & Ford, supra note 25, at 16.
146. Id.
147. Harris et al., supra note 20, at 215.
148. Schor & Ford, supra note 25, at 17.
149. Id.
150. Television Commercial for Apple Jacks Cereal, Apple Jacks Commercial (1996),
YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggHae3QNvCc.
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choose to eat Apple Jacks, which in Baudrillardian fashion, don't taste like
apples.'5 1 The boys conclude, "[W]e eat what we like."' 5 2 These marketing
strategies seem to increase tensions between parents and their children. As
a marketing expert explains about Lunchables, "Parents do not fully
approve-they would rather their child ate a more traditional lunch-but this
adds to the brand's appeal among children because it reinforces their need to
feel in control.' 5 3
Advertisers use similar strategies when marketing to adults.'5 4 For
instance, when marketing to mothers "advertisers tap into the symbolic
association of food with maternal love and concern, associating giving food
with caring for a child, making a warm, emotional connection, or providing
nutritious substances.' 55 Advertising to mothers, like advertising to
children, often involves peer pressure."56 For instance, food companies
increasingly use social media to "exploit the power of peers and encourage
young people to send advertising messages to their friends."' 57 Similarly,
Proctor and Gamble has enlisted 600,000 mothers to sell their products
through a "Word-of-Mouth" program.' 58
Emotional marketing campaigns work, and routinely undermine the
ability of young people, as well as adults, to make health-based decisions
about food.'59 Numerous large-scale empirical studies demonstrate that
"food promotion has a causal and direct effect on children's food
preferences, knowledge and behavior" at both the "brand and category
level."' 60 For instance, The Institute of Medicine of The National Academies
convened a 16-member committee including experts in marketing, consumer
behavior, nutrition, and child and adolescent development.' 6' The
committee reviewed over one hundred published empirical studies of food
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Susan Linn & Courtney L. Novosat, Calories for Sale: Food Marketing to
Children in the Twenty-First Century, 615 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
133, 147 (2008).
154. Schor & Ford, supra note 25, at 17.
155. Schor & Ford, supra note 25, at 17.
156. Harris & Graff, supra note 140, at 219.
157. Id.
158. Robert Berner, I Sold It Through The Grapevine, BLOOMBERG BUsINESSWEEK
(May 28, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-05-28/i-sold-it-through-
the-grapevine.
159. Harris et al., supra note 20, at 213.
160. Id.
161. Inst. of Med., Overview of the IOM Report on Food and Marketing to Children
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marketing, and concluded that: "Food advertising to children affects their
preferences, purchase behaviors, and consumption habits for different food
and beverage categories, as well as for different product brands." '62 The
committee further concluded that the current advertising regime contradicts
"recommended healthful diets" for children and consequently, current food
and beverage marketing practices puts children's long-term health at risk. 163
Or, as representatives of the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity
explain, "[c]hild marketing makes clear that it is exciting, fun, and cool to
eat great-tasting, high-calorie food almost anytime or anywhere, and there
are no negative consequences for doing so.
Biology, psychology, and social theory strongly suggest that, contrary
to the neoliberal myth, food consumption choices are often irrational and are
highly malleable-particularly in children. As the Food Justice movement
points out, opportunities to manipulate the environment to encourage healthy
food options are often subverted by powerful industry interests. 65 Food and
food culture are then important sites of political resistance, but also of
corporate-state control.
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A JUST FOOD REGIME
A. The Use of "Triggering Devices"
The Food Justice movement is pulling apart the neoliberal myth and its
associated institutions. To continue doing so, the Food Justice movement
can use what Baumgartner and Jones call "triggering devices.' 66 Triggering
devices are "events that symbolize a situation forcing it onto the public
agenda," thereby creating a "window of opportunity" for agenda access.167
In order to overcome the American preference for stealth democracy,
discussed above, triggering devices could highlight the way government
policies serve elite interests. Triggering devices could also challenge the
"market as human nature" proposition-what Jameson calls, "the most
crucial terrain of ideological struggle.' ' 168 Recent examples of potential
triggering devices include outbreaks of food-borne illness, child obesity,




164. Harris et al., supra note 20, at 213.
165. Id.
166. Baumgartner & Jones, supra note 4, at 129.
167. Id.
168. Jameson, supra note 16, at 263.
169. See Baumgartner & Jones, supra note 4, at 129-30.
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Additionally, political constituencies are being mobilized against an
existing policy monopoly by expanding the policy image "beyond the
confines of the existing policymaking system."' 7 ° For the Food Justice
movement, defining the crises of the industrial food system "as a syndrome
implies a comprehensive approach to treatment, whereas disaggregation
implies a smaller effort."' 1  The Food Justice movement then has an
opportunity to re-lace seemingly disparate agricultural negative externalities
into a policy image of the defining failures of the neoliberal myth. And also
an opportunity to dismantle existing political institutions-like the FBI's
targeting of Food Justice activists, as well as agricultural subsidies for
corporate farms, and the criminalization of undocumented immigrants.
The Food Justice movement has found support and a broader
constituency in advocating for change. Food Justice advocates, Eric Holt
Gimenez and Annie Shattuck note that there is a growing constituency in
opposition to the existing capitalist food regime. 72 This constituency links
rural and urban areas, "farmer federations, NGOs, women's organizations,
and labor and environmental groups... acting on local and national issues
and organizing transnationally. These are all embryonic examples of the
'convergence in diversity' among opponents of the neoliberal food
regime."'
7 3
B. Political Institutions of the Just Food Regime
During periods of agenda access, created by triggering devices and
issue expansion, new food justice policies and institutions can form. These
policies should aim to remedy the inhumane commodification of food and
agriculture. As sociologist Margaret Mead observes, food has been
"[d]ivorced from its primary function of feeding people, treated simply as a
commercial commodity .... "'17 Instead, food should be "subject first to the
needs of people and only second to the needs of commercial prosperity."' 75
New Food Justice institutions could include financial support for food justice
businesses and organizations, and direct government ownership of co-
operative farms, as well as limits on corporate speech.
170. Id. at 89.
171. Id. at 127.
172. Gimenez & Shattuck, supra note 14, at 125.
173. Id. at 134.
174. Margaret Mead, The Changing Significance of Food, 2 J. OF NUTRITION EDUC.
17, 18 (Summer 1970).
175. Id. at 19.
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Some of these policies could be grown within existing political
institutions. For example, the USDA microloan program 76 could be
expanded to include aggressive lending and grants for grocery and worker
cooperatives, as well as small farms.
The direct government ownership of communal farms would also
provide a strong policy alternative to the late capitalist food regime. Michael
Pollan and Joel Salatin famously call for a return of animals to the land'7 7-
it could be argued that people should also be returned to the land-or, more
accurately, the land returned to people in a process of primitive de-
accumulation, or, to rephrase David Harvey, de-accumulation by
repossession. 17 Practically, these policies were tried successfully on a small
scale in the United States following the Southern Tenant Farmers Union
strikes.' 79 Then, the Farm Security Administration held title to cooperative
farms run by displaced agricultural workers. 80 The farms were productive
and well-received by constituents, but were dismantled and privatized under
the threat of creeping socialism.' 8' Their dismantling was a turning point in
the development of industrial agriculture, and Populist policies should be
revisited during a new agenda-setting and institution-building period.'82
Additionally, limitations on corporate speech, both campaign finance
and advertising, would check the dominance of corporate food companies in
the dialectic construction of food ideologies. Limiting corporate speech
could be as complicated as a constitutional amendment to overturn the
Citizens United decision and the commercial speech doctrines utilized by
corporations, or as simple and immediate as creating FTC regulations to curb
advertisements to children.'
83
Together, these policies aim to democratize food's cultural and
biological significance. The Food Justice movement has been leading this
change, and suggests that if we forgo the compforts of neoliberal legitimacy
we may find thicker fulfillment in the Nietzchean courage "that whatever
176. Farm Operating Loans & Microloans, FSA.USDA.GOV (Nov. 7, 2014, 2:12 PM),
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subj ect=fmlp&topic=dflop.
177. Michael Pollan, An Animals Place, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 10, 2002),
http://michaelpollan.com/articles-archive/an-animals-place/.
178. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY-OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007).
179. See JEANNIE M. WHAYNE, A NEW PLANTATION SOUTH: LAND, LABOR, AND
FEDERAL FAVOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARKANSAS 207, 214 (1996).
180. Id. at215.
181. Id. at 216.
182. Id.
183. See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 588 U.S. 310
(2010); David R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure
Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455 (2013) (discussing the commercial speech doctrine in
regard to corporations); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/cnforcement.
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social and spatial form our future misery may take, it will not be alien
because it will by definition be ours."' 84
184. Jameson, supra note 16, at 286.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2014, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") that would set
requirements for shippers, carriers and receivers of food transported in
intrastate and interstate commerce.' The NPRM marks a potentially
* Mr. Nash graduated from Harvard Law School in 2014 and currently is an Associate
Attorney at McGuireWoods where his practice focuses on healthcare law including a
range of transactional, regulatory and corporate matters.
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important step in a long history of the (non-)regulation of food
transportation.2 In Parts I and II, this paper will provide some context of the
history of food transportation, as well as the major incidents that placed the
food transportation industry on the regulatory map. In Parts III and IV, the
paper will consider the history of food transportation regulation from the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA") to the most recent NPRM.3
Finally, in Part V, the paper will consider the potential efficacy of the NPRM
from the standpoint of its ability to correct market failures.4
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FOOD TRANSPORTATION
Food transportation is nothing new. For thousands of years, merchants
have sought to satisfy consumers' desire for new foods, with demand being
fueled by consumers' willingness to pay for better nutrition and new tastes,
as well as experiencing different cultures.' Archeological evidence suggests
that fish paste was shipped between Spain and Britannia over two thousand
years ago.6 Transporting food presents a number of challenges, which may
not be as significant when shipping other goods, mainly because food has
the tendency to spoil and is frequently unstable due to its irregular shape.7
From the beginning, people have devised innovative methods to allow for
the shipment of a greater variety of foods in greater quantities over greater
distances.8 For example, around the same time that the fish paste was being
transported, Romans were importing Spanish olive oil in massive quantities.9
One estimate was that the Romans imported 1.6 billion gallons of oil during
this period.' ° The quantity and efficiency of the operation was due to a
container designed for easy carrying which also fit the contour of a ship."'
1. Sanitary Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. 7006 (proposed
Feb. 5, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
2. id.
3. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); Sanitary
Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. at 7006.
4. See Sanitary Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. at 7006.
5. See generally Lynne Olver, Food Timeline FAQs: Mesopotamia through
Shakespeare, THE FOOD TIMELINE, http://www.foodtimeline.org/foodfaq3.html#venice
(Jan. 3, 2015).
6. SARAH MURRAY, MOVEABLE FEASTS x (2007).
7. Id.
8. Id. at ix-x.
9. Id. at 6-8.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Murray, supra note 6, at 10.
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The modem revolution in food transportation was made possible by the
popularization of refrigeration.' 2 To achieve ubiquity, the icebox first fought
against a number of countervailing cultural forces.' 3 Individuals were
accustomed to purchasing food for immediate or near immediate
consumption.' 4 Further, the use of refrigeration was initially viewed with
skepticism. 5 Some believed that merchants used refrigeration to control the
food supply and artificially inflate prices.'6 However, in the United States,
the ice men had cometh by the early twentieth century.' 7 Household
refrigeration increased consumer demand for imported fresh food. 8 And as
the transportation industry developed, suppliers sought innovative ways to
satisfy this demand, such as through refrigerated steamships' 9 and faster
modes of transport.2°  However, with increased transportation came
increased concerns about food safety.2' Early efforts focused mainly on
stamping out methods used to make spoiled food appear palatable.
2
However, as our understanding of food borne illnesses developed, state and
federal governments began identifying new areas of concern, such as
microorganisms, cross-contamination 23 and bioterrorism.
2 4
12. SUSANNE FREIDBERG, FRESH A PERISHABLE HISTORY 19 (2009).
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id.
15. Id at 19.
16. Id at 29.
17. Freidberg, supra note 12, at 19.
18. Id. at 47.
19. See generally Murray, supra note 6, at 109.
20. Id.
21. See SANDRA HOFFMAN, FOOD SAFETY POLICY & ECONOMICS: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 1 (2010), available at http://www.rff.org/documentsfRFF-DP- 1 0-36.pdf.
22. Id.
23. The FDA has defined cross-contamination or "cross-contact" to be "the
unintentional incorporation of a food allergen into a food." Current Good Manufacturing
Practice and Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Preventive Controls for Human Food, 78
Fed. Reg. 3643, 3693 (proposed Jan. 16, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 117).
24. See, e.g., Gerald Wojtala, Interstate Food Transportation Assessment Project,
MICH. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & RURAL DEV. (June 16-20, 2007),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mda/truckproj_224450_7.pdf.
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III. A SERIES OF INCIDENTS PLACES THE FOOD TRANSPORTATION
INDUSTRY ON THE FEDERAL REGULATORY RADAR
Modem food regulation has been a largely reactive enterprise,25 and
public health crises move the regulatory agenda.26 In food transportation,
the trend has been no different.27 Although there is significant concern of
adulteration during transport, it has generally been difficult to isolate
incidents that occur while the food is being transported from those that
originate during production or preparation.28 Perhaps as a result, the number
of public health issues that can be directly linked to food transportation is
relatively low.29 Further, nearly all the documented incidents involve cross-
contamination.3 ° This is not surprising. In such cases, the adulteration can
generally be traced to a specific substance that either left residue in a vehicle
that was later used to transport food or that accompanied the food on its
journey.3'
One of the first incidents that placed food transportation on the national
radar involved pet food.32 In 1974, approximately 800 dogs died after eating
Dad's Dog Food.33 The FDA conducted an investigation and was able to
determine that one of the ingredients used in the food, corn gluten, was
transported in a railcar that previously housed lead monoxide.34 As a result,
the manufacturer issued a Class I recall and the FDA prosecuted the company
responsible. 35 In a memo approving the prosecution, the FDA concluded
that the company, Corn Products International ("CPC"), did not even employ
"minimal controls" to prevent contamination.36 Specifically, CPC only did
a "cursory" inspection of the rail hopper at night using a flashlight.37 Further,
25. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.





30. See Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22714 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1)
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Memorandum from the FDA Bureau of Veterinary Medicine to General Counsel
(June 9, 1975) (on file with author).
34. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg. at
22714.
35. Id.
36. Memorandum from the FDA Bureau of Veterinary Medicine, supra note 33.
37. Id.
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the FDA pointed out that the firm failed to follow its own inspection
procedures as provided to the FDA at the Notice of Hearing.
38
In 1989, a somewhat similar situation arose when animal feed was
contaminated by a hull previously used to transport barium carbonate, a
highly toxic chemical used in rat poison.39 The incident led to the death of a
number of dairy cows.4" And the FDA found the manufacturer, Purina Mills,
had failed to property inspect the railcar prior to mixing the feed.41 The FDA
worked with the manufacturer to voluntarily recall the adulterated feed.42
Perhaps because neither incident sparked significant public outcry, the FDA
did not immediately pursue a regulatory response. However, at the close of
its memo detailing the cow feed incident, the FDA stated that "[w]ith the
current interest in the suitability of the transportation vehicles for food
transport, this case merits further review."
'4 3
Not long after the feed incident, the food transportation industry faced
its first crisis of confidence.4 4 The popular press ran a number of reports that
food trucks were being used to haul garbage on return trips.45 The practice
allegedly developed because New York was a net importer of food from the
Midwest and a net exporter of garbage.4 6 In a practice known as
"backhauling," the press detailed incidents where transporters used food
trucks to transport garbage from New York.4 7 Although no specific public
health incident was tied to the apparent practice of backhauling, the press
reports hit Americans in their stomachs.48 The Government Accounting
Office ("GAO") was commissioned to conduct an investigation of the
38. Id
39. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22714 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
40. Id
41. Memorandum from the Dep't. of Health & Human Servs. Case Guidance Branch
to Tura L. King, Supervising Consumer Safety Officer of the New Orleans District Office
(Nov. 5, 1989) (on file with author).
42. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg. at
22714.
43. Memorandum from the Dep't. of Health & Human Servs. Case Guidance Branch,
supra note 41.
44. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22714 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
45. Matthew Purdy, Trash in Food Trucks Appalls Lawmakers, INQUIRER




48. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-90-161, TRUCK TRANSPORT:
LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT HAULING GARBAGE & FOOD IN THE SAME VEHICLES, 2 (1990).
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practice, but only found "anecdotal" evidence.49 The GAO was unable to
reach firm conclusions, in part because of a lack of recordkeeping
requirements in food transportation. 50 But it highlighted a number of gaps
in both knowledge and the regulatory regime;5' one finding was that little
research had been done about the public health risks associated with food
transportation. 52 Additionally, the GAO pointed out that the FDA did not
have regulations requiring specific truck cleaning procedures.53 Finally, the
report provided that the FDA was not conducting inspections on trucks
because of the lack of health incidents tied to food transportation as well as
the costs associated with setting up an inspection regime. 54 Although the
GAO's conclusions were far from clear, sufficient public concern was
engendered to spur Congress to pass the Sanitary Food Transportation Act
of 1990 ("1990 SFTA").
55
As much as food trucks transporting garbage made good headlines, the
watershed moment in food transportation regulation occurred in 1994.56 The
Minnesota Department of Health traced an increase in salmonella enteritidis
infections to Schwan's ice cream.57 After investigating the plant and tanker
trailers, it was determined that ice cream premix was contaminated by
residue left in three tanker trailers from non-pasteurized liquid eggs.58 The
premix was then used to produce a significant amount of ice cream. 59 The
Minnesota Department of Health linked the consumption of the
contaminated ice cream to 150 cases of salmonella in Minnesota. 60 An
investigation published in the New England Journal of Medicine,
extrapolated from the confirmed cases to estimate that 29,100 Minnesotans
and 224,000 people nationwide contracted salmonella from the contaminated
ice cream. 61 The outbreak led the FDA and the Food Safety and Inspections
Service ("FSIS") to issue a joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking
("ANPRM") in 1996 requesting comments on approaches to transportation
49. Id.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 48, at 3.
54. Id.
55. See id; Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-500, § 1, 104
Stat. 1213 (1990).
56. Thomas W. Hennessy et al., A National Outbreak of Salmonella Enteritidis
Infections From Ice Cream, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1281 (1996).
57. Id. at 1283-84.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1282.
61. Hennessy et al., supra note 56, at 1283.
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and storage of "potentially hazardous foods. 62 The ANPRM highlighted a
number of regulations issued by the FDA, FSIS and the Department of
Transportation ("DOT") both before and after the GAO report.6 3 However,
the ANPRM indicated that the agencies had not devoted significant
resources to the problem and empirical data was still lacking.64 Although the
FDA collected industry data and responses, no specific action was taken on
the ANPRM.
65
In rulemaking actions taken after 1994, the FDA cites the salmonella
outbreak as an example of the potential public health impact of procedural
failures in food transportation.6 6 Arguably labelled as having committed the
original sin, the dairy industry has reacted defensively to subsequent FDA
actions. 67 For example, the dairy industry submitted comments in response
to the FDA's 2010 ANPRM, over fifteen years after the outbreak.68 In its
comments, the International Dairy Foods Association ("IDFA") sought to
"clarify" FDA's characterization of the outbreak.69 The IDFA said another
outbreak was "highly unlikely" given that the industry had worked with the
FDA to implement procedures to pasteurize its products at the plant of final
packaging and to eliminate possible sources of cross-contamination.
70
However, the 1994 incident remains the paradigmatic example of improper
food transportation.
7'
Given that the most significant food transportation incidents involved
cross-contamination, FDA actions have continued to emphasize the
importance of industry inspection and cleaning procedures. 72 For example,
in a 2010 warning letter, the FDA investigated contaminants in shipments of
cottonseed, which is used in animal feed.73 The investigator found shredded
tire intermingled with the cottonseed.74 The transport company was using
62. Transportation and Storage Requirements for Potentially Hazardous Foods, 61
Fed. Reg. 59372 (proposed Nov. 22, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 110).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 59376.
65. See id
66. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22715 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
67. Letter from Clay Detlefsen, representing the International Dairy Foods




71. Hennessy et al., supra note 56, at 1283-84.
72. Letter from John R. Gridley, Dist. Dir., Dep't of Health & Human Serv., to C.
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the same trailer to ship both seed and tire remains.75 Although the company
claimed that the driver was responsible for ensuring the trailer was cleaned
between shipments, the FDA found no procedures in place for ensuring this
was done.
7 6
Since 1994, there have been instances where food transportation was
implicated, but was not tied to a specific outbreak.77 For example, in July
1999, approximately 300 people in the United States and Canada were
confirmed to have contracted salmonella muenchen from contaminated
orange juice.78 The outbreak was not linked to a specific issue in
transportation.7 9  However, the FDA expressed concern that containers
housing the affected juice could contaminate future shipments.8" Similarly,
in 2009, the FDA reiterated this concern after an outbreak of salmonella
typhimurium was caused by contaminated peanuts.81 The FDA's stance after
these incidents made it clear that the agency believes the regulation of food
transportation is important not only to prevent outbreaks, but also to limit its
scope. 2
Additionally, the FDA was alerted to potential issues as a result of
incidents outside of food transportation.83 In 2010, Johnson & Johnson
("J&J") issued a large recall of Tylenol after reports of consumers feeling
sick from "odd odor."84 J&J blamed chemically-treated wood pallets for the
incident.85 Concerns were also raised about the potential contamination of
food from wood pallets. 6 Small scale local tests of wood pallets revealed
that ten percent were contaminated with E. Coli and three percent with
Listeria.87 In its 2010 ANPRM, the FDA noted a study finding that pallet
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Muenchen Infections Associated with




80. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22715 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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quality was a food safety concern.88 In its comment to the 2010 ANPRM,
the National Wooden Pallet and Container Association largely placed blame
on improper handling.89 Nonetheless, because of its ubiquity and tendency
to degrade, the FDA tagged wood pallets as a potential area of food
transportation regulation.
90
Finally, the FDA also looked to state enforcement to evaluate the
potential scope of food transportation contamination. 9' Based on anecdotal
evidence and available state inspection data, it is not uncommon for the state
policc to pull over trucks and discover violations. For example, an Indiana
police officer recently pulled over a truck leaking "brown liquid" to discover
raw chicken stacked on open containers of vegetables.92 In 2006, the
Michigan Department of Agriculture & Rural Development ("MDARD")
made a concerted effort to "determine the current state of food safety and
defense of in-transit food in interstate commerce."93 The study included data
from 615 inspections of food trucks traveling between Michigan, Ohio,
Illinois and Indiana.94 The study found 22 violations resulting from improper
or no refrigeration, cross-contamination and insanitary conditions in trucks.95
Further, the study cited low levels of food safety awareness among drivers.
96
The MDARD concluded that nearly all violations were small box trucks and
ethnic food trucks.97 Recommendations included encouraging better law
enforcement surveillance and coordination, as well as educating food truck
drivers on food safety issues. 98 The MDARD's approach was, therefore, to
increase industry compliance through some combination of industry best
practice and state enforcement efforts.
99
88. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22720 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
89. Bruce N. Scholnick, Industry Wake Up Call, NATIONAL WOODEN PALLET AND
CONTAINER ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2010), available at www.palletcentral.com.
90. See id.
91. 200 Pounds of contaminated food headed to central Indiana restaurants in semi









98. Wojtala, supra note 24.
99. Id.
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The FDA has cited the MDARD study, as evidence of the extent of
food transportation violations. ° However, it is difficult to draw firm
conclusions from a study limited to 615 inspections conducted in a single
year in four states. 1 ' Although the study called for greater interagency and
interstate coordination,'0 2 there is no indication that either state or federal
agencies have taken up the call for a more systematic effort to document
violations. Perhaps this is at least partially explained by its results; the
majority of the offending shipments contained food bound for a handful of
restaurants. 0 3 Presumably, such shipments are less likely to cross state lines.
The FDA may have determined that rather than devoting significant federal
resources, local authorities should be left to deal with what appears to be
largely a local issue.
IV. THE HISTORY OF FDA FOOD TRANSPORTATION REGULATION
As previously alluded to, the FDA shares responsibility for the
regulation of food transportation with the United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA"), the DOT and state and local authorities.'
0 4
Congressional actions have generally provided for some coordination
between relevant agencies. 05 This paper will focus on the role of the FDA
and its regulations promulgated under the relevant statutes. Particular
attention will be devoted toward assessing the FDA's most recent notice of
proposed rulemaking ("NPRM"), which was published in the Federal
Register on February 5, 2014, as required under the FDA Food Safety
Modernization Act ("FSMA").1
0 6
A. Pre-1990 Food Transportation Regulation
Prior to 1990, the FDA's sole authority for the regulation of food
transportation was the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (the "Act" or
"FDCA").' °7 The FDA first promulgated food transportation regulations
100. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22715 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
101. Wojtala, supra note 24.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22715 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
105. See id
106. Sanitary Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. 7006 (proposed
Feb. 5, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1); Food Safety & Modernization Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-353, § 418, 124 Stat. 3885, 3894 (2011).
107. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
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under the Act's provision on adulterated drugs and devices."0 8 Specifically,
the FDA sought to regulate the contamination of animal feed under the Act's
section on adequate controls on manufacture, which provides that drugs must
conform to "current good manufacturing practice" ("CGMP"). °9 In 1976,
the FDA promulgated a series of CGMPs, which included a section on
medicated animal feeds."' 0 The specific section may have been partially
motivated by the pet food contamination incident two years prior."' A
relatively short section of the regulation was specific to feed
transportation, 12 and it regulated equipment cleanout procedures and
provided that any equipment housing medicated feed shall be cleaned using
physical means (such as washing), flushing or "equally effective
measures." 13  The section's stated purpose was to "avoid unsafe
contamination of feeds with drugs.""' 4 Other than this relatively narrow
provision, the FDA did not have regulations specific to food transportation
and, therefore, had to rely on the Act's sections covering adulterated food."5
B. The 1990 Sanitary Food Transportation Act
Although the GAO report on food trucks hauling garbage was largely
devoid of empirical evidence, it did highlight potential regulatory gaps." 6
Specifically, the GAO pointed out that the FDA did not have standard
procedures to regulate the separation of food from potential contaminants or
specific recordkeeping requirements for vehicles hauling food." 7  Not
surprisingly, the 1990 SFTA attempted to remedy these perceived
deficiencies." 
8
The 1990 SFTA provided responsibility to the DOT to issue regulations
covering motor and rail vehicles which transport food and "nonfood
products" (including refuse) that might render the food unsafe to humans or
108. 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2012).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2012).
110. 21 C.F.R. § 225.1 (2014).
111. Memorandum from the FDA Bureau of Veterinary Medicine to General Counsel,
supra note 33.
112. 21 C.F.R. § 225.65 (2014).
113. Id.
114. id.
115. See 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2012).
116. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-90-161, TRUCK TRANSPORT: LITTLE
Is KNOWN ABOUT HAULING GARBAGE & FOOD IN THE SAME VEHICLE 1, 3 (June 1990).
117. Id.
118. Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-500, § 2, 104 Stat.
1213 (1990).
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animals." 9 Under the 1990 SFTA, the DOT was required to consult with the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS", the FDA's parent
agency) and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 2 ' The 1990
SFTA mandated that the DOT provide a two-track system of regulatory
prohibitions governing the transportation of "nonfood" products with
foods.' 2 ' For tank vehicles, which includes "tank truck(s), rail tank car(s) or
cargo tank(s)," the FDA was required to publish and maintain a list of
"acceptable nonfood products" that would not be subject to the
prohibition.'2 2 For motor and rail vehicles, the DOT was required to publish
a list of unacceptable nonfood products. 123 The statute also provided that
trucks hauling "extremely dangerous products," such as asbestos and refuse,
could never be used to transport food "despite any decontamination.' ' 24 The
DOT was also expected to promulgate a list of products meriting the
"extremely dangerous" designation. 25 Inspection authority was also vested
in the DOT, which included assisting states in carrying out compatible
laws. 126 The DOT had the authority to seek assistance from other agencies
and the states in carrying out inspections as well as training inspectors.
27
Further, the 1990 SFTA attempted to address the paucity of available
information by requiring the DOT to promulgate recordkeeping
provisions. 1
28
What followed after the 1990 SFTA cannot be described as model for
administrative efficiency. The delays and ultimate lack of action can be
described as characteristics of food transportation regulation as a whole. The
1990 SFTA required the DOT to promulgate the relevant regulations by July
31, 1991.129 The DOT issued an ANPRM on February 20, 1991.130
119. Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 4, 104 Stat. at 1214.
120. Id.
121. Sanitary Food Transportation Act §§ 5-6, 104 Stat. at 1215-16.
122. Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 5, 104 Stat. at 1215.
123. Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-500, § 6, 104 Stat.
1213, 1216 (1990).
124. Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 7, 104 Stat. at 1216.
125. Id.
126. Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 9, 104 Stat. at 1217.
127. Id.
128. Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 4, 104 Stat. at 1214.
129. Safeguarding Food From Contamination During Transportation, 69 Fed. Reg.
76423-24 (proposed Dec. 21, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 121); DEPT. OF
TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT, REVIEW OF
DEPARTMENTAL ACTIONS CONCERNING THE SANITARY FOOD TRANSPORTATION ACT OF
1990, TR-1998-100 (Mar. 27, 2008).
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Approximately a month later, the agency extended the comment period until
April 29, 1991.31 The 1990 SFTA deadline passed and nearly two years of
radio silence followed. 13 2 Finally, on May 21, 1993, the DOT issued an
NPRM. 13 3 In the NPRM, the DOT refused to provide a list of acceptable
nonfood products to be transported with food in tank vehicles because they
found that there were no qualifying products.'34 The DOT did provide a list
of nonfoods deemed unacceptable for transportation with food products in
motor or rail vehicles.'35 Unacceptable substances included those meeting
the DOT's definitions of poisonous materials, infectious substances,
hazardous waste or solid waste.' 36 The DOT did not define any additional
"extremely dangerous" products requiring dedicated trucks.'37 Finally, the
DOT found that elaborate recordkeeping procedures were not justified and
proposed to limit shipping disclosures to cargo tanks. 1
38
After accepting comments, the DOT again went into regulatory
silence. 139 In 1998, the Office of Inspector General wrote an audit report
assessing whether the DOT was fulfilling its requirements under the 1990
SFTA. 4 ° The report found that the DOT did not fulfill its deadlines, failed
to develop the required lists of acceptable and unacceptable nonfood
products, and had not consulted with the other agencies on how to implement
the act.' 4 ' The Inspector General concluded the DOT lacked the expertise
required to implement the 1990 SFTA and that inspections required under
the act may have been incompatible with the DOT's existing safety
inspections.'42 Specifically, the report found that the DOT: i) frequently
inspected vehicles prior to the attachment of any food containers or tanks; ii)
did not conduct inspections at "critical control points" as would be required
to catch contaminants during final shipment to the distributor; and iii) lacked
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Safeguarding Food from Contamination During Transportation, 58 Fed. Reg.
29698 (proposed May 21, 1993) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 106, 107, 108, 110, 212,





138. Safeguarding Food From Contamination During Transportation, 58 Fed. Reg.
29698, 29702 (proposed May 21, 1993) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 106, 107, 108,
110,212, 171, 178 and 180).
139. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT,
REVIEW OF DEPARTMENTAL ACTIONS CONCERNING THE SANITARY FOOD
TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1990, TR- 1998-100 (Mar. 27, 2008).
140. Id. at 1.
141. Id. at 1-2.
142. ld. at 6.
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the training and equipment to conduct inspections.143 The report concluded
that the regulatory authority should be moved to the FDA and the USDA
given the agencies' expertise and tradition of food safety oversight.144 Six
more years of regulatory silence followed. 45 On December 21, 2004, the
DOT issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking ("SNPRM").
146
In the SNPRM, the DOT reiterated the stance of the Inspector General,
saying that regulatory authority should be vested in the FDA and USDA. 1
47
Further, the DOT concluded that FDA and USDA regulations and guidelines
issued after the 1990 SFTA "adequately address the overarching SFTA goal
of protecting food and food products from contamination during
transportation."'' 48 The DOT, therefore, requested comment on incorporating
USDA and FDA regulations and developing procedures to ensure
coordination between the agencies. 14 Again, no final rule was published.'50
Finally, and perhaps mercifully, a year later the DOT withdrew its 1993
NPRM and SNPRM citing the Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005,
which transferred authority from the DOT to the HHS.1
51
C. FDA Actions Between 1990 and 2005
Although the 1990 SFTA vested primary regulatory authority with the
DOT, the FDA continued to promulgate regulations and put out guidance
impacting food transportation.152 After the 1994 salmonella outbreak, the
FDA and FSIS issued a 1996 ANPRM that sought comment on across the
board regulation of "potentially hazardous foods.' ' 53 However, ultimately
the FDA did not take action on the 1996 ANPRM and opted for a more
industry-specific approach involving binding regulations and nonbinding
143. Id. at 6-7.
144. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT,
supra note 129, at 6-7.
145. The previously discussed audit report was issued in 1998; no known action was
taken again until 2004 with the DOT's issuance of a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking. Safeguarding Food from Contamination During Transportation, 69 Fed.
Reg. 76423 (proposed Dec. 21, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 121).
146. Safeguarding Food from Contamination During Transportation, 69 Fed. Reg.
76423, 76424 (proposed Dec. 21, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 121).
147. Id. at 76425.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 76424.
150. To date, there is no record of such a rule being published.
151. Safeguarding Food from Contamination During Transportation, 70 Fed. Reg.
76228 (proposed Dec. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Subch. B).
152. Transportation & Storage Requirements for Potentially Hazardous Foods, 61 Fed.
Reg. 59372, 59374 (proposed Nov. 22, 1996).
153. Id. at 59372.
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guidance. 154 An exhaustive examination of these regulations and guidance
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the trend during this period was
for the FDA to identify particular risk industries and prescribe or recommend
various procedures to minimize risk.' For example, the 2001 Hazard
Analysis & Critical Control Points ("HACCP") regulation focused on juice
as a carrier of various bacteria-related infections.' 56 The regulation
prescribed a 5-log reduction process, which is a set of performance standard
requirements.'57 The 5-log process must achieve a 100,000 fold decrease in
"pertinent pathogens."' 158  The process must be applied after any
transportation of juice or juice products to the plant of final packaging.
159
The FDA stated that the regulation was designed to allow processors
flexibility to determine how to meet these requirements. 60
Outside of such targeted regulation and guidance, it seems that food
transportation practice developed with little or no regulatory oversight and
food industries began putting out their own best practice guides.'
61
Industries were likely motivated by a desire for standardization as well as to
stay off the FDA's regulatory agenda. For example, the North American
Produce Transportation Working Group released a best practice guide which
included recommended produce storage temperatures and a series of
checklists for use between the shipper, transportation provider and
receiver.'62 It is worth considering the impact of long regulatory lulls and
the FDA's targeted, flexible regulation on the food transportation industry as
a whole. It should not be a surprise that the industry now largely relies on
procedures that it has developed. 163 Erik Lieberman, of the Regulatory
154. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22716 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
155. See generally Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Point; Procedures for the Safe
& Sanitary Processing & Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6138 (Jan. 19. 2001) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 120) (providing an example of such measures taken by the
FDA).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6139.
158. Id. at 6169, 6174.
159. Id. at 6139-40.
160. Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Point; Procedures for the Safe & Sanitary
Processing & Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. at 6140.
161. Produce Transportation Best Practices, NORTH AMERICAN PRODUCE
TRANSPORTATION WORKING GROUP (2012),
http://www.hortcouncil.ca/uploads/file/naptwgproduce trans best-practices.pdf
162. Id.
163. Erik R. Lieberman, Sanitary Food Transportation: What's in Store for the Food
Industry?, FOOD SAFETY SUMMIT ExPO & CONFERENCE (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.fmi.org/docs/regulatory-
documents/sanitaryfoodtransportation041912.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
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Counsel for the Food Marketing Institute ("FMI"), made a case for retaining
the current regulatory regime at the 2012 Food Safety Summit."6
Anticipating FDA rulemaking, Lieberman cited the industry's long history
of self-regulation without significant incidents.165 Rather than a new
regulatory regime, Lieberman preferred a flexible, guidance-based
approach. 66 Lieberman cited a number of industry best practices and quality
control processes that, in his view, rendered further regulation
unnecessary. 
167
D. 2005 Sanitary Food Transportation Act Amendments
The 1998 DOT Inspector General report made it clear the DOT was not
meeting its obligations under the 1990 SFTA and recommended a
reallocation of agency authority.168 However, likely because of a lack of
serious public health incidents that could be traced to food transportation,
congressional action was not forthcoming. 169  Although reform was
deprioritized, the issue occasionally resurfaced when the FDA and public
health organizations pointed to the potential role of food transportation in
exacerbating outbreaks.17° When Congress passed the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
("SAFETEA-LU"), they took the opportunity to revise the 1990 SFTA.17" '
SAFETEA-LU was passed in 2005 to "shape[] the highway program to meet
the Nation's changing transportation needs."'72 The bill authorized funding
for a number of highway infrastructure initiatives. 173 Of its 836 pages,
approximately three were devoted to food transportation. 174 The subtitle of
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171. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, SAFETEA-LU, A SUMMARY OF HIGHWAY




174. Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 7201-04, 119
Stat.1144, 1911 (Aug. 10, 2005).
175. Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 7201, 119 Stat. at 1911.
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Much of the substance of the 1990 SFTA was retained in the 2005
version.176 The purpose, as provided in the Conference Report of the
Committee of Conference of H.R. 3, was to "reallocate responsibilities for
food transportation" among the relevant agencies.177 As recommended in
the 1998 DOT Inspector General report, the 2005 SFTA shifted much of the
regulatory authority from the DOT to the FDA. 178 Specifically, the 2005
SFTA amended Section 342 of the FDCA by deeming food adulterated if it
is not in compliance with the new Section 416.179 The 2005 SFTA then
delegated authority under Section 416(b) to the HHS Secretary to establish
"sanitary transportation practices." 8 ' The Secretary was required to regulate
food sanitation, packaging, vehicle limitations, disclosure and
recordkeeping."8 ' Like the 1990 SFTA, the 2005 SFTA also distinguished
between bulk and motor or rail vehicles.' 82 However, the 2005 SFTA
discarded the 1990 SFTA requirement to list "acceptable" nonfoods for bulk
vehicles and "unacceptable" nonfoods for motor or rail vehicles.1 83 Instead,
the 2005 SFTA made the lists consistent by requiring that the FDA maintain
lists of unacceptable foods for each vehicle type.' 84 This may have been a
reaction to the DOT's refusal to list any acceptable nonfoods for
transportation with foods in bulk vehicles.
The 2005 SFTA also provided for specific recordkeeping requirements,
which may have been Congress's way of responding to the DOT's 1993
NPRM, which largely found recordkeeping requirements unjustified by their
costs.' 85 Compared to the 1990 SFTA, the 2005 SFTA provided the HHS
Secretary with more robust enforcement mechanisms, for instance the 2005
SFTA required that shippers and carriers produce records at the Secretary's
request.186 Failure to do was a "prohibited act" under Section 331 of the
Act, 8 7 which carried the potential imposition of fines and criminal
penalties.'88 Despite the DOT Inspector General's statement that food safety
inspections may be incompatible with its existing safety inspections,
176. Id.
177. H.R. REP. No. 109-201, at 1088 (2005).
178. Lieberman, supra note 163.
179. Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 7202-04, 119
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Congress largely left inspection authority with the DOT. 8 9 However,
perhaps recognizing that prior agency coordination had been nonexistent,
Congress required that the DOT notify the HHS of "any instances of
potential food contamination or adulteration" identified during safety
inspections. 90 Given the lengthy periods of regulatory neglect, one might
have expected that Congress would have imposed strict deadlines to
promulgate regulations. However, the 2005 SFTA contained no specific
timeframes.19' Perhaps because over a decade had passed since the last
significant public health food transportation incident, Congress chose to
proceed with caution. As a result, the stage was set for another period of
food transportation regulation remission.
E. 2005-2010: The FDA Continues the DOT's
Prior Tradition of Regulatory Inaction
Despite being granted broad regulatory authority, the FDA initially
seemed content to continue to regulate specific industries using both
guidance and regulations.192 For example, in 2007, the FDA provided a
model standard for training and evaluation criteria to be met by transporters
of milk; in 2008, the FDA provided guidance for transporting fresh-cut
vegetables to prevent physical, chemical and microbiological contamination;
and, also in 2008, the FDA, responding to concerns about mad cow disease,
promulgated regulations requiring dedicated equipment in transporting
"cattle materials" prohibited for use in animal feed.193 The agency did not
pursue any specific action under the 2005 SFTA until 2010. "'
During this period the FDA did, however, take steps to attempt to
remedy the dearth of information about the scope of the potential problem.'
1 95
Prior regulatory efforts had demonstrated the difficulty in estimating the
189. Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 7203, 119 Stat.
1144, 1914 (2005).
190. Id.
191. See generally Sanitary Food Transportation Act § 7202, 119 Stat. at 1911.
192. See Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
193. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation, 75 Fed. Reg. at 22719.
194. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation, 75 Fed. Reg. at 22713.
195. Sanitation & Transportation Guidance Documents & Regulatory Information,
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potential benefits of regulation.'96 For example, the DOT, in its 1993
NPRM, estimated that the benefits of the regulation would outweigh its
costs.' 97 It may be argued that much of this conclusion rested on the
estimated benefits from reducing consumption of contaminated food.
However, based on the analysis thus far, it seems that the DOT's difficulty
was putting a number on benefits without specific data on the number of
illnesses caused by food contaminated during transportation. Food safety
incidents may not be reported. Further, it may be impossible to know
whether contamination occurred during transportation or elsewhere in the
distribution chain. The 1993 NPRM would have required incident reporting
to "evaluate the extent of the problem, the effectiveness of the regulatory
program, and the need for any legislative or regulatory changes."'
98
However, there is no record of the DOT issuing a final rule based on the
1993 NPRM. The FDA had some industry data in response to its 1996
ANPRM, but by the time of the 2005 SFTA, the FDA considered this
information "dated."' 99 Therefore, in 2009, the FDA contracted the Eastern
Research Group, Inc. ("ERG"), to provide a study of the current methods
employed in food transportation and to identify particular risks.2°°
The ERG report begins by stating that "[t]here is currently very little
information on the state of food transportation... in the United States."
20'
Given that specific industry data was lacking, the ERG's findings were
largely based on scientific literature and a survey of industry experts.20 2 An
industry survey found the biggest concern among companies and carriers
was insufficient capacity and driver shortages. 203 Food safety, on the other
hand, was sixth on the list.204 However, the ERG cautioned that issues with
capacity could lead to more dangerous practices, such as the type of
backhauling discussed in Section II, of this article. 2 5 Additionally, driver
196. See generally Safeguarding Food from Contamination during Transportation, 58
Fed. Reg. 29698 (proposed May 21, 1993) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 106, 107,
108, 110, 212, 171,178, and 180).
197. Id.
198. Safeguarding Food from Contamination during Transportation, 58 Fed. Reg. at
29703.
199. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22719 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
200. Nyssa Ackerley & Aylin Sertkaya, Eastem Research Group, Characteristics of
Current Food Transportation & Holding Practices for Food Commodities i (ERG Task
No. 0193.16.001.001, March 6, 2009).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2-1.
204. Id.
205. Ackerley et al., supra note 200, at 2-2.
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shortages could place pressure on companies to employ individuals with less
knowledge of food safety or to invest less money in training.20 6 ERG was
unable to provide data on the specific costs associated with contamination.
20 7
The report cited to a 2003 article which speculated that the food
transportation "failures" may account for costs of two billion dollars
annually. 2 8 However, the article does not provide the methodology used to
derive this figure. 209 The ERG report concluded that the size of the problem
is likely significant given the amount of food shipped, 200 billion metric tons
per year globally, as well as the variety of foods and techniques employed to
transport it.
2 10
Based on the available scientific literature and expert opinions, the
ERG identified fifteen problem areas where contamination may occur.
211
The list largely tracked the problems identified in food transportation
incidents that have occurred over the last forty years: improper packing
including cross-contamination, refrigeration, handling, materials including
pallets, sanitation of vehicles and containers, pests and insufficient driver
knowledge. 212 The report then considered how industry and HACCP best
practices address potential risks.2 3 However, the ERG did not engage in a
granular approach to identify potential gaps between the problems identified
by scientific literature and those addressed by best practices.214 One way to
do this would be to determine whether problems are prioritized differently
by the literature and best practices. Given the lack of empirical data, such a
comparison would be difficult. However, it might be possible to identify
some areas in which best practices have not developed in response to
emerging risks. For example, post-9/1 1 literature discussed the food supply
as a potential target for bioterrorism. 2 5 Although regulations were passed to
address potential vulnerabilities, there is evidence that less than half of all
food transportation trucks are properly locked.216 A comparative approach
206. Id. at 3-4.
207. Id. at A-45.
208. Larry Keener, Transportation: the Squeaky Wheel of the Food Safety System,




210. Ackerley et al., supra note 200, at 2-1.
211. Id. at i-ii.
212. Id.
213.. Id. 2-14:2-21.
214. See generally id.
215. Dina Solodoukhina, Food Safety and Bioterrorism from Public Health
Perspective, in ADVANCES IN FOOD PROTECTION 17, 19 (Magdy Hefnawy ed., 2011).
216. Wojtala, supra note 24.
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of the literature and empirical data could guide the FDA's allocation of
resources by assessing whether resources are being allocated according to
current food safety concerns.
Although the ERG report contained data from nearly 50 studies, it only
provided general information about the degree and nature of food
transportation risks.2 17 In order to better understand the problem and
exigency of devising particular regulatory solutions to supplement or replace
existing methods, the FDA attempted to obtain more information through a
2010 ANPRM.2" 8 The FDA requested data on current industry practice as
well as on specific incidents of contamination and "associated outbreaks."219
The agency's stated purpose was to "obtain data and information that would
be more current and of greater relevance than the data and information [the
agency] received in response to the 1996 joint ANPRM and to augment the
more current information in the ERG report.
220
The specific questions posed to industry can be classified under the
headings of i) quantitative shipping data; ii) public health incident data; iii)
current industry best practices; iv) current recordkeeping practices; v) data
on the shipping of nonfoods with foods; vi) grounds for waiver of potential-
regulatory requirements; vii) information on relevant state and local food
transportation regulations; and viii) general information on the potential
benefits and costs of regulation.22' In response, the FDA received 52
comments, the majority of which were submitted by various industry
associations, institutes and councils. 222 Industry responses generally pointed
out the benefits of retaining current best practices. 223 For example, the
National Grain and Feed Association wanted the flexibility to use existing
cleanout procedures given the expected increases in demand for its
products. 224 The Independent Bakers Association took the tack of pointing
out the sufficiency of its procedures given the relatively low risk nature of
217. Ackerley etal., supra note 200, at A-I:A-61.
218. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22720 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
219. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg. at
22713-14.
220. Id. at 22720.
221. Id. at 22720-22.
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its products.225 It was argued the FDA did not receive meaningful data on
the potential scale of the problem,226 and most comments either did not
address this question or said data was unavailable. 227 When addressed, the
American Meat Institute's response is characteristic of the industry's tone:
"[T]he number of instances which transportation of food has been implicated
as the cause for contamination is negligible. 228
On the same day that the ANPRM was published, April 20, 2010, the
FDA released guidance on the sanitary transportation of food.229  The
guidance was more significant as an indication of FDA's willingness to
promulgate regulations applying across industries than for its specific
content. The FDA provided that the guidance "differs from prior regulations
and guidance in that it provides all sectors of the food industry with broadly
applicable recommendations.""23 The document highlighted a number of
ERG's findings, including problem areas that posed the greatest risk to food
safety.23 ' Based on this evidence, the FDA recommended that the food
transportation industry focus on: i) appropriate temperature control; ii)
sanitation which includes vehicle conditions, pests and loading/unloading
conditions; iii) packing materials; iv) communication between the shipper,
transporter and receiver; and v) employee awareness and training.232 The
FDA stated it would revisit the need for guidance once final regulations were
issued. 33 Because the guidance is nonbinding and extremely general, it is
unclear what effect it has had, if any, on the food transportation industry.
In response to the 2010 ANPRM and guidance, some food
transportation consultants and experts questioned whether the FDA's
findings justified a change in its current approach to issuing industry and
process-specific guidance and regulations.234 Terry Levee, Food Safety
Manager for Deloitte & Touche LLP, took issue with the paucity of the
225. Nicholas A. Pyle, Independent Bakers Association, Docket No. FDA-2010-N-
0013, 2 (Aug. 30, 2010).
226. Id.
227. Implementation of Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 2005, 75 Fed. Reg.
22713, 22720-22 (proposed Apr. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
228. Ashley B. Peterson, American Meat Institute, Docket No. FDA-2010-N-0013, 8
(Aug. 30, 2010).
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FDA's evidence, saying the agency had cited a only a "handful" of events
over the last 35 years. 235 Levee questioned whether regulation was needed
in light of the DOT's conclusion just six years earlier that FDA regulations
and guidance sufficiently protected the food supply during transportation.236
Similarly, FMI's Lieberman responded to the 2010 ANPRM by stressing the
food transportation industry's relatively unblemished incident record.
237
Further, he pointed out that all of the incidents FDA cited are now violations
of current law and regulations.238 His proposed solution was for the FDA to
develop guidance to ensure food transporters understood their current
obligations under the Act. 239 All signs pointed to another regulatory lull: the
FDA lacked data, no significant incidents had occurred, Congress had not
imposed deadlines and the industry was resistant to change.
However, rather than waiting to see whether the FDA would act,
Congress forced the agency's hand and on January 4, 2011 passed the Food
Safety Modernization Act ("FSMA"), which the FDA describes as "the most
sweeping reform of our food safety laws in more than 70 years. 240 The
FSMA focuses on improving food safety and security through provisions: i)
requiring industry to institute greater procedural controls such as hazard
analysis, recordkeeping and tracing systems; ii) providing the FDA with
greater inspection and enforcement authority; and iii) instituting new
requirements for imported foods.24' The original version of the FSMA
introduced in 2009 did not have a particular provision specific to food
transportation.242 The final version, however, contained Section 111,
"Sanitary Transportation of Food., 243 Of the bill's 89 pages, this section
occupies less than half a page.244 In substance, Section 1 11 requires the FDA
to promulgate regulations under the 2005 SFTA within eighteen months of
the enactment of the FSMA.2 45 Recognizing the persistent shortage of data,
the Section also required the HHS Secretary to conduct a food transportation
study which includes data about food safety in "rural and frontier areas."246
235. Id.
236. Id.
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The legislative history does not provide any specific discussion of why
Section 111 was added to the bill; however, speaking on behalf of the bill,
Texas Representative Sheila Jackson Lee recounted how a "single tainted
pepper" had spread salmonella to 1,25 1.247 Although the outbreak was not
tied to improper food transportation, it is reasonable to think that such
incidents made Congress more aware of the potential for food transportation
to exacerbate public health crises. Regardless, the FDA was required to
promulgate regulations under the 2005 SFTA within eighteen months of its
enactment.248
V. THE 2014 NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
The FDA met the FSMA deadline by issuing a NPRM on schedule. 249
The stated goal of the proposed rule is "to ensure that transportation practices
do not create food safety risks., 250 The proposed rule sets out requirements
under five general headings: vehicles and transportation equipment,
transportation operations, training, records and waivers.2 1' Each is addressed
below.
The proposed rule would cover both intrastate and interstate shipment
of food.252 The proposed rule tracks the problem areas identified in the ERG
report relatively closely.253  However, a notable exception is that the
proposed rule would exempt shippers, receivers or carriers with less than
$500,000 in total annual sales.254 The proposed rule would also exempt fully
packaged shelf-stable foods, live food animals and raw agricultural
commodities when transported by farms.2 5  Further, the proposed rule would
not apply to food transported into the United States by means other than
motor or rail.2 56 Nor would the proposed rule cover foods transported in the
United States but not for domestic consumption or distribution. 7
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Notably, like the DOT before it, the FDA refused to promulgate a list
of nonfoods prohibited for transportation with food.25 8 The FDA stated that
such a list was impractical given that the likelihood of contamination
depended on case specific factors such as packaging, vehicle construction,
concentration of nonfoods and cleaning, and sanitation procedures. 9
Instead, the FDA indicated that, after publication of the final rule, it would
provide guidance on procedures to prevent contamination of food by
nonfoods during transport.
26 °
Based on its statements under the various provisions of the proposed
rule, the FDA appears to have attempted to minimize costs imposed upon
industry. The FDA points out that. many of the provisions have been
designed in light of industry best practice. 26 ' Further, the FDA provides a
table which compares proposed provisions against current good
manufacturing practice ("CGMP").262 The FDA concludes that seven
provisions have CGMP analogues and that, therefore, "many firms are likely
to already be in compliance with the proposed provisions of this rule.
263
The FDA estimates that the proposed rule would impose a first year cost of
$149.1 million.264 The agency determined that 83,609 firms would be
covered by the rule at a cost of $1,784 per firm.265 The FDA, unlike the DOT
before it, did not attempt to provide an estimate of benefits. 266 In its
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, the FDA notes that it is difficult to
link an outbreak to a specific issue in transportation.26 7 Further, intrastate
transportation data is generally unavailable to the agency.268 The FDA
candidly admits that it is "unable to estimate the effectiveness of the
requirements of the proposed rule to reduce potential adverse health effects
in humans or animals. '269 Although the FDA expects some changes in
behavior, the changes are anticipated to be small scale because the proposed
rule largely adheres to industry best practice. 270 The potential benefits that
258. Id. at 7009.
259. Id.
260. Id
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may result from the rule include a reduction in recalls, adverse health effects
and losses resulting from contaminated human and animal food.2 7'
The proposed rule would be placed in 21 C.F.R. 1, subpart 0 under the
title "Sanitary Transportation of Human and Animal Food., 27 2  The
provisions under the rule would span from Sections 1.900 to 1.934.273
A. Section 1.906, Vehicle and Transportation Equipment
The provisions under Section 1.906 would set out a number of general
requirements for the design and maintenance of vehicles and transportation
equipment.274 The provisions would require that vehicles and equipment be:
designed to allow for adequate cleaning, 1.906(a); maintained in sanitary
condition, 1.906(b); designed to maintain temperatures, 1.906(c); equipped
with thermometers in refrigerated compartments containing foods that can
support microbial growth, 1.906(d); and stored as to prevent pest infestation
or other conditions that would result in adulteration, 1.906(e).275 Section
1.906 does not appear to impose requirements beyond existing regulations
and industry best practices.276 The FDA indicated that 1.906(a) is consistent
with best practices as provided in response to the 2010 ANPRM.277
Additionally, Sections 1.906(b)-(e) have nearly equivalent provisions in the
FDA's CGMP.278
B. Section 1.908, Transportation Operations
Section 1.908(a) would set out general procedures to prevent food
adulteration during transportation.279 Specific provisions would require
effective measures to: i) ensure foods are not contaminated by nonfoods
when transported in the same load, 1.908(a)(3)(i); ii) prevent cross-
contamination of foods in the same load, 1.908(a)(3)(ii); and iii) ensure
appropriate conditions, including temperature control, for foods that can
support microbial growth, 1.908(a)(3)(iii).2 81 Section 1.908(b) would set out
a number of requirements for shippers, including i) providing the carrier with
271. Id.
272. Id. at 7009.
273. Id. at 7033.
274. Sanitary Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. at 7016.
275. Id. at 7016-18.
276. See id.
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278. Id. at 7011-12.
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sanitation requirements for vehicles and equipment, 1.908(b)(1); ii)
inspecting the carrier's vehicle or transportation equipment before loading
any food not "fully enclosed" in a container, 1.908(b)(2); iii) providing the
carrier with transportation conditions in writing for foods that can support
microbial growth, 1.908(b)(3); and iv) verifying the precooling of
refrigerated compartments that will contain foods that can support microbial
growth, 1.908(b)(4). 81 Section 1.908(c) would apply to both shippers and
receivers and includes requirements for provision of hand washing facilities,
1.908(c)(1), and conditions for loading and unloading of foods that can
support microbial growth, 1.908(c)(2).28 Finally, Section 1.908(d) would
apply to carriers and largely tracks the same requirements outlined above,
including with regards to vehicle and equipment conditions, 1.908(d)(1),
temperature maintenance, 1.908(d)(2), and precooling, 1.908(d)(3)."8 3
The Section would also impose a number of recordkeeping
requirements on carriers, such as offering the shipper information about the
last three cargoes, 1.908(d)(4),and the most recent cleaning, 1.908(d)(6).284
Additionally, the carrier is required to have written procedures for cleaning
practices, 1.908(d)(6)(i), and temperature control, 1.908(d)(6)(ii).285 The
FDA points out that most of the provisions would mirror existing CGMP and
industry best practice.286 However, the FDA cites a few instances where the
regulations may require additional compliance for some entities.218  For
example, the FDA states that it has received comments indicating that
temperature control procedures are not always followed during loading and
loading, 1.908(c)(2),288 and carriers do not always provide information about
the previous three cargoes in all sectors of food transportation,
1.908(d)(4). 89
C. Sections 1.910-1.914, Training, Recordkeeping and Waiver
The proposed rule would require carriers to train "personnel engaged
in transportation operations" in food safety awareness and practices upon
hiring and as needed, 1.910(a). 29' As outlined above, a number of Sections
281. Id. at 7020-22.
282. Id. at 7022-23.
283. Id. at 7023-24.
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of the proposed rule mandate recordkeeping.29' Section 1.912 would
establish specific recordkeeping requirements for the relevant provisions of
the proposed rule, such as how long documents must be kept, when
documents must be produced, and the format of and when the documents
must be disclosed, 1.1912(a)-(g)2 92 Finally, the proposed rule would
provide the FDA with the ability to waive any provision for "any class of
persons, vehicles, food or nonfood products" as long as the result would not
be "unsafe for human or animal health and the waiver [would] not be
contrary to the public interest," 1.914.293
VI. A LONG OVERDUE SOLUTION OR A REGULATION
IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM?
The road to food transportation regulation is littered with detours,
delays and failed attempts. The problems are many and varied: overlapping
agency mandates, federalism, uncertainty and cost. The FDA, seeing the
1990 SFTA languishing in regulatory purgatory, pursued a fractured
approach to regulation.294 During the decade that followed the 1990 SFTA,
the agency issued guidelines and regulations specific to industries,
procedures and products.295 This was at least partially enabled by a lack of
significant public health crises that would have shifted attention to the
industry. Even the most serious incident, the contamination of ice cream
estimated to have caused 224,000 cases of salmonella, 296 did not provide
sufficient political pressure for meaningful regulatory change. The
regulatory response to the 1994 incident was an ANPRM in 1996 that was
eventually abandoned.297 The FDA's solution was like many that pre and
postdated it; the agency worked directly with the dairy industry to develop
procedures to prevent a recurrence.298
As the 1994 incident has receded into the rearview mirror, the food
transportation industry has effectively staved off efforts to regulate.
Arguably, the DOT proved to be somewhat of a combination of unable and
unwilling to regulate during the 1990s and the FDA did not fill the regulatory
291. See generally id. at 7006.
292. Id at 7027-28.
293. Id. at 7028.
294. See Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-500, § 1, 104 Stat.
1213 (1990).
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Reg. 59372 (proposed Nov. 22, 1996).
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void. Although the Act provided the FDA with relatively broad powers to
regulate across industries, the agency chose a targeted approach.299 Further,
it may be argued that regulation was hampered by an enforcement gap. The
most logical agency to conduct inspections, the DOT, could not easily wrap
food truck inspections into its existing efforts. Further, the off cited but
rarely practiced coordination between agencies and state and local officials
did not materialize to any large degree.
During this period, industries took up the mantle to develop food
transportation best practices.3 00 One can reasonably ask to what degree the
industries' decision was motivated by food safety and/or a desire to preempt
more stringent regulations. Regardless, the food transportation industry
could cite its own practices and a relatively unblemished safety record to
justify the status quo. What was not mentioned, however, was that the
industry appeared to benefit from a high degree of empirical uncertainty.
When food safety incidents occurred, it was generally difficult to isolate the
cause to transportation. Unless the incident could be traced to a previous
substance in a vehicle, the contamination could have as easily occurred in
the factory or point of distribution. Additionally, few studies specifically
looked at the potential role of transportation in food contamination. Uneven
recordkeeping practices also made tracing incidents difficult. It is notable in
this regard that the FDA continues to cite the 2006 Michigan MDARD
study,3"' which was small scale, regional and temporally limited, as evidence
of the role of food transportation in contamination.30 2 The FDA's own effort
to gain a better empirical foothold, the 2009 ERG study, pointed to potential
vulnerabilities in food transportation procedures.30 3 However, the study did
not provide a real sense of the scale of the problem.3 °4
In light of this history, recent efforts seem to be a departure from what
could be called the laissez-faire approach of the 1980s and 1990s. The 2005
SFTA attempted to address the jurisdictional issues by largely vesting power
in the FDA.30 5 The FDA's 2010 ANPRM sought to obtain evidence of the
magnitude of the problem.30 6 Although the industry's response may be
categorized as pleading the fifth, Congress would not be deterred. Instead
299. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
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of allowing the FDA to continue a tradition of inaction based on uncertainty,
Congress included a provision in the 2011 FSMA to require the FDA to issue
regulations under the 2005 SFTA within eighteen months, as well as to
conduct. a food transportation study.3"7 Notably this all occurred without
having been prompted by a specific public health crisis. However, the
question remains as to whether the FDA's 2014 NPRM addresses significant
regulatory gaps or if time has made the proposed rule largely redundant.30 8
A. Market Failure Analysis of the 2014 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
A useful way to analyze the 2014 NPRM3 °9 is to consider the extent to
which it addresses potential market failures. Diana Crumley provides a
framework for analysis in her 2012 article, "Achieving Optimal Deterrence
in Food Safety Regulation. '310  She lists imperfect information and
externalities as primary food safety market failures.3
Food safety suffers from the familiar "lemons" problem in the used car
market. The individual purchasing food can only verify its lack of
contamination at great expense. Therefore, purchasers are forced to rely on
individuals up the supply chain ("providers"). Providers have the incentive
to only spend resources up to the point that the food is likely to be rejected
by the purchaser or that they will be held responsible for negative health
effects. Responsibility could be in the form of legal liability, fines,
imprisonment or reputational damage.
Under this model, food carriers would be expected to calculate how
much to spend on safety based on the probability of having food rejected or
being required to bear the costs of public health effects. There are reasons
to think the current market is less than efficient. The first reason is
underreporting and under-identification of public health incidents.3"2
Particularly if the health impact is not serious enough to require
hospitalization, carriers would not be responsible for unidentified, but
potentially significant, public health impacts. The likelihood of reporting
would also be a function of shipment size. Larger shipments would impact
more individuals and increase the probability that public officials would
307. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 111, 124 Stat. 3885, 3916
(2011).
308. Sanitary Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. 7006 (proposed
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identify and attempt to determine the source of an outbreak. Another reason
for market inefficiency is the number of actors in the supply chain. Even
when a public health incident is identified, there could be difficulty in meting
out blame to the shipper, carrier, receiver or consumer. To the extent that
such issues are intractable, the carrier would have a lower probability of
facing ramifications.
Under-enforcement of regulations may also contribute to lower levels
of compliance. Even discounting the aforementioned factors, companies
may reasonably believe the FDA is unlikely to bring enforcement actions.
Because of limited resources, the agency is unable to pursue every identified
issue and generally allows companies an opportunity to comply prior to
bringing an enforcement action.313 Further, penalties may be too low to
encourage efficient behavior. The issue of the appropriate penalty is
particularly significant given the difficulty in aggregating potentially large
and dispersed public health impacts. For example, should Schwan's have
been held responsible for the 150 confirmed cases of salmonella or the
224,000 estimated cases?3 14 And how should damages be calculated?
Missed work and hospital bills, or some measure of suffering and
inconvenience? Depending on the answers to these questions, the range of
damages could be minimal to crushing. To the extent that carriers would not
be held responsible for the public health impacts of contamination they
cause, this would impose an externality on society.
Many of the market inefficiencies identified may be at least partially
mitigated by market forces exerting pressure in the opposite direction. The
costs associated with recalls and their reputational damage provide
companies with a strong incentive to prevent contamination. For example,
a salmonella outbreak in 2009 from tainted peanut butter led to a massive
recall and ultimately the bankruptcy of the company responsible, the Peanut
Corporation of America.3" 5 In fact, entire industries may have incentives to
encourage individual companies to adhere to food safety measures. One can
be sure that the impact of the peanut butter recall spread to brands not
associated with the outbreak. The month after the recall, overall sales of
peanut butter were estimated to have declined by twenty-five percent.31 6
313. See Letter from John R. Gridley, supra note 72.
314. Hennessy et al., supra note 56, at 1281-83.
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Even the best case scenario is costly. Schwan's handling of the ice cream
contamination is cited as a model of successful crisis management.317
However, to survive the crisis, Schwan's was compelled to shutdown sales
and production, invite in state and FDA officials to investigate, and conduct
customer outreach.318 Although the brand recovered, it took approximately
two years for ice cream sales to return to their 1994 levels.319
Given the importance of brand recognition for large food producers,
the incentive provided by the desire to preserve brand integrity likely dwarfs
that provided by possible regulatory reprisal. However, for smaller
producers and producers not reliant on brand recognition, reputational
concerns will not induce the same degree of compliance. In the case of
independent carriers, the incentive is further attenuated. Carriers are not
public brands. Their incentive is not necessarily to ensure that food is not
contaminated during transport. Instead their primary concern is to secure
business, which may involve demonstrating a safety record as well as
entering into a contract requiring that certain measures be taken. The
shipper/carrier situation is a classic agency problem. Although shippers can
take measures to align interests, incentives will not be perfectly matched
because carriers will not suffer the full measure of reputational harms.
B. Comparison of the Efficacy of Current Regulations and the
Proposed Rule in Correcting Market Failures
In order to gauge the success of the 2014 NPRM 321 in addressing
market inefficiencies, one must consider how well they are being addressed
by the status quo web of best practices, nonbinding guidance and regulations.
The FDA has the ability to conduct inspections and charge violators under
Section 331 of the Act. 321 For example, a carrier that did not sufficiently
clean out a vehicle before loading food could render the food adulterated
under Section 342322 and be subject to penalty under Section 333.323
Additionally, as outlined above, the FDA has issued regulations governing a
number of specific issues, including cleanout procedures for vehicles used
317. ARCHIE CARROLL & ANN BUCHOLTZ, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY: ETHICS AND
STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 172 (8th ed. 2011).
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319. The Schwan Food Company, International Directory of Company Histories,
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320. Sanitary Transportation of Human & Animal Food, 79 Fed. Reg. 7006 (proposed
Feb. 5, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1).
321. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
322. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2012).
323. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2012).
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to transport medicated animal feeds, treatment requirements for juice
processing, and record retention and production requirements.324
Despite these legal bases, there are a number of reasons to doubt that
the FDA's regulations are having a large independent impact on industry
behavior. First, the agency has limited resources to conduct inspections. It
seems likely that any efforts the FDA conducts are in response to specific
reports from other agencies, state or local officials or the industry itself.
Second, given the relatively broad language of the Act's adulteration
provisions, the FDA may not have a regulation addressing a particular
behavior. Therefore, the agency may balk at bringing resources to bear on
an action that is not clearly a prohibited act under Section 33 1325
Third, the likelihood of significant penalties is low. The industry is
aware that the FDA generally issues warning letters to allow companies to
remedy behavior before bringing any legal action. Further, a $1000 fine
under Section 333326 is unlikely to be a significant deterrent. The Act does
allow for imprisonment for up to one year.327 Although not spelled out in
the Act, this would presumably be reserved for particularly egregious
behavior. The FDA has said the type of action to be taken against a violator
depends on "public health concern[s], [a]gency policy, previous history of
violations by the firm, and other factors."
328
Finally, existing regulations do not address the incentive deficit of
smaller companies and carriers. As outlined above, such companies have
less to lose in brand reputation and, therefore, are less likely to devote
resources to ensuring food safety. In sum, although market pressures may
induce compliance, the legal regime does not appear to have the content or
the authority to be a strong independent source of preventing food
transportation contamination.
To determine the efficacy of the 2014 NPRM,329 it is worth considering
the extent to which it would address the market inefficiencies identified
above. The NPRM does not contain any provisions directly addressing the
issue of underreporting. 330 However, the NPRM would require relatively
extensive recordkeeping requirements, which may allow for better
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identification of the cause of contamination.33" ' It should not be a surprise
that the NPRM does not contain specific provisions to encourage reporting
since this issue is not specific to food transportation and involves
coordination with other agencies and state and local officials.
33 2
The NPRM does not call for greater enforcement efforts or penalties.333
However, the NPRM would allow the FDA to better respond to conduct
likely to cause contamination during transport.33 4 The greater specificity of
the provisions of the NPRM would provide the FDA with a stronger basis
for bringing enforcement actions for behavior that is currently not a clear
violation of the Act.335 The efficacy of these new provisions in shaping
conduct would depend on the degree to which they are enforced. It is not
clear yet whether the FDA would devote significant resources to upholding
the terms of any final rule. Additionally, the NPRM would not increase
penalties for violations.336 A violation of a provision of the NPRM would
be labeled a prohibited act under Section 331 of the Act and carry the same
penalties as outlined above.337
The NPRM does not appear to specifically target entities with lower
market-based incentives to adopt food safety measures.3  As detailed
above, carriers have less incentive to ensure food safety given their lower
reliance on brand recognition. To some degree the NPRM may address this
through imposing greater requirements on carriers.339 Again, whether these
provisions shape behavior would depend on the degree to which they are
enforced. However, most problematic is the fact that the NPRM would
exempt shippers, carriers and receivers with less than $500,000 in annual
revenues.340 As outlined above, these are precisely the entities with a greater
incentive to cut food safety corners. Such entities would not be recognized
brands nor have a great deal of assets to protect. The data that is available
supports this conclusion. The Michigan MDARD study found that large
semi trucks, which would be more likely to carry large brand name food
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problems identified in the study were in small box and ethnic food trucks.
34 2
The FDA provides that the exemption addresses the requirement under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA") that agencies "analyze" options to
minimize the impact on small entities.343 Further, the agency notes that
smaller entities would still be covered under the Act. 344 However, as
important as ensuring the viability of small entities may be, this does not
appear to justify wholesale exemption. The FDA could impose variable
standards to reduce burdens according to annual revenues. By exempting
the entities most likely to pose a threat to public health, the FDA would
undermine the purposes of the proposed rule.
Overall, the NPRM would take a few small steps in the right direction.
The proposed rule would enable the FDA to better target specific conduct
deemed to create the greatest public health risks. However, the efficacy of
the rule will largely depend on considerations outside the scope of its terms.
Specifically, the agency would need to devote more attention to identifying
public health incidents, conduct greater enforcement efforts and potentially
raise the penalties for noncompliance, or at least reduce its reliance on
warning letters. Further, much of the potential benefit of the NPRM would
be lost by exempting entities with annual revenues of less than $500,000.
The FDA should consider eliminating this provision or, at minimum, scaling
the NPRM's burdens according to an entity's annual revenue.
VII. CONCLUSION
The road to food transportation regulation has been bumpy. Food
transportation has provided enormous benefits to society; however, a number
of incidents point to its public health risks. Further, there is reason to think
identified incidents may only be the tip of the iceberg. Despite a growing
awareness of the dangers associated with food transportation, regulation has
not been forthcoming. Amongst other factors, regulation has been hindered
by empirical uncertainty, a lack of agency coordination and the cost of
setting up a more robust enforcement regime. Recent events have provided
more hope for a broader, more consistent regulatory approach. Specifically,
Congress vested regulatory authority in the FDA in the 2005 SFTA and put
a deadline on the agency to promulgate regulations in the 2011 FSMA.
345
The result was the 2014 NPRM, which does take some important steps in
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providing consistent regulations across industries.346 However, there are
reasons to believe that the NPRM will not solve many of the risks associated
with food transportation. The FDA could go a long way toward reducing
public health dangers by devoting more attention to identifying incidents,
conducting greater enforcement efforts, increasing penalties for violators and
removing, or at least scaling back, exemptions for small entities. Only time
will tell whether the 2014 NPRM3 47 becomes a milestone in food
transportation regulation or another agency action left abandoned by the side
of the road.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Food and technology have had a long and tempestuous relationship.
Current methods of food production and processing in the industrialized
world depend heavily on technological developments. However, all
technologies are not created equal. Some can produce food that is safer, more
sustainable, more nutritious, or longer lasting.' Some can have the opposite
effect: increasing opportunities for adulteration,2 increasing the difficulty in
detecting food fraud,3 and contributing to both foreseeable and unforeseeable
health or ecological costs. 4 Increasingly sophisticated technologies often
* Ms. Schaefer is a J.D. candidate, May 2015, at the University of California at Los
Angeles, School of Law. Special thanks to Prof. Michael T. Roberts, Executive Director
of the Resnick Program for Food Law and Policy at UCLA School of Law, whose
guidance made this comment possible. Lauren Bernadett, Associate at Somach Simmons
& Dunn, offered her invaluable perspective on the publishing process. Thanks also to
Margot Pollans, Teaching Fellow at the Resnick Program, and Prof. Daniel J. Bussel at
UCLA School of Law for their constructive comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Y. MOTARJEMI ET AL., FOOD SAFETY ISSUES: FOOD TECHNOLOGIES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 7 ( World Health Organization July 25, 1995), available at
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/fs management/en/foodtech.pdf (declaring
that food technology should be recognized as a health technology as well); ROYAL
SOCIETY NAMES REFRIGERATION MOST SIGNIFICANT INVENTION IN THE HISTORY OF
FOOD AND DRINK (Sept. 13, 2012), http://royalsociety.org/news/2012/top-20-food-
innovations/; Nadia Arumugam, Best Food Innovations of2012, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2012,
12:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/2012/12/26/best-food-
innovations-of-2012/ (including in this list edible food packaging and drifting ocean fish
farms).
2. See, e.g., James Griffiths, 20, 000 Kilos of Fake Beef Seized in Xi 'an, SHANGHAIIST
(Sept. 14, 2013, 11:00 PM),
http://shanghaiist.com/2013/09/14/20000_kilos of fake beefseized in xian.php;
Patrick Boehler, Bad Eggs: Another Fake-Food Scandal Rocks China, TIME NEwSFEED
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/06/how-to-make-a-rotten-egg/.
3. See, e.g., Daniel Kelley, 5 Food Frauds You Might Have to Watch For, ESQUIRE
(Jun. 12, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/food-for-men/food-frauds-to-
watch-15574457; Shoshana Walter, Farm Fakes: A History of Fraudulent Food,
MODERN FARMER (May 3, 2013), http://modemfarmer.com/2013/05/farm-fakes-a-
history-of-fraudulent-food/.
4. See, e.g., Crystal Gammon and Environmental Health News, Weed-Whacking
Herbicide Proves Deadly to Human Cells, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 23, 2009),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=weed-whacking-herbicide-p;
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become less apparent to the average consumer. For example, consider
irradiated meat or genetically modified foods as opposed to freezer storage
or homogenization. Some food technologies, like freeze-drying, tend to
attract consumers.' Others, like meat from cloned animals, tend to elicit
negative reactions.6 This wide variety in applications of technology to food,
as well as the range of consumer responses, leaves industry stakeholders and
regulatory bodies with difficult choices concerning when and where to
involve consumers.
The astounding pace of technological innovation has outpaced
developments in consumer participation, resulting in consumer frustration
and an increasing sense of hostility between consumers on the one hand and
industry and regulators on the other.7 How can regulators and industry
stakeholders foster innovation without alienating consumers? How can they
develop and market innovative goods that consumers feel benefitted by?
How can these goals be met in a climate that is often presented in a reductive
binary: either technological innovation or transparency enabling consumer
preference?
This paper compares United States ("U.S.") and European Union
("EU") approaches to the intensifying questions surrounding technology in
the food industry. Juxtaposing the U.S. and EU is not meant to automatically
elevate one approach above another, but to highlight the range of choices
available. Through an evaluation of the role consumer concerns play in the
adoption of currently marketed innovative food technologies, this paper
shows that the developing field of nanotechnology presents an opportunity
for proponents of technology in the food industry. This paper argues that
regulators and industry stakeholders should embrace a conception of the
consumer as intelligent, thoughtful, and invested in the potential benefits of
technology. By acting on this view of consumers, regulators and the industry
can repair their relationships with consumers and build development and
regulatory protocols that serve all these groups better.
Maggie Koerth-Baker, Listeria Evolved to Live in Your Fridge, BOING BOING (May 5,
2011, 8:41 AM), http://boingboing.net/2011/05/05/listeria-evolved-to.html.
5. Steven Rinella, A Love Affair with Freeze-Dried Food, OUTSIDE (March 6, 2013),
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/culinary/A-Love-Affair-With-
Freeze-Dried-Food.html (noting a steady increase in consumer sales).
6. James Meikle, Public Strongly Against Cloned Animal Meat, Study Reveals,
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2008/jun/06/foodtech.food; Finlo Rohrer, What
are Attitudes to Clone Food in the US?, BBC (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada- 10871737.
7. See Elen Stokes, You Are What You Eat: Market Citizens and the Right to Know
About Nano Foods, 2 J. HUMAN RIGHTS ENV'T 178, 179-80 (2011).
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However, this paper suggests that industry stakeholders and regulators
should embrace consumer preference by increasing transparency and
involving consumers in key policymaking structures surrounding nanotech
and other developing food technologies. As significant stakeholders in the
food system, consumers should be educated, and their input should be
valued. Some evidence presented in this paper suggests this inclusion will
result in positive responses when a consumer benefit can be shown. If
consumers feel they are participants in the development of new food
technologies they are more likely to make calculated risks rather than
rejecting the technology out of hand.
This paper does not seek to suggest a value-or lack thereof-of
developing food technologies or to evaluate related scientific data. Rather, it
proposes better integration of consumers into the process of developing and
regulating new food technologies. This integration will, in turn, result in a
more transparent process that can benefit industry stakeholders as well as
consumers and regulators. As an analytic lens, this paper will compare
approaches by the U.S. and the EU, which have long been in tension and
have resulted in numerous international and bilateral trade disputes.
The analysis is structured as follows: this paper first discusses the
current role of consumers in developing and regulating new food
technologies, such as irradiation, artificial hormones, antibiotics, and
genetically engineered crops. Then follows a survey of the current state of
nanotechnology, which shows it is an area ripe for new approaches. The final
section suggests new avenues of promoting consumer engagement with
nanotech development, which can serve as a model for other developing food
technologies.
II. CURRENT CONSUMER RELATIONSHIP TO FOOD TECHNOLOGIES
A. Technological Development Drives Supply and Demand
Technology has served as the primary shaper of food supply and
demand throughout history, in a "boom and bust cycle". 8 For example, the
development of irrigation and plows increased production but also resulted
in erosion and soil infertility.9 These issues were addressed with the
development of crop rotation, cover crops, and manure-based fertilizers.'"
8. JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE, Teaching the Food System:
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Further increases in food production resulted in increases to the population,
which precipitated the need for additional production and catalyzed the
development of refrigeration, synthetic fertilizers, monocultures, and
significant food imports and exports." The industrialized food system relies
on economies of scale, and this incorporates the values of specialization,
simplification, routinization, mechanization, standardization, and
consolidation. 12
The current food system has resulted in minimal off-the-shelf costs for
many,' 3 but also increased tension between consumers and food producers.
Consumers are becoming more aware of marketing strategies aimed to get
them to pay the same amount of money for a less costly product, or for
products with little to no nutritional value.'4 The hidden cost of
externalities-like skyrocketing chronic diseases and increasing awareness
of environmental unsustainability of food production processes-and new
issues-like superweeds, antibiotic resistance, and arsenic in chicken-have
resulted in resurging consumer wariness of industry and regulator
assurances. 5 Increasing attention is being paid to the rise of consumer
distrust, which seems poised to increase as technology develops.' 6 Many
consumers feel current uses of technology in food are driven by profit,
without regard to their social, environmental, ethical, or health preferences. 7
Without a change in the way industry and regulators interact with
consumers, consumers will likely continue to see food technologies as
geared toward industry benefit rather than their own enrichment. This may
lead to increased consumer backlash and rejection of new technologies.
11. WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: How TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD
12-14 (2009).
12. History of Food, supra note 8, at 13-14; see also JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS,
AND STEEL 279 (1999).
13. Americans spend less than 9% of their incomes on groceries, almost a 30%
reduction compared to the early 80s. Lam Thuy Vo, What America Spends on Groceries,
NPR's PLANET MONEY (June 8, 2012, 10:37 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/06/08/154568945/what-america-spends-on-
groceries.
14. See, e.g., Michael Moss, The Extraordinary Science ofAddictive Junk Food, NY
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/magazine/the-
extraordinary-science-of-j unk-food.html.
15. See, e.g., Maria Lee, Risk and Beyond: EU Regulation of Nanotechnology, 35
EUR. L. REV. 799, 800, 816-18 (2010).
16. Stokes, supra note 7, at 178-79.
17. Americans Lack Trust in and Knowledge of Food Industry, Finds New FoodThink
White Paper, PR NEWSWIRE (March 19, 2013), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
releases/americans-lack-trust-in-and-knowledge-of-food-industry-finds-new-foodthink-
white-paper-199063621 .html (noting that 81% of US consumers express distrust of the
food industry).
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To illustrate the current tensions, this paper will examine the reception
of several significant food technologies: irradiation, artificial hormones,
routine antibiotics in animal agriculture, and genetically engineered crops.
Each section will compare the responses of European Union and United
States industry and regulators.
1. Irradiation
Exposing food products to ionizing radiation kills pests, delays
ripening, and reduces some microbes; this extends shelf life and decreases
contamination."8 Originally used extensively on astronaut food, irradiation
did not expand into the consumer market until the 1980s. 19 While it is
considered safe within certain parameters by both the EU and U.S.,
consumers expressed concerns over whether approved doses would leave
irradiated food radioactive or alter nutrition, taste, or texture, as well as
whether manufacturers would use the technology as a substitute for sanitary
practices.' °
While U.S. consumers were initially wary, several studies suggested
educating them on the potential benefits of irradiation, especially in
comparison with the alternatives, would result in increased acceptance.2 1
While the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") now requires labeling of
some irradiated foods, it responded to consumer concerns by making it
harder to identify which foods were irradiated.22 In 1984, it originally
proposed no labeling requirement.23 In 1997, it decreased label visibility and
18. Food Irradiation, ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/sources/food irrad.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2013).
19. Jo'zsef Farkasa and Csilla Moha'csi-Farkas, History and Future of Food
Irradiation, 22 TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH. 121, 122 (2011).
20. See e.g., Samuel S. Epstein and Wenonah Hauter, Preventing Pathogenic Food
Poisoning: Sanitation, Not Irradiation, 31 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 187 (2001); PUBLIC
CITIZEN, FOOD IRRADIATION AND GLOBAL TRADE: WHAT IRRADIATION MEANS FOR
FARMERS AND RANCHERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2003),
available at www.citizen.org/documents/tradereport.pdf.
21. Michael Boland and Sean Fox, Food Irradiation and Public Health, U. MINN.
FOOD POLICY RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 2012),
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/157629/1/FPRCIssue%/20Brief IrradiationU
DC%202013.pdf.
22. FDA, Food Irradiation: What You Need to Know,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/ToolsMaterials/ucm216924.htm (last
updated Nov. 7, 2014).
23. WASHINGTON ASSOCIATED PRESS, FDA Proposes Softening Irradiated Food
Labels, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter FDA Proposes],
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-04-04-food-radiation N.htm.
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exempted disclosure of irradiated ingredients.24 In 2007, it proposed
allowing irradiated food labels to say "pasteurized" or "cold pasteurized"
instead of "treated by radiation" or "treated by irradiation."25 Further, the
FDA has rejected various requests for public hearings by consumer advocacy
organizations, while expanding approved uses of irradiation.
2 6
In the EU, the government responded to consumer concerns in 1999 by
permitting irradiation only where necessary, non-hazardous, beneficial to
consumers, labeled, and not replacing proper manufacturing practices.27 EU
rules also require inspection of irradiation facilities and devices.28 Member
states are allowed to further restrict or ban the practice as they see fit.29 These
different approaches have resulted in vastly different utilization of the
technology. In 2010, the U.S. irradiated over 100,000 tons of food, eleven
times the amount irradiated in the EU.3 °
2. Artificial Hormones in Meat Animals
Synthetically produced growth hormones sparked intense disagreement
between the European Union and the United States, including a World Trade
Organization ("WTO") dispute.3 These hormones are relatively inexpensive
in their artificial form and can increase producer profits significantly by
promoting rapid muscle and fat growth.32 However, they come at a cost.
Because treated cattle require more energy-dense feed to support this faster
growth, feed supplements began including meat and bone meal-a risk
24. Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 306, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
25. FDA Proposes, supra note 23.
26. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 76 Fed. Reg.
20509 (Apr. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 179); Peyton Ferrier, Irradiation of
Produce Imports: Small Inroads, Big Obstacles, USDA ERS (June 16, 2011),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/20 11-j une/irradiation-of-produce-imports.aspx.
27. Council Directive 1999/2, 1999 O.J. (L 66/16) (EC); Council Directive 1999/3,
art. 4, 1999 O.J. (L 66/24) (EC).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Tamikazu Kume and Setsuko Todoriki, Food Irradiation in Asia, the European
Union, and the United States: A Status Update, 62 RADIOISOTOPES 291 (2013). In the
European Union, the most common irradiated foods are frog parts, poultry, and spices;
in the US, spices, grains, fruits, and meats are routinely irradiated. Id. at 296-97.
31. Ladina Caduff, Growth Hormones and Beyond 1-2 (Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich, Working Paper No. 8-2002, Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.ib.ethz.ch/docs/working_papers/wp_2002_08.pdf.
32. Renee Johnson and Charles E. Hanrahan, The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf.
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factor for BSE ("Mad Cow Disease").33 Consumer concerns regarding these
hormones related not only to BSE, but also to cancer and reproductive harm
in humans3 4 and animal welfare.3 5 Europeans were particularly concerned
after several "hormone scandals," including the discovery of endocrine
disruptors in baby food from cattle fed hormone growth stimulants.3 6
U.S. consumers opposed to these hormones did not gain traction with
regulators, despite some support from the General Accounting Office
("GAO").3" The United States allows added growth hormones in cattle and
sheep production without labeling.38 While safe residue levels have been
established, a 2010 audit found the United States Department of
33. Judith Ferera, Environment: Mad Cows And Growth Hormones Part Of The Same
Problem, INTER PRESS SERVICE (March 25, 1996),
http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/03/environment-mad-cows-and-growth-hormones-part-
of-the-same-problem/.
34. See, e.g., SCI. COMMITTEE ON VETERINARY MEASURES RELATING TO PUB.
HEALTH, Assessment Of Potential Risks To Human Health From Hormone Residues In
Bovine Meat And Meat Products, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (April 30, 1999), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scv/out21 en.pdf.
35. Hormone use tends to correspond with industrialized CAFOs, which have a
reputation for inhumane animal treatment. See, e.g., What Are The Animal Welfare
Impacts of Using Hormone Growth Promotants in Beef Cattle?, RSPCA AUSTRALIA,
http://kb.rspca.org.au/What-are-the-animal-welfare-impacts-of-using-hormrone-growth-
promotants-in-beef-cattle_459.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2014).
36. TIM JOSLING, TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
OF THE WTO 260 (James C. Hartigan, ed., 1st ed. 2009) ; RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT
AND TRADE 279 (Edith Weiss Brown, et al., eds., 2008); G.M. Fara et al., Epidemic of
Breast Enlargement in an Italian School, 2 LANCET 295 (1979).
37. See Samuel S. Epstein, None of Us Should Eat Extra Estrogen, LA TIMES (March
24, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997-03-24/local/me-41521 1 hormone-levels;
Jayson L. Lusk and John A. Fox, Consumer Demand for Mandatory Labeling of Beef
from Cattle Administered Growth Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn, 34 J.
Ag. & Applied Econ. 27 (2002), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/15506/1/34010027.pdf (finding that 85 percent
of respondents wanted mandatory labeling of beef produced with growth hormones);
GAO, RECOMBINANT BOVINE GROwTH HORMONE: FDA APPROVAL SHOULD BE
WITHHELD UNTIL THE MASTITIS ISSUE Is RESOLVED, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS (Aug. 6, 1992), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/216521 .pdf.
38. Steroid Hormone Implants Used for Growth in Food-Producing Animals,
FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/ProductSafetylnformation/ucm055
436.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2011).
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Agriculture's ("USDA") testing program inadequate to ensure compliance.
39
Recent efforts to improve that testing have yet to be evaluated for efficacy.
4
During the first BSE scare in the 1990s, the EU banned imported meat
from cows treated with these hormones.41 The U.S. disputed this action with
the WTO, which ruled against the EU and allowed punitive sanctions. 42 From
the WTO perspective, the EU was making rules that were more restrictive
than necessary to protect its citizens' health, and the policy was thus labeled
as hidden protectionism. 43 Similar clashes have erupted with the use of rBGH
in dairy cows 44 and a hormone-like drug called ractopamine in beef, pork,
and turkeys.45 While consumer concerns have not made much of a ripple
regarding U.S. policy, increasing trade resistance to the hormone-like drugs
recently prompted the USDA to implement a program labeling meats as
"Never Fed Beta Agonists," hoping these meats will find less trade
resistance.46
39. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT OF THE FSIS NATIONAL
RESIDUE PROGRAM FOR CATTLE (March 25, 2010).
40. See Helena Bottemiller, USDA to Ramp Up Drug Residue Testing for Meat and
Poultry, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 2, 2012),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/07/usda-to-ramp-up-drug-residue-testing-for-
meat-and-poultry/.
41. Hormones in Meat -Introduction, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/chemicalsafety/contaminants/hormones/index-en.htm
(last updated Dec. 4, 2007).
42. Johnson & Hanrahan, supra note 32.
43. Dispute Settlement: European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/casese/ds26_e.htm (last updated May 9,
2014).
44. Press Release, Consumer Policy Inst., U.S. and Europe Agree to Disagree on
Safety of Dairy Hormone (June 30, 1999), available at
http://consumersunion.org/news/u-s-and-europe-agree-to-disagree-on-safety-of-dairy-
hormone/.
45. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller, FDA Petitioned to Lower Ractopamine Limits for
Meat, Review Health Impacts, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/12/fda-petitioned-to-lower-ractopamine-limits-
for-meat-review-animal-health-impact/.
46. See Helena Bottemiller, Escalating Trade Dispute, Russia Bans Turkey Over
Ractopamine Residues, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/02/escalating-trade-dispute-russia-bans-turkey-
over-ractopamine-residues/; Cathy Siegner, USDA Introduces Certification Program for
Meat Without Growth-Enhancing Drugs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/new-usda-certification-program-may-
increase-exports-for-livestock-producers-who-dont-use-growth-enhancing-drugs/.
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3. Antibiotics in Animal Agriculture
During the middle of the previous century, studies found that
antibiotics could be used not only to treat sick animals, but also to prevent
diseases prevalent in the crowded industrial animal feed operations.
47
Somehow, these antibiotics also increase feed conversion efficiency,
resulting in ballooning use.48 Increased antibiotic use coincided with
consumer concerns surrounding antibiotic resistance, animal welfare, harm
from residues, and whether they would be substituted for sanitary conditions.
The FDA approved routine feed-based antibiotic use in the 1950s based
on these studies alone.4 9 Similar to growth hormones, antibiotics are subject
to residue limits and random testing.50 The FDA did not solicit public
comment regarding these approvals and waived regulations they could have
enforced to require a showing of safety regarding these new uses.5' After a
1969 United Kingdom ("UK") committee concluded that such uses
contributed to antibiotic resistance in humans, the FDA convened a task
force to address the issue.52 In 1977, it attempted to withdraw several
approvals, but was blocked by industry pressure.53 Industry representatives
claimed the FDA did not have sufficient scientific evidence of harm.54 A
1980 study from the National Academy of Sciences found that:
[E]xisting data could neither prove nor disprove the
postulated hazards to human health from subtherapeutic
antimicrobial use in animal feed. However, the report
cautioned that "[t]he lack of data linking human illness with
subtherapeutic levels of antimicrobials must not be equated
with proof that the proposed hazards do not exist. The
research necessary to establish and measure a definitive
47. Lisa Heinzerling, Undue Process at the FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and
Agency Intransigence, 37 VT. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2013).
48. Jd.at 1012.
49. Id. at 1010.
50. 21 C.F.R. § 556.1(a) (2010).
51. Heinzerling, supra note 47, at 1010.
52. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: The Judicious Use of Medically




53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 6-7.
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risk has not been conducted and, indeed, may not be
possible."55
The following three decades produced additional domestic and international
support for restricting sub-therapeutic antibiotic use in animals, including
recommendations from the GAO, World Health Organization ("WHO"), and
Codex Alimentarius,5 6 as well as consumer groups.57 Despite this, only 20%
of antibiotics used in the United States from 2009 to 2010 were used by
humans: over 70% were given in animal feed and water, with just 3%
injected therapeutically.58 The most recent attempts to address antibiotic
overuse have come in the form of voluntary measures, which some argue
will not be effective.59
The EU has responded to these realizations more quickly, but with
varied success, and still much more slowly than might have been expected.
For instance, in the 1990s, they banned selected antibiotics;6" they increased
the ban in 2006 to include all antibiotic use for growth promotion. 61As part
of the effort, the government also sponsors an annual EU Antibiotic
Awareness Day to draw attention to the importance of their careful use.62
However, these policies still allow antibiotic use for disease prevention,
which is administered the same way and in the same doses as for growth
promotion.63 Due to the allowances for disease-preventing antibiotics, actual
55. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
56. dat 8-14.
57. Helena Bottemiller, FDA Denies Petition to Ban Certain Antibiotics, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/201 1/11/fda-denies-
petition-to-ban-certain-antibiotics/.
58. Know The Facts About Antibiotic Resistance and Animal Agriculture, KEEP
ANTIBIOTICS WORKING (June 2012),
http://www.keepantibioticsworking.com/new/Library/UploadedFiles/KAW-brochureJ
une2012.pdf.
59. Lydia Zuraw, Will FDA's Voluntary Plan Actually Reduce Antibiotics in Animal
Feed?, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec., 12, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/12/fda-finalizes-guidance-for-phasing-out-
antibiotics-in-food-animals/.
60. The Antibiotic Ban in Denmark: A Case Study on Politically Driven Bans,
ANIMAL HEALTH INST., http://www.ahi.org/issues-advocacy/animal-anitbiotic-ban-in-
denmark-a-case-study-on-politically-driven-bans/. (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
61. Animal Nutrition - Feed Additives - Basic Legislation, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/foodlanimalnutrition/feedadditives/legislen.htm (last updated
June 23, 2008).
62. Press Release, European Commission, European Antibiotic Awareness Day
2013: Key Facts on the Fight Against Antimicrobial Resistance in the EU (Nov. 15,
2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO- 13-994 en.htm.
63. Dan Charles, Europe's Mixed Record on Animal Antibiotics, NPR'S THE SALT
(March 23, 2012, 4:53 PM),
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use varies.64 However, since the 90s, Denmark has successfully cut its use in
half.65 Even the Netherlands-which used comparable amounts to the U.S.-
is finally seeing a decrease.66
4. Genetically Engineered Crops
Compared to irradiation, hormones, and antibiotics, genetic
engineering ("GE") 67 presents a wider range of possible applications to
food-the combination of foreign genes that may be inserted into a base
crop's genetic code is almost endless. This carries with it a corresponding
breadth of potential concerns, including human safety, allergens,
environmental impact, cross breeding with conventional seeds, superweeds,
and increased monocultures and pesticide use. The few consumers
introduced to GE crops early in their development expressed enthusiasm for
their development, but wanted studies completed regarding the above
issues-and they opposed large-scale production. 68 They favored strict
regulation but did not trust agencies on their own-they wanted input from
public health officials, environmental groups, and taxpayers.69
In 1986, when biotechnology was in its infancy, the Reagan White
House developed the "Coordinated Framework"-assigning current laws
administered by the FDA, USDA, and the Environmental Protection Agency






67. This term may be used to reference direct genetic manipulation using
biotechnology and includes what are commonly referred to as GMOs - genetically
modified organisms.
68. Alison Peck, Does Regulation Chill Democratic Deliberation? The Case of
GMOs, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 668 (2013) ("[A] majority of respondents supported
equal or increased government support for biotechnology research, and most supported
small-scale field tests. When asked about large-scale environmental releases (short of
commercial release), however, respondents were more skeptical: fifty-three percent said
firms should not be able to make such releases, even 'if the risks of environmental danger
are judged to be very small."') (citing Office of Tech. Assessment, New Developments
in Biotechnology: Public Perceptions of Biotechnology (May 1987), 83-84 & 87-88).
69. Id. at 668-69 ("When asked whether they would believe statements about the risk
of a biotech product from various groups, respondents were more inclined to believe
university scientists, public health officials, and environmental groups than federal
agencies.").
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present no unique risks.7" These and other key decisions were implemented
without meaningful public input.7' Until a groundswell of public demand,
the FDA discouraged even most voluntary labeling as potentially confusing
and misleading.7 2 In 2011, the USDA fast-tracked approvals for new
strains,73 while 60% to 70% of foods other than fresh fruits and vegetables
used GE ingredients.74 Meanwhile, decades into the development and use of
GE crops, fewer than half of U.S. consumers knew about such products in
2013, and only one quarter believed they had eaten GE foods.7 5
Consumers who have learned about these foods are demanding
information but receiving intense industry opposition.76 Nearly half of
American states have introduced mandatory labeling proposals.7 7 Several
local governments are considering, or have already, banned or limited GE
70. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, Issues in the Regulation of
Genetically Engineered Plants andAnimals 1 (April 2004) [hereinafter PEW INITIATIVE],
http://www.pewhealth.org/uploadedFiles/PHG/ContentLevelPages/Reports/foodbio
tech regulation_0404.pdf.
71. Peck, supra note 68 (concluding that, "[T]he history of biotechnology
development and public awareness of that technology raises doubts as to whether the
public has had an opportunity to engage in meaningful democratic deliberation about
biotech controls."); see also PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 70, at 18, 86 (noting that FDA
processes have no minimum requirements for public participation and transparency;
many current GE foods are put on to market after voluntary, confidential consultations
between the agency and the product's developers).
72. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or
Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering, FDA.GOV, available at
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation
/labelingnutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) ("A statement that a food
was not bioengineered or does not contain bioengineered ingredients may be misleading
if it implies that the labeled food is superior to foods that are not so labeled.").
73. Petition Process Improvements, USDA,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petproc imp.shtml (last modified March 5,
2012).
74. Maggie Caldwell, 5 Surprising Genetically Modified Foods, MOTHER JONES
(Aug. 5,2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/08/what-are-
gmos-and-why-should-i-care.
75. William K. Hallman et al., Public Perceptions of Labeling Genetically Modified
Foods 4 (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://humeco.rutgers.edu/documentsPDF/news/GMlabelingperceptions.pdf.
76. CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, State Labeling Initiatives,
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/state-labeling-
initiatives (last accessed Dec. 21, 2013).
77. Id.
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crops, including Hawaii's Big Island,"8 several California counties,79 and the
City of Los Angeles.8" The industry spent millions of dollars to oppose
mandatory labeling in just two states and is aiming for a federal ban.8" To fill
the gap between industry and government reticence on the one hand and
consumer demand on the other, expensive niche retailers like Whole Foods
are developing private labeling requirements,82 leading to a sense that
transparency is, for many dependent on the U.S. food system, an
unaffordable luxury.
The EU countries first imported GE crops in 1996, near the height of
the BSE scandals that shattered public trust in government food regulators.8 3
Despite the opposition of consumer groups, environmental groups, and some
scientists, the EU originally approved fourteen GE plants and was poised to
approve thirteen more. 84 Member states, however, instituted their own bans
and called for biotech manufacturer liability legislation before they would
continue approvals or imports.8 U.S. crop containment failures in 2000 and
2005 further eroded confidence in the technology.86
In response, the EU adopted additional regulations, including the
Regulation on Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, which requires
labeling of many GE products.8" It also created the European Food Standards
Agency to conduct independent safety assessments.88 While the EU was
working to craft approval processes acceptable to member countries, the U.S.
78. Hawaii's Big Island Bans Biotech Companies & GMO Crops, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 19, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/19/big-island-
bans-gmon 4305729.html.
79. Gabriela Pechlaner, GMO-Free America? Mendocino County and the Impact of
Local Level Resistance to the Agricultural Biotechnology Paradigm, 19 INT'L J. OF
SOC'Y OF AGRIC. & FOOD 445 (2012).
80. Los Angeles May Become Largest GMO-Free Area in the US, RT.COM (Oct. 24,
2013, 12:05 AM), http://rt.com/usa/los-angeles-gmo-ban-643/.
81. Stephanie Strom, Food Companies Claim Victory Against Labeling Initiative in
Washington State, NY TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), available at www.nytimes.com.
82. Stephanie Strom, Major Grocer to Label Foods With Gene-Modified Content, NY
TIMES (March 9, 2013), available at www.nytimes.com.
83. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: An Examination of




84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 28, 33.
87. Id. at 9.
88. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. V. EU, supra note 83, at 28.
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launched another trade dispute.89 The EU streamlined their approval process,
but still required labeling and traceability.9" A 2010 study indicates that 84%
of EU citizens had heard of GE foods and 61% felt their development should
not be encouraged, though these opinions vary from country to country.
91
While the EU has responded to international pressures to accept GE food
technologies,92 public concerns seem to have significantly influenced
approvals and use in the EU market.
93
B. Regulator and Industry Assumptions Regarding Consumers
The approaches of the U.S. and the EU, while different, are not an
exclusive binary. However, the divergence between the approaches
highlights the substance, causes, and effects of assumptions regarding
consumers. The U.S. focuses its food regulation on immediate food safety
concerns, rather than long-term effects or social or environmental concerns.
The FDA, which regulates about 80% of the U.S. food supply,94 has
repeatedly disclaimed responsibility for incorporating such concerns in its
regulations and guidance.95 For example, when refusing to incorporate U.S.
consumer comments regarding animal cloning in its policies, the FDA said,
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 13.
91. TNS OPINION & SOCIAL for the EUROPEAN COMM'N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMERTER
73.1: BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 13-32 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter EUROBAROMETER],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs 341 en.pdf.
92. For example, the EU has required member states to drop wholesale bans on GE
products. EU Tells Serbia to Drop GMO Ban in Order to Join WTO, B92.NET (Oct. 17,
2013),
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business.php?yyyy-2013&mm=l 0&dd=l 7&nav id=880
36.
93. Today, ninety GE crop varieties can be grown in and exported from the U.S.,
while only two are approved for cultivation in the EU, with thirty-nine approved as
imports. Gemma Masip et al., Paradoxical EU Agricultural Policies on Genetically
Engineered Crops, 18 TRENDS IN PLANT SCIENCE 312, 320 (2013). Some studies suggest,
though, that consumers do not actively avoid foods containing GE ingredients to the
degree predicted. Susanne Sleenhoff and Patricia Osseweijer, Consumer Choice: Linking
Consumer Intentions to Actual Purchase of GM Labeled Food Products, 4 GM CROPS
AND FOOD: BIOTECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD CHAIN 166 (2013).
94. FDA Facts: Food Safety Modernization Act, FDA (May 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FactSheets/UCM305765.pdf.
95. See generally U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA'S RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENT
ON THE ANIMAL CLONING RISK ASSESSMENT, RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY 5 (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/ucm055491 .htm.
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The agency is not charged with addressing non-science
based concerns such as the moral, religious, or ethical issues
associated with animal cloning for agricultural purposes, the
economic impact of products being released in commerce,
or other social issues unrelated to FDA's public health
mission.
96
In the U.S., the focus is thus on public health, or food safety. The Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act provided the FDA with the additional mandate
of providing nutrition and other labeling. 97 This facilitates some consumer
ability to make choices between foods, but only foods that the FDA has
decided are materially different.98
Public interest groups-such as the Center for Science in the Public
Interest, Public Citizen, and the Consumer Federation-cooperate with other
consumer groups on an international level, but do not have a formalized
association with either the FDA or Congress. Their input must be given
either in the form of lobbying, lawsuits, or the general public comment
process, which is not available until a ruling is already in draft stage and the
industry concerned has already been extensively consulted. 99 FDA officials
often are hired after working at a high level in a food or drug manufacturing
business.' 0 This structure allows for consumer input only at the last
moments of rule-making. Further, it results in a FDA that is more versed in
the perspective of the business than the perspective of the consumer.
In contrast, EU food regulations consciously respond to consumer
concerns. The European Commission has noted a need for increased
consumer education and involvement in order to increase confidence in the
market.0 1 In fact, citing the increased responsibility placed on consumers by
market liberalization, it developed a comprehensive strategy that includes
96. Id.
97. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (1990).
98. Id.
99. Comment on Proposed Regulations and Submit Petitions, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/Dockets/Comments/default.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2014).
100. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507 (2013) (discussing the crossover between public agency and private industry
employees).
101. Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European
Consumer Agenda - Boosting confidence and growth, at 9 COM (2012) 132 final (May
22, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/consumer agenda 2012 en.pdf.
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consumer education even during compulsory schooling years.1"2 EFSA
("European Food Safety Authority"), an EU analogue to the FDA, -oversees
food safety.10 3 In order to allow EFSA to assess and monitor how consumers
perceive it, EFSA also carries out research among its key target audiences,
performing routine assessments to see whether it is meeting its further goal
of "communication and dialogue" to "reinforce confidence and trust in
EFSA and the EU food safety system through effective risk communications
and dialogue with partners and stakeholders.
' 10 4
Consumer groups in the EU also benefit from formalized connections
to the government. For instance, the European Consumer Organization
("BEUC") lobbies EU decision-making bodies on behalf of independent
consumer groups throughout Europe."0 5 A significant part of their funding
comes from an EU grant for consumer organizations.10 6 Perhaps even more
significant is the European Consumer Consultative Group ("ECCG"), which
was created by the European Commission to advise it on consumer issues
and disseminate information to consumer groups.'0 7 To preserve the group's
integrity, only individuals independent of both industry and government may
serve on the ECCG. 108 The divergent consumer input structures between the
U.S. and the EU mirror the differences between how these governments have
dealt with developing food technologies.
102. Commission Staff Working Document on Knowledge-Enhancing Aspects of
Consumer Empowerment, at 17 COM (2012) 235 final (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter
Consumer Empowerment], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/commission-staff working-knowledge-en
hancing_2012 2014_en.pdf.
103. European Food Safety Authority, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/agencies/regulatoryagencies bodies/policyagencies/efsa/index en.htm
(last accessed Dec. 18, 2013).
104. Who We Work With, EFSA,
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/aboutefsa/efsapartners.htm (last accessed Nov. 20, 2014).
105. Who We Are, BEUC, http://www.beuc.org/about-beuc/who-we-are (last accessed
Nov. 20, 2014).
106. How are We Financed?, BEUC, http://www.beuc.org/about-beuc/financial-
information (last accessed Nov. 20, 2014).
107. European Consumer Consultative Group, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/eccgen.htm (last accessed Dec. 19,
2013).
108. European Consumer Consultative Group, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/consumers/protection of consumers/coOO10_e
n.htm (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013).
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1. Issues Raised
In the preceding illustrations, several issues emerge as central to
decisions of when and how to respond to consumer concerns: (1) distinctions
between process and product, (2) a right to know what one eats, (3) free trade
concerns, and (4) science-based regulation. The following sections address
those issues.
a. Process vs. Product
Product information relates to a good as received by the consumer. An
example of a product-related disclosure would be nutrition information: if a
granola bar contains 3 grams of fiber, this is so regardless of the machines
used to make it, the company's labor practices, or the types of pesticides used
to grow the ingredients. Process information, on the other hand, addresses
how the product got to be the way it is: Did its production harm workers,
animals, or the environment? Is there a difference between this good and
another one that appears identical? Examples of process information include
organic, fair trade, and dolphin-safe labels.
The process/product distinction features prominently in international
trade negotiations and U.S. food labeling regulation.° 9 In international trade,
process-based distinctions are viewed as suspicious, disguised protectionism
rather than responses to legitimate market needs.110 Under WTO rules,
process-based measures elicit stricter scrutiny and require more justification
than product-based measures." U.S. rule makers have relied on this
distinction when dismissing consumer wishes for more information.112 U.S.
industry groups have developed free-speech legal arguments by
distinguishing process information as less substantial than product
information." 3 On the one hand, they argue that mandatory process
disclosures are not justified by consumer interest; on the other, they claim
109. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences For Processes: The Process/Product Distinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540 (2004).
110. Id at 545.
111. Id. at 545-47.
112. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of
Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 431 (2002)
("[B]iotechnology should not be regulated as a process, but rather that the products of
biotechnology should be regulated in the same way as products of other technologies.")
(quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 25 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Kysar, supra note 109, at 569. For further explanation, see the section on
consumers' right to know. pg. 24 et seq.
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that their own voluntary process-related disclosures should be exempt from
the advertising regulations that apply to product-related information. 114
Critics say the process/product distinction is artificial, reductionist, and
difficult to apply." 5 Supporters claim the distinction protects consumers
hampered by information limitations and naYvet6." 6 In practice, the
process/product distinction can function to restrict information, adding to
problems of consumer confusion or lack of knowledge rather than solving
them."' "Natural" food labels provide a prime example. A majority of
Americans look for the label "natural" when they shop." 8 Most believe such
food is produced without pesticides, herbicides, genetic engineering, or
artificial ingredients. "9 Many further believe that a food labeled "natural" is
closer to these ideals than one labeled "organic."' 2° However, the FDA has
not defined the term "natural" and only offers voluntary guidance for its
use. 2 ' The past two years have seen over one hundred false advertising
lawsuits over "natural" claims alone.'22 Some, like PepsiCo's Naked Juice,
reached multi-million dollar settlements.'23 Public interest groups like the
114. Id.
115. Id.at 540.
116. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 641. ("This process/product distinction has been invoked to question the
authority of an importing nation to ban or label products that are developed using
processes deemed objectionable by its citizens; to rationalize ignoring overwhelming
consumer support for mandatory labeling of food products that contain genetically
engineered ingredients; and to narrow the constitutional conditions under which states
may force manufacturers to disclose process information or to face legal challenges for
disclosing false or misleading process information. These efforts to restrict the
informational environment of consumers exist uncomfortably within a global political
climate that increasingly embraces market liberalism and the rhetoric of consumer
choice as its fundamental guideposts.") (emphasis added).




119. What Does "Natural" Mean?, PCC SOUND CONSUMER (Oct. 2011),
http://www.pccnaturalmarkets.com/sc/1110/natural.html.
120. Id.
121. FDA, What is the Meaning of "Natural" on the Label of Food?, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm214868.htm (last updated May 8,
2014) ("From a food science perspective, it is difficult to define a food product that is
'natural' because the food has probably been processed and is no longer the product of
the earth. That said, FDA has not developed a definition for use of the term natural or its
derivatives. However, the agency has not objected to the use of the term if the food does
not contain added color, artificial flavors, or synthetic substances.").
122. Esterl, supra note 118.
123. Rachel Tepper, Naked Juice Class Action Lawsuit Settlement Over Health Claims
Means $9 Million For Consumers, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2013, 12:31 PM),
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Center for Science in the Public Interest see these labels as deliberate
deception: "There's a boatload of litigation and that is going to continue until
companies stop conning people. ' 24 Such situations fuel consumer
perceptions that the industry uses misleading process-related information to
capitalize on consumer values without addressing their concerns.125
b. Right to Know
Consumer claims that they have, at minimum, a "right to know" what
is in their food have followed closely on the heels of disclosures of
previously hidden technologies in food production. The concept of a right to
know has embedded itself in the American consciousness through its ties to
freedom of the press, government transparency, workplace safety,
carcinogen disclosure, and even consumer concerns about garment
sweatshops. 26 "The consumer right to know can be characterized as 'the
notion that the public has a basic right to know any fact it deems important
about a food or a commodity before being forced to make a purchasing
decision. '127
Many NGOs ("Non-Governmental Organizations") and consumer
groups support recognition of such a right, but the EU is one of the only
governments to have endorsed such a policy with regard to food. 128 While
the right to know carries great rhetorical power, its legal force in U.S. food
regulation is all but eviscerated. Right-to-know food-labeling legislation has
repeatedly failed in Congress.1 29 Courts have framed the right to know as
"mere consumer curiosity" in conflict with producers' free speech rights.' 30
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/naked-juice-class-action-
lawsuit n 3830437.html.
124. Esterl, supra note 118.
125. See also Aurora Paulsen, Catching Sight of Credence Attributes: Compelling
Production Method Disclosures on Eggs, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 280, 281-82
(2011) (concluding that failure to regulate process disclosures on egg cartons results in
consumer deception and premium prices paid for eggs with bucolic images that imply a
higher quality of product than the consumer receives).
126. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer's Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of
Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 301 (2006).
127. Id. at 302.
128. Id. at 292.
129. ld. at 293.
130. Alliance for Biolntegrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 (D.D.C. 2000);
Keane, supra note 126, at 314 ("[A]lthough the right to know concept theoretically
factors into the legal analysis of food labeling, in reality, it is only relevant once a
significant safety issue has been established."); Sally Noxon Vecchiarelli, Mandatory
Labeling Of Genetically Engineered Food: Constitutionally, You Do Not Have a Right
to Know, 22 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 215, 222 (2013).
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Litigation surrounding labeling milk from cows administered production-
increasing hormones ("rBST") resulted in holdings that limit a consumer's
right to know to "material" product differences that have been shown as a
possible cause of significant harm to the consumer. 3' Note, however, that
some producers have used a similar analysis to fend off attempted voluntary
labeling prohibitions 13 2 and some reasoning suggests even slight
compositional differences in products may provide a legal foothold for
consumer interest.]
33
On the other hand, the EU embraced a consumer right to know at the
community's inception. While some European commentators suggest
bolstering industry rights via international treaties, modeling the arguments
on the, U.S. industry's use of the Constitution, 34 EU consumers' political
power has increased rather than waned:
Legal support for the regulations is found in the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty, which expressly promotes the right to
consumer information as separate and distinct from health
and safety interests. From a political standpoint, European
food scares from the late 1990s have affected the public
consciousness about food safety such that the demand for
information about non-traditional foods cannot go
unanswered without political ramifications.' 35
131. Keane, supra note 126, at 306 ("A fair interpretation of Stauber and Alliance, at
least with respect to food labeling, is that consumers only have a right to know what
could harm them. However, even when a colorable likelihood of harm can be established,
the right to know turns out to be a rebuttable right.").
132. See Laurie J. Beyranevand, Milking It: Reconsidering the FDA's Refusal to
Require Labeling of Dairy Products Produced From rBST Treated Cows in Light of
International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 102, 113
(2012). Some argue that there is no right to food choice at all, much less a right to know
what you are eating. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV.
738, 744 (2013) (positing a right against forced consumption of any particular food).
133. Beyranevand, supra note 133, at 133-34; see also Paulsen, supra note 125, at 313-
15.
134. Bernd van der Meulen and Eva van der Zee, "Through the Wine Gate": First
Steps Towards Human Rights Awareness in EU Food (Labelling) Law, 8 EUR. FOOD &
FEED L. REV. 41, 45-6 (2013) (advocating EU application of international human rights
treaties to grant businesses "freedom of expression," analogous to the freedom of speech
enjoyed by corporations in the United States). While US court rulings on corporate legal
personhood paved the way for US industry legal arguments, it is unclear how the author
envisions corporations could qualify as humans deserving of universal rights.
135. Keane, supra note 126, at 292.
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Where food scares in the U.S. have been brushed aside after official
assertions of safety, similar issues galvanized EU consumers, leading to the
development of EFSA and the Novel Foods Regulation.136 However, even
with these protections, concerns linger regarding regulatory gaps, trade
disputes, how EU rules will apply to new technologies, and whether current
rules offer true choice to consumers. 37
c. Free Trade
While U.S. consumers believe increased international trade is
beneficial, 38 one encounters little discussion of the impact its rules have on
domestic consumers. International trade rules focus on free trade as a way to
increase efficiency and thus increase overall output and wealth; each area
should focus on its specialties, which will result in increased efficiency from
economies of scale.'39 Increased export profits will then enable the purchase
136. See Lizette Alvarez, Consumers in Europe Resist Gene-Altered Foods, NY TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2003, at A3. Such food scares led directly to the formation of EFSA and the
implementation of the Novel Foods Regulation. EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY,
About EFSA, EFSA, http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/aboutefsa.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2006); Alison Ma, Technology. Against the Grain. Controversy Around New
Genetically-Modified Crops May Have Caught Biotech Companies by Surprise, FIN.
TIMES MANDATE, Oct. 15, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 4261839; Q&A on the Novel
Foods Regulation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NEWS, (March 29, 2011, 11:31 AM),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20101019BKG88150/html/QA-on-the-novel-foods-regulation. Some
have expressed concerns that the Novel Foods Regulation unfairly prejudices products
from developing nations. Anu Liihteenmdiki-Uutela, European Novel Food Legislation
as a Restriction to Trade, Oct. 25, 2007, available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.eduIbitstream/7909/l/pp07la01.pdf.
137. Stokes, supra note 7.
138. AMERICA 'S PLACE IN THE WoRLD 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 3, 2013),
available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/12-3-13%20APW%20VI%20release.pdf.
139. Some argue that free trade in staple foods is the answer to world hunger, a view
echoed by the 1986 US Agriculture Secretary: "[The] idea that developing countries
should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure
their food security by relying on US agricultural products, which are available, in most
cases at much lower cost." Philip McMichael, The Impact of Globalisation, Free Trade
and Technology on Food and Nutrition in the New Millennium, 60 PROC. NUTR. SOC.
215, 219 (2001). Others see this increase in trade of foodstuffs as problematic for its
consequences of raising food prices. See, e.g., Jim Harkness, Free Trade Versus Food
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of goods not produced domestically. Free trade aims to lessen and eventually
eliminate restrictions on the sale of goods between different areas.
140
Trade restrictions can be direct or indirect. Financial levies like tariffs
that directly increase the price of an imported item are direct. However,
labeling and other production requirements-such as the EU measures
regarding hormones and genetic engineering-have been challenged
internationally through the WTO as indirect restrictions on trade.14 1 Such
measures are not trade restrictions on their face, but could have that effect.
For example, some WTO members argued that the U.S.'s recently proposed
Country of Origin Labels ("COOL") lowered the value of their imported
goods, because consumers automatically prefer domestic products. 1
42
Each country proposing such regulations cites a specific internal,
arguably consumer-oriented, rationale: EU member countries worried that
allowing cultivation of genetically engineered crops without a robust liability
structure in place would leave them unable to hold producers accountable for
environmental or health harms that may later be discovered. Similarly, they
expressed concerns over hormone use linked to BSE, cancer, and
reproductive defects. 43 U.S. regulators claimed COOL would increase
traceability in the event of safety issues and bring processed meats in line
with labeling requirements for other goods. 
44
Each of these measures may also have some market influence. If these
measures have such an effect, those who stand to profit will support them as
well. While looking at who stands to gain from a policy can provide helpful
information, automatically treating any market-influencing measure as
suspect greatly increases the difficulty a country faces when implementing
consumer wishes and addressing their concerns. Some free trade
commentators have criticized this tendency, claiming that the goal should
not be eliminating trade barriers per se: "Policymakers must realize that the
objective is not simply a matter of removing barriers to trade, but promoting
140. For a list of trade barrier examples see Trade Barriers, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://madb.europa.eu/madb/barrierscrossTables.htm (last updated Nov. 28, 2013).
141. See, e.g., Labelling, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/labellinge.htm (last accessed Dec. 22,
2013).
142. Vilsack: Let WTO Resolve Country-of-Origin Labeling, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Nov., 15, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/vilsack-let-wto-resolve-
country-of-origin-labeling/; Remy Jurenas and Joel L. Greene, Country-of-Origin
Labeling for Foods and the WTO Trade Dispute on Meat Labeling, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., Sept. 16, 2013, at 14-15.
143. See generally Harkness, supra note 139.
144. See Jurenas & Greene, supra note 142.
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trade in a way that would benefit the public."'' 45 Without tethering free trade
discussions to the public good, the rules look like little more than political
and industrial battering rams.
Free trade arguments have also appeared in U.S. domestic spats, but
have lain dormant for several decades. 146 One Iowa Representative revived
them during recent Farm Bill debates when he proposed that Congress
interpret the Commerce Clause to mean that states cannot regulate interstate
trade based on the means of production. 47 While this amendment was
targeted specifically at state-level animal welfare laws-including a recent
California law requiring that all eggs sold within its borders be produced by
hens in humane facilities by 2015-it could also have put into effect a lowest
common denominator rule for food safety and seed quality standards, as well
as for state-level labeling requirements. 148 Proponents argued the amendment
should pass to increase choice and lower prices for consumers, 149 while
opponents claimed that it would impermissibly nullify choices that a state's
citizens have made for themselves about the kinds of products they want to
buy. 5° Similar discussions have taken place among EU member states,
particularly Germany, France, and the UK.'
5'
145. Debra M. Strauss, The Application Of TRIPs To GMOs: International Intellectual
Property Rights And Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 287, 319; Keane, supra note
126, at 301.
146. See generally, Paul T. Truitt, Interstate Trade Barriers in the United States,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (1941), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol8/iss2/2; Steven G. Craig and Joel W. Sailors,
Interstate Trade Barriers and the Constitution, 6 CATO J. 819 (1987), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journa1/1 987/1/cj6n3-6.pdf.
Federal bodies rarely mediate interstate trade disputes, but a few cases have been decided
at the Supreme Court level. David R. Francis, A War Between the States. Home-Grown
US Trade Barriers Costly, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 20, 1984),
http://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0920/092015.html.
147. Steve King, The Protect Interstate Commerce Act Offers State Trade Solution,
BEEF USA, http://www.beefusa.org/ourviewscolumns.aspx?newsid=2620 (last accessed
Dec. 22, 2013).
148. Lauren Bemadett, Proposed King Amendment Threatens Broad Spectrum of Food
Issues, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/proposed-king-amendment-threatens-broad-
spectrum-of-food-issues/.
149. King, supra note 147.
150. Anne Lieberman, King Amendment to House Farm Bill Ignores Consumer
Trends, THE HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG (June 20, 2013, 7:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/306637-king-amendment-to-
house-farm-bill-ignores-consumer-trends.
151. Natalie Chen and Dennis Novy, Many Trade Barriers Remain High in the EU,
Vox (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/zero-tariffs-and-high-trade-costs-eu-
technical-barriers-trade; UNICE INTERNAL MARKET WORKING GROUP, It's the Internal
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d. Science-Based Regulation
The approach dubbed "science-based regulation" requires proof of
actual harm in order to place limitations on a product or process. This
principle appears within WTO mechanisms and U.S. food and agriculture
policies. In the abstract, it sounds undeniable that this would provide a
needed, objective standard against which to make international and domestic
rules. However, it assumes a product or process is safe until shown
otherwise. This means the burden is on those concerned about the product,
those who may not have enough evidence of long-term harm until after a
product has been widely distributed. With food, unless the harm is acute and
immediate, proof of harm will likely not be possible until the product has
been distributed and consumed for some time.
Many contrast science-based regulation with the precautionary
principle, which requires proof of safety before distribution if there is a
significant risk. EU regulations tend to favor this approach, which places the
burden on the producer or promoter of the product. While both approaches
lie on a spectrum and both have benefits and drawbacks, this juxtaposition
shows why the food industry tends to favor the science-based approach: it
requires less investment and effort up-front, lowers costs, increases market
opportunities, increases market certainty, and exculpates them from liability
for unforeseen consequences. 52
Juxtaposing the burdens of each approach also shows why consumers
tend to favor the precautionary approach: it requires that innovations are
affirmatively shown to be safe before they are widely disseminated; it
protects consumers from the effects of possibly detrimental technologies;
and it gives consumers confidence that the long-term effects of new
technologies have been taken into account. Because both approaches take
into account scientific findings, the nomenclature may be somewhat
misleading. "Ultimately, this is much less a discussion [] about whose
approach is more 'science-based' than it is about establishing the right time
Market, Stupid! A Company Survey on Trade Barriers in the European Union, UNICE 8
(May, 25, 2004),
http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/multimedia/archive/00000/A companysurveyon tr
_375a.pdf. Assertions of national sovereignty in analogy to states' rights in the WTO
have been rebutted by the consensual nature of the relationships. See CLAUDE E.
BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2002).
152. See e.g., Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, NY TIMES (Oct. 25, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/25/magazine/playing-god-in-the-garden.html
("Monsanto should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food. Our interest is in
selling as much of it as possible. Assuring its safety is the FDA's job.") (quoting Philip
Angell, Monsanto's director of corporate communications).
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to act to prevent harm in the process of accumulating evidence, and how to
make manageable that point of action, be it early or late." '153
Proponents tout science-based regulation as a filter that will sort out
necessary measures from those based on unpredictable and varying social
values. Social values, or consumer preferences, are suspect. They should not
provide a basis for regulation, or even discrimination, because they could
unnecessarily hamper economic vitality and can fluctuate. Industries should
be allowed to develop and sell commodities without interference, unless
there is significant and undeniable justification.
Recent scuffles over ractopamine, a drug that mimics the function of
stress hormones in the bodies of animals that will be used for meat,
exemplify objectivity concerns. 54 Producers like this drug because it causes
more efficient conversion of feed to lean muscle weight, lowering the cost
to produce each pound of meat. 55 Sources say it is fed to 60% to 80% of
pork-producing pigs in the U.S. 56 Consumer organizations and some
governments, including the EU, oppose its use as a potential public health
hazard and on animal welfare grounds.157 In 2012, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, whose standards are recognized by the WTO as a basis for
trade disputes, placed the ractopamine bans of the EU, China, Taiwan, and
Russia on unstable footing by setting maximum residue levels. 58 The sixty-
nine to sixty-seven vote called into question the decision's objectivity and
sound scientific basis. 59 Additionally, Codex used to adopt measures by
consensus; resorting to votes on contentious issues leads to further lessening
of confidence. 1
60
153. Arguing about nothing? "Science-based" regulation of endocrine disruptors,
HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT (Jul. 21, 2013),
http://healthandenvironmentonline.com/2013/07/21/arguing-about-nothing-science-
based-regulation-of-endocrine-disruptors/.
154. See, e.g., Ractopamine Fact Sheet, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (Feb. 2013),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/ractopamine factsheet 02211 .pdf.
155. Burt Rutherford, Codex Commission Adopts Global Standards For Ractopamine
Hydrochloride, BEEF (July 5, 2012), http://beefmagazine.com/health/codex-
commission-adopts-global-standards-ractopamine-hydrochloride.
156. Helena Bottemiller, Dispute over Drug in Feed Limiting US Meat Exports, FOOD
& ENV'T REPORTING NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.thefem.org/2012/01/dispute-over-drug-in-feed-limiting-u-s-meat-exports/.
157. Ractopamine Fact Sheet, supra note 154.
158. Helena Bottemiller, Codex Adopts Ractopamine Limits for Beef and Pork, FOOD
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Industry groups are also influencing such scientific bodies. 16' Many
science-based regulations and standards depend not on independent findings
but on assessments provided by industry stakeholders themselves. 62 In
addition to conflict of interest concerns, they also often omit costly human
studies. 63 If a country or agency wants to set higher standards, that is seen
as protectionism, rather than warranted caution.
These concerns have also surfaced regarding the FDA, which primarily
evaluates evidence offered to it from other sources."64 Similar concerns have
been lcvied against EFSA. 165 Industry groups may also use the science-based
regulation principle to naysay consumer choices based on criteria like
environmental concerns or corporate control of foods by labeling these
consumers as anti-science, or anti-technology. 1
66
2. Assumptions
a. What They Are
i. U.S. Consumers should Accept Goods that Meet Minimum Standards
Addressing consumer discomfort with the current relationship of food
and technology requires an evaluation of the assumptions behind current
161. Kuei-Jung Ni, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety
Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response of WTO Adjudication to Problematic
International Standard-Making, 68 Food & Drug L.J. 97, 97 (2013).
162. MARJELLE D. MASSON-MATTHEE, THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION AND
ITS STANDARDS 68 (2007).
163. European Food Safety Authority, Safety Evaluation of Ractopamine: Scientific
Opinion of the Panel on Additives and Products or Substances Used in Animal Feed,
1041 EFSA J. 1, 24, 28 (2009), available at
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajoumal/pub/1041.htm.
164. See, e.g., Ramona Bashshur, FDA and Regulation of GMOs, ABA HEALTH
ESOURCE (Feb. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba -health -esource- home
/aba health lawesource_1302_bashshur.html; Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop
Research?, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug. 13, 2009),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-seed-companies-control-gm-
crop-research.
165. Martin Banks, EFSA's Anniversary Hit by Protest over "Industry Capture" of
Food Safety, PARLIAMENT (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.theparliament.com/latest-
news/article/newsarticle/efsas-anniversary-hit-by-protest-over-industry-capture-of-
food-safety/.
166. See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, Looking Behind the Curtain. The
Growth of Trade Barriers that Ignore Sound Science, NFTC.ORG (May 2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/forums e/ngoe/posp47 nftc looking behind e.pdf.
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policies. Based on the illustrative technologies and themes evaluated so far,
the U.S. and EU seem to ascribe different functions and capabilities to
consumers. U.S. policies allow choices among products that have met
official minimum standards, but do not facilitate choices that look behind or
second-guess these thresholds. This seems to imply that consumers have a
low level of sophistication when choosing foods: they could not understand
the issues at play even if they received the information. Further, consumers
who wish to coordinate their social values with their food choices must
purchase specialty products, the labeling and regulation of which has caused
its own confusion and tensions. Industry groups have argued voluntary
informational labeling itself is misleading without an acute safety threat. 167
The FDA has discounted concerns through suggested disclaimers, such as
the one on rBST free milk: "No significant difference has been shown
between milk derived from rBST-treated and non-rBST treated cows.
1 68
The use of the word "significant" here simply denotes immediate health
effects. While consumers have a limited right to knowledge about their food,
consumer choices that conflict with FDA minimum standards are tolerated
at best. At worst-as with GE foods-such choices are intentionally
frustrated, after being labeled irrational, reactionary, or anti-science.
ii. EU Consumers should Use their Purchasing Power to Make Social
Choices
EU policies emphasize consumer education; they imply that consumers
can and should make informed, intelligent choices. 169 The EU consumer
empowerment plan specifically notes the importance of consumer education
and choice in an increasingly global economy:
The growing emphasis in policy-making on the freedom and
responsibility of consumers to make their own informed
choices means that consumer education is seen as a key tool
in ensuring the smooth operation of markets. However, the
167. See, e.g., Letter from FTC to Monsanto (April 21, 2007), available at
http://milk.procon.org/sourcefiles/FTC-to-monsanto.pdf.
168. Id.
169. See generally Stokes, supra note 7 (asserting the growing need for EU structures
to support these choices). Some say that retailers make the choices, not consumers, so
consumers have only an indirect choice based on what retailers believe that they want.
See, e.g., Colin A. Carter and Guillaume P. Gruere, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically
Modified Foods: Does it Really Provide Consumer Choice?, 6 AGBIOFORuM 2003, at
68, available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v6nl2/v6nl2al3-carter.pdf (last visited
Nov. 21, 2014).
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development of consumer education practices, in formal or
non-formal education, appears in most countries not to
reflect this shift in emphasis. 7°
Further, EFSA's goal to increase consumer confidence in the EU food
system acknowledges that regulators must work to deserve consumer trust;
consumers are not irrational for finding official assertions less than
comforting.171
EU policies also assume that purchasers can legitimately reflect social
values in their decisions. When asked why they do not prefer various food
technologies, EU consumers do not hesitate to say that they want to preserve
the livelihoods of their farmers, or preserve biodiversity, or reduce pesticide
use on their land-the kinds of value judgments that are not directly related
to the safety of the food itself.172
b. Where They Come From
i. Economic Investments
Commentators suggest several reasons for these divergent
assumptions: (1) economic investments, (2) market assumptions, and (3)
industry power. 73 The U.S. invests significant resources into developing
new technologies, including their applications to food. The government
provides tax incentives for research and development,' 74 grants funds for the
development of specific technologies,1 75 and develops technologies for
170. Consumer Empowerment, supra note 102, at 16.
171. Id. at 6.
172. See EUROBAROMETER, supra note 91, at 18.
173. At least one commentator assesses U.S./EU differences in GE plant regulation as
ultimately dependent on consumer preference and only peripherally connected to
production commitments, attitudes toward mass production, and centers of political
power. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2012). This
analysis, however, ignores the low level of actual US consumer awareness. See NPD
GROUP, Over Half of U.S. Consumers Are Concerned About Genetically-Modified
Foods, But the Definition of GMOs Is Unclear Among Consumers, REPORTS NPD (Dec.
19, 2013), http://www.foodproductdesign.com/news/2013/12/gmo-concerns-steadily-
grow-among-consumers.aspx.
174. See generally Jonathan Talley, The Research and Development Tax Credit:
Moderately Effective but Hampered by Politics, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 77 (2011)
(discussing U.S. R&D tax credits, which began in 1981).
175. See U.S. Government Grants, About Us, TECHNOLOGY GRANTS, http://us-
government-grants.net/technology-grants (last accessed Dec. 22, 2013) (noting that for-
profit corporations may receive grants if they are "conducting research" or "creating
jobs").
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military use that are then commercialized.' 76 In contrast, the EU incentives
for R&D have been criticized as too low 7 7 and have been re-evaluated over
the past ten years. 178 By the time a given technology is ready to market, both
the U.S. government and industry have already committed significant
resources. It stands to reason that they would look for the broadest market
possible, while the EU would not experience the same loss by preserving
their status quo.
ii. Market Assumptions
U.S. regulators and judges tend to encourage developments in food
technologies. 79 Innovation appears to promise increased consumer choice
and decreased cost, as well as quality improvement.1"0 This optimism seems
to assume that any negative effects will be visible enough that the industry
will have motivation to correct itself. It seems to further assume that any
176. See Dana Nicolau, Innovation and Knowledge Transfer in Emerging Fields: The
Case of Nanotechnology in Australia, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 384, 392 (2005)
("[T]he military market provided an important springboard for small companies in
electronics and computers, and, later, in biotechnology."); James P. Chandler, The Loss
of New Technology to Foreign Competitors: U.S. Companies Must Search for Protective
Solutions, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 305, 308 (1994) ("For the past 50 years,
the major stimulus for U.S. technology research and development has been the design,
development and production of weapons and space systems. Many commercial products
today are the result of technologies developed for defense applications.").
177. See Simon Tilford, Is EU Competition Policy an Obstacle to Innovation &
Growth?, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM (Nov. 2008),
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/201 1/essaycom
petition st 20novO8-1359.pdf.
178. Placing Taxation at the Service of Research and Development, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/taxation/131047_en.htm (last updated Feb. 8,
2007).
179. See generally Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation In The European Union
And The United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525
(1998) (concluding that, "the U.S. regulatory approach doubts the safety of many
traditional foods but embraces new technologies like genetic engineering and
irradiation.").
180. This attitude appeared as early as the 1930s, when a court evaluated Bred Spred,
a new product that looked like jam but contained very little fruit. Though consumers had
no indication of this difference other than the absence of the word "jam" on the jar, the
court refused to find the product misbranded, adulterated, inferior, or even an imitation
of jam. See United States v. Ten Cases, More or Less, Bred Spred, Etc., 49 F.2d 87 (8th
Cir. 1931) ("There is nothing harmful or deleterious in the product Bred Spred. It has
some food value and some nutritive value."). See also MEREDITH A. HICKMAN, THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 36 (2004).
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damage caused will be readily identifiable and reversible--or at least that
companies involved will be held responsible.
The EU embraces technical innovations in food more cautiously.18" '
While they were originally more liberal in adopting hormones and GE crops,
the EU reacted to unforeseen consequences by moving more cautiously
thereafter. EU consumer education program materials suggest market
liberalism is inevitable, leaving the government unable to implement all the
restrictions it may see as valuable. Informing consumers becomes the new
mechanism for protecting them, and relies on a view of the consumer as
active in shaping the market, rather than as passively receiving from it.
iii. Industry Power
Assumptions about consumers' lack of sophistication in the U.S. mirror
industry arguments that those who do not embrace their technologies are
"rogue anti-technology campaigners""' or "cynical . . . scare
campaign[ers]."' 83 This perspective bleeds into government because the
same people who work for the biotech and pharmaceutical companies behind
the technologies take up positions of power in agencies like the USDA and
FDA."'84 These individuals often move to the private sector, leading to what
some see as the industry becoming its own de facto regulator. While there is
a vigorous debate over whether this "revolving door" produces inappropriate
bias, there is no debate over its existence. 
85
181. See Echols, supra note 179, at 543 ("These influences in the EC tend to result in
laws that accept the safety of traditional foods and production processes, like that for raw
milk cheeses, but hesitate in the face of new technologies and novel foods."); Heidi
Moore, The US-EU Trade Deal Could Take Monsanto 's GM Crops off the Table,
GUARDIAN (May 15, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/i 5/us-eu-trade-deal-monsanto-
crops.
182. John Entine, Exposing the Anti-GMO Legal Machine: The Real Story Behind the
So-Called Monsanto Protection Act, FORBES (April 2, 2013, 5:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/j onentine/2013/04/02/exposing-the-anti-gmo-legal-
machine-the-real-story-behind-the-so-called-monsanto-protection-act/.
183. Henry 1. Miller & Jeff Stier, Mandatory Labeling Of Genetically Engineered
Foods Deserves A Warning Label Of Its Own, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrymiller/2013/10/09/mandatory-labeling-of-
genetically-engineered-foods-deserves-a-waming-label-of-its-own/.
184. See, e.g., Judy Saransohn, Under Bush, the Revolving Door Gains Speed,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/26/AR2005102602454.html.
185. See generally Jason luliano, Killing Us Sweetly: How to Take Industry out of the
FDA, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 31, 84-5 (2010) (discussing the approval process of artificial
sweeteners as evidence of the conflicts of interest guiding high level FDA decisions),
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The government-industry partnership in the U.S. begins early in almost
any technology's development; many spring from academic-industrial
partnerships, which attract government funding.'86 In addition to alleged
agency capture, biotech and pharmaceutical industries-the main producers
of controversial food innovations-also wield immense political and
academic influence. 87 A recent Lancet study found multinational food
corporations, many U.S. based, use tactics similar to the tobacco industry in
order to undermine health policies and circumvent regulation. 18 8 Examples
of these tactics include producing biased research, diverting health
professionals and policy makers to promote their products, lobbying against
regulations, promoting individual votes against regulations, and deflecting
David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 548-
9 (2013) (concluding the crossover between public agency and private industry
employees is not a touchstone of corruption, but that bureaucrats have incentives to do
their regulatory jobs well to preserve their reputations, among other reasons); Elizabeth
R. Glod6, Advising Under the Influence?: Conflicts of Interest Among FDA Advisory
Committee Members, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 293, 321-2 (2002) (concluding that the FDA
must re-evaluate its conflict of interest criteria); James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription
Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a Better Food
and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 338 (2005) (asserting that the
FDA does not have the needed independence from the industry).
186. See Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflict Of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical
Frontier, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 151 (2001) (discussing 1980s Bayh-Dole Act and its
incentives for academic-industrial partnerships, which some claim are responsible for the
rise of biotechnology); Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (Mar. 1, 2000, 12:00 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/03/the-kept-
university/306629/?singlepage=true.
187. See Interview by Steven M. Sellers with Jerome Kassirer, MONEY & MEDICINE,
Trial 34 (June 2012) ("1 do worry a lot about ghostwriting [i.e., articles written by
industry representatives but bylined by physicians], much more than I did when I was
the editor [of the New England Journal of Medicine] .... And it's not just ghostwriting
of review articles; it's even ghostwriting of clinical trials."); W. John Thomas, The Vioxx
Story: Would It Have Ended Differently In The European Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED.
365, 376 (2006) ("[T]he pharmaceutical industry has the largest lobbying organization
in Washington."); Bradford, supra note 173, at 32 ("Biotechnology is seen as a key for
retaining the U.S. competitiveness in export markets .... Consequently, U.S. farmers
and the entire biotechnology industry are influential players in the U.S. political
process.") (internal citations omitted); Nicola Lucchi, Governing Control over Human
Genetic Resources: Promises and Risks, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 254, 254-55 (noting the use
of biotechnology in developing new pharmaceuticals).
188. Rob Moodie et al., Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects of
Tobacco, Alcohol, and Ultra-Processed Food and Drink Industries, LANCET, Feb. 12,
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attention from the health of their products by engaging primarily in unrelated
philanthropic arenas.
89
In the U.S., consumers are implicitly told to leave safety concerns to
the FDA, despite the fact that the FDA process has little pre-market power
to address long-term health implications. This leaves consumers vulnerable,
as shown by the recent action against trans-fats. 9 ' Artificial trans-fats
entered the U.S. food supply in the 1950s, and caused significant scientific
alarm in the 1980s, but industry pressures have delayed meaningful FDA
action until 2013.191 Perhaps tellingly, food industry arguments in the EU
reflect their government's opposing assumptions. Biotech trade
representatives use these arguments to claim, as it relates to Europeans,
"There is no evidence that opposition to GM food is a manifestation of a
wider disenchantment with science and technology in general." 192 This effort
to engage consumer approval directly seems to stem from the industry's
sense of its lack of political clout in the EU.
C. Nanotechnology Applications to Food
It is in this convoluted food regulatory space that nanotechnology is
beginning to come into its own. The concept of manipulating atoms on an
extremely small scale has existed since at least the late 1950s, and throughout
its ensuing development commentators encouraged tailored and cautious
regulatory responses.193 However, most consumers remain unaware of this
developing technology, much less that over 1,600 products on the market
include nano-materials.'
94
189. Id. at 673-4.
190. Kristin Wartman, Trans Fats: Deadly Consequences of FDA Inaction, CIVIL EATS
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://civileats.com/2013/11/20/trans-fat-travails/.
191. Id.
192. George Gaskell et al., EUROPEANS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY IN 2005: PATTERNS AND
TRENDS, EUROBAROMETER 64.3 May 2006, at 3, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2006/pdf/pr1906 eb 64 3 final report-
may2006 en.pdf; What do European Consumers Really Think about GM Foods?,
EUROPABIO,
http://www.europabio.org/sites/default/files/facts/what-do european-consumersreally
-think about gmfoods.pdf (last accessed Dec. 23, 2013) (arguing that consumers
should be given more opportunities to choose between GE and non-GE foods, with
increased information being made available).
193. Stokes, supra note 7, at 180-8 1.
194. See Brita Belli, Eating Nano, E MAG. (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.emagazine.com/magazine/eating-nano ("[E] ach of us likely consumes some
amount of titanium dioxide (TiO2) nanoparticles each day, and children under 10 likely
consume the greatest amounts ... due to their higher intake of frosted foods, candy, gum
and other sweets"); see also Stokes, supra note 7; Press Release, WILSON CTR., Inventory
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Nanoparticles are materials that are microscopic-
significantly smaller than a red blood cell; and tens of
thousands of times smaller than the width of a human hair.
These particles can help deliver nutrients, ensure longer
freshness of food, act as thickening agents or enhance taste
or flavor. The problem is, scientists are still determining the
health and environmental impact of these tiny particles,
even as industry is forging ahead. 95
The web of standards that may be imposed on developing technologies
makes application of current measures to nanotechnology uncertain.
Additionally, the growing global sense of consumers distrust of the food
industry and of regulatory bodies suggests that new food technology should
inspire new approaches to their development and regulation.
While the majority of consumer nanotech applications relate to durable
consumer goods, many relate to food. One example is nano-sized titanium
dioxide, which is present in "many processed foods, including Mentos,
Trident and Dentyne gum, M&Ms, Betty Crocker Whipped Cream Frosting,
Jello Banana Cream Pudding, Vanilla Milkshake Pop Tarts and Nestl6
Original Coffee Creamer."' 96 While some nano-sized materials exist in
nature (like viruses, some milk proteins, and caramelized foods),
nanotechnology enables the production and manipulation of materials not
originally present in nano form.197 While the chemical composition is the
same, materials produced at nanoscale increase in surface area, which can
increase reactivity and result in different properties than their conventional
counterparts.198 For instance, some opaque materials are transparent at
Finds Increase in Consumer Products Containing Nanoscale Materials (Oct. 23, 2014),
available at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/9241/nano oct 2013_finalver.pdf
; Andy Behar, Study the Use of Nanoparticles in Food, CNN (Feb., 14, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/14/opinion/behar-food-nanoparticles/.
195. Belli, supra note 194.
196. Twilight Greenaway, Nanoparticles in Your Food? You 're Already Eating Them,
GRIST (Dec. 3, 2012, 8:40 AM), http://grist.org/food/nanoparticles-in-your-food-youre-
already-eating-them/. Food applications of nanotechnology are often discussed in the
following categories: (1) packaging, (2) cookware, (3) supplements, and (4) in foods
themselves. Jill Richardson, Meet the Four Categories of Nanofoods, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS ( Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/11/meet-the-four-
categories-of-nanofoods/.
197. Greenaway, supra note 196.
198. What is it & How it Works, NANO.GOv, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what
(last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
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nanoscale; some materials that normally would be excreted after ingestion
can migrate into various tissues at nanoscale and accumulate; some materials
simply have a different texture or are lighter.'99 These different properties
are precisely the reason they are being developed.00 In fact, the United States
government has allocated almost $21 billion to nanotechnology research.
2 1
Like genetic engineering, nanotechnology has significant potential
across the food and agriculture spectrum:
Nanotechnologies are expected to contribute to materials
with better, for instance[,] antimicrobial properties; and to
"smart" packaging using sensors to indicate food
spoilage. . . . Nanotechnologies are expected to enable
encapsulation devices which protect sensitive food
ingredients, improve their solubility and mask unpleasant
tastes. They enable processing technologies such as particle
stabilized emulsions which can contribute to novel food
structures which have novel "mouth sensations."
Nanotechnologies may contribute to highly sensitive sensor
technologies to detect food pathogens and may be used to
monitor crop growth.2 °2
Many of these potential benefits could accrue to consumers directly in the
form of superior products, whether in terms of nutrition, safety, or simply a
new food experience. Further, food packaging developed with
nanotechnology may significantly reduce food waste, helping to address
world hunger.
Discussion of nanotechnology regulation has stalled based on industry
apprehension that consumers are opposed to technology applications to food,
or "concerns about concerns. 203 Food made with nanotechnology does raise
199. Nanocomposites, NANOSONIC (2011),
http://www.nanosonic.com/29/nanocomposites.html.
200. Frequently Asked Questions, NANO.GOv, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-
101/nanotechnology-facts (last accessed Dec. 23, 2013).
201. Id. According to a 2011 report, the US leads worldwide nanotech research, with




202. Haico te Kulve et al, Context Matters: Promises and Concerns Regarding
Nanotechnologies for Water and Food Applications, 7 NANOETHICS 17, 22 (2013)
(internal citations omitted).
203. Id. at 22, 23 (noting that such concerns are "largely about the perceptions by
advocates of nanotechnologies (such as industry) about possible negative perceptions of
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health and safety concerns, and some question the magnitude of the actual
benefits:
[P]ossible health and safety issues includ[e], for example,
the possible migration of nanomaterials in food packaging
or possible toxic effects of nanoparticles used to improve
taste or the nutritional value of food products. Occasionally
other issues are mentioned, such as possible environmental
impacts of nanomaterials, i.e. impacts of disposed
nanomaterials. In addition, some voices do not refer directly
or indirectly to health or environmental risks, but are
skeptical about the performance of future products and their
economic feasibility.20
4
Assessing these concerns presents additional difficulty because of the
breadth of nanotechnology: engineered nanomaterials comprise a broad
category, with wide-ranging potential concerns and possibilities. One
engineered nano-material may be quite harmful, while another completely
benign. Informed citizens cite several concerns reminiscent of other
technologies discussed: long-term health effects, environmental
repercussions, how the technology's development is controlled, and how
risks would be assessed and distributed. 25 These concerns do not reflect anti-
technology sentiment. In fact, consumers polled were more interested in
nanotechnology in food than in GE technology in food, but still wanted more
transparency. 20 6 They cite what they saw as past failures of regulators to take
into account their interests (e.g., BSE, asbestos, Agent Orange) as an impetus
for such concerns.207
Many nanotechnology commentators have discussed the lack of
consumer engagement and transparency by industry promoters of GE foods
as a pitfall to be avoided with the introduction of nanotechnology.
2°
However, industry proponents and governments have largely ignored this
insight. In the mid-2000s, several countries-including the UK, U.S.,
consumers, so concerns about concems, rather than examining actual data of consumer
perceptions. Expectations about negative consumer responses are supposed to affect the
way how the food industry approaches nano-based applications, namely by keeping
silent about the respective activities.") (internal citations omitted).
204. te Kulve, supra note 202, at 23.
205. Georgia Miller, Nanotechnology and the Public Interest: Repeating the mistakes
of GMfoods?,7 INT'L J. TECH. TRANSFER & COMMERCIALIZATION 274, 275-76 (2008).
206. See generally id.
207. Id. at 276.
208. See id.
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France, and Germany--experimented with "public engagement exercises,"
but none connected to actual decision making.
209
Not only are nanotechnology developers refusing to identify and target
socially desirable developments, less than one half of one percent of
worldwide technology research funding goes to research of health and
environment risks. 210 Even among Swiss and German companies, which
serve some of the most eco-conscious consumers, new nanotechnologies are
rarely assessed for risk.211
Nanomaterials are effectively un-tracked and un-regulated in most of
the world. Despite vast development investments, no country has
implemented a nano-specific approval or regulatory regime." 2 As of the end
of 2014, the EU requires labeling of nanotech-enhanced food and
cosmetics.213 The still-developing science makes it unclear, though, exactly
how products will be regulated or which will be subject to approval under
the Novel Foods Regulation.214
In the U.S., no government body to date has developed requirements
for engineered nanomaterials. The FDA does not even track nanotech used
in food products. 215 The U.S. regulates nanotech materials just like their
209. Id. at 279.
210. Miller, supra note 205, at277.
211. Id. at278.
212. Several countries have disallowed engineered nanotech particles in foods labeled
"organic": Canada, UK, Austria, Australia. In the US, the Organic Crop Improvement
Association has banned nano in organics; while the National Organic Standards board
recommended in 2010 that nanotech be disallowed in organics, no final stance seems to
have been taken. NATIONAL ORGANIC STANDARDS BOARD, Formal Recommendation to
the National Organic Board, Oct. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl .0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5087795; Canada
Bans Nanotechnology in Organics, ORGANIC & NON-GMO REPORT (May 2010),
http://www.non-gmoreport.com/articles/may I 0/canada-bans-nanotechnology-
organics.php.
213. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, & the European Economic & Social Committee on the Second Regulatory
Review on Nanomaterials, COM (2012) 288 final (Oct. 3, 2012); see also Nicola Barrett,
European Union Regulation of Nanotechnology in the Food Industry, 8
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 252 (2012).
214. See generally Daniela Marrani, Nanotechnologies and Novel Foods in European
Law, 7 NANOETHICS 177 (2013) (noting the EU's incremental regulatory approach,
which subjects nanomaterials to the same kinds of rules as other products unless new
risks are found to require different rules, as well as the lack of international agreement
on definitions and risk assessments, which may lead to trade disputes).
215. Belli, supra note 194 ("Following is a recent email exchange with Sebastian
Cianci, a spokesperson at the FDA: E Magazine: What can you tell me about the
prevalence of nanomaterials in our food supply? Sebastian Cianci: FDA does not have a
list of food products that contain nanomaterials. E: Where are nanomaterials most often
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larger counterparts, unless the manufacturer voluntarily identifies a material
difference.2"6 Despite repeated assertions that public information and
engagement will encourage development of nanotechnology, governments
and industry are largely ignoring the so-called lessons of the GE food
controversies.217 Efforts by public interest groups to this end have met with
failure,218  and consumer information regarding nanotechnology
developments has actually been declining.2 19 Retailers have similarly failed
to demand life-cycle safety or environmental impact studies. Experiences
with genetic engineering and other technologies seem to have brought
discussion of nanotech in food to a standstill.
III. A NEW MODEL FOR CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT
IN DEVELOPING FOOD TECHNOLOGIES
A. Responses to Current Assumptions
1. United States
While U.S. consumers are expected to accept goods that meet
minimum safety standards due to an inability to adequately evaluate
additional issues,2 2 ° this paper has shown this approach is lacking. Widely-
found within food products? In colorings or additives? S.C.: FDA does not maintain a
list of food products that contain nanomaterials so we cannot reliably answer this
question.").
216. FDA, Guidance for Industry, 2014 CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION
4, 5 ("As with all food substances, this guidance also is intended to recommend that you
consult with us regarding a significant change in manufacturing process for a food
substance already in the market, irrespective of your conclusion about whether that
change affects the safety or regulatory status of the food substance. It is prudent practice
for you to do so, particularly when the change in manufacturing process involves
emerging technology .... The consequences (to consumers and to the food industry) of
broadly distributing a food substance that is later recognized to present a safety concern
have the potential to be significant.")
217. Miller, supra 205, at 277 (2008); see, e.g., Carla Almeida, Brazil Struggles to
Regulate Emerging Nanotechnology, SCIDEVNET (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://www.scidev.net/global/technology/feature/brazil-struggles-to-regulate-emerging-
nanotechnology.html.
218. For example, in 2006, a coalition of consumer and environmental groups
petitioned the FDA for labeling and testing of new nano-enhanced products. In 2011, it
sued for a response to the petition. Complaint at 2, International Center for Technology
Assessment et al., v. Hamburg, Docket No. 3:11 -cv-06592 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
219. Caroline Scott-Thomas, Consumers Less Aware of Nanotech as Media Coverage
Falls, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.foodnavigator.com/Financial-
Industry/Consumers-less-aware-of-nanotech-as-media-coverage-falls.
220. See generally Wartman, supra note 190; Heinzerling, supra note 47.
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cited risk-communication expert David Ropeike, diagnoses this situation as
the "malady of Fear of Fear," noting that, contrary to popular belief,
Choice makes risks feel voluntary. It makes us feel
empowered, more in control of our health and safety, and
that makes any risk feel less scary. Time and time again,
when people are given choice-as labeling would do-their
fears are reduced and they engage in risks they fight tooth
and nail when the risk feels imposed.221
Unnecessarily restricting consumer decision-making by excluding
information is counterproductive. It encourages skepticism and distrust.
Assumptions of consumer unwillingness or inability to engage in calculated
risks also hamper consumer efforts to make choices that implement their
social or ethical values.222 This "lowest common denominator" approach can
also mislead by portraying food choices as black and white, safe or unsafe,
resulting in consumer inaction, due perhaps to a false sense of security or
bystander apathy.223
Finally, focusing developments in the food industry on patented or
patentable technologies may not be beneficial from a consumer standpoint.
A frequent claim arises: granting and protecting government-granted
monopolies (i.e., patents on crops or other food-related technologies) is the
only way to promote innovations that will address consumer tastes and
market needs, like increased production to meet growing world nutrition
demands. However, this claim may prove unsubstantiated if empirically
analyzed.
224
221. David Ropeik, GMO Labeling: An Open Letter to BigAgTech CEOs, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 6, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-ropeik/gmo-
labelingb 4224023.html.
222. See, e.g., Dorothy Du, Note, Rethinking Risks: Should Socioeconomic and Ethical
Considerations be Incorporated into the Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops?, 26
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 76 (2012).
223. See Wartman, supra note 190; Heinzerling, supra note 47(discussions of trans fats
and antibiotic resistance); see also Alison Peck, Does Regulation Chill Democratic
Deliberation? The Case of GMOs, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 685 (2013).
224. See Emily Marden & R. Nelson Godfrey, Intellectual Property and Sharing
Regimes in Agricultural Genomics: Finding the Right Balance for Innovation, 17 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 369, 391 (2012) ("[B]oth regimes that grant [P and those that mandate the
sharing of such resources are necessary for continued innovation in the agricultural
genomics space .... The collective impact on innovators by these fragmented and
complex regimes has not been conclusively documented and remains difficult to unravel
for developers and academic commentators alike."). For an overview of plant patent
history, seed market consolidation, and reduction in biodiversity, and other issues related
to plant patents, see Allyson Martin, Seed Savers v. Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory
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2. European Union
While the EU seems to operate from a different starting point than the
U.S., saddling consumers with the responsibility to implement social choices
through their individual choices brings its own set of concerns. First, labeling
alone may not be enough to facilitate an informed decision. For instance, a
consumer may see "made with Nanotechnology" but not know how that
information should be used. A recent pamphlet from an EU biotech trade
organization, EuropaBio, noted that consumers may be interested in
purchasing technologically enhanced food products with additional
information, such as whether the technology resulted in lower pesticide
residue, or involved a more environmentally friendly process.225
Second, a consumer may lack superior options or feel inundated with
so many important choices that she may become overwhelmed rather than
empowered. Alternatively, consumers may feel satisfied with doing the best
they can even when that "best" is bounded by production and distribution
mechanisms that conflict with their values. Some academics discuss this
phenomenon as a growing "consumer burden" resulting from liberal trade
and regulatory policies.22 6 This suggests that even the EU's aggressive
education plans may not assure consumers a meaningful way to enact their
social values or make purchases consistent with their ethical concerns.
3. How to Think about Consumers
Consumers can react viscerally when they feel information has been
deliberately hidden from them, even if they would have accepted the change
with an adequate up-front explanation. These considerations suggest that
industry and government should shift to thinking of consumers as true
stakeholders rather than simply purchasers and digesters of products.
for Wilting Biodiversity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 95 (2013). A
research project by the National Bureau of Economic Research concluded that plant
patents may in fact result in market concentration and uniformity of available varieties,
using rose plants as a case study. Petra Moser and Paul W. Rhode, Did Plant Patents
Create the American Rose? in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY
REVISITED 413 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stem, eds., 2012).
225. EUROPEAN ASSOC. FOR BIOINDUSTRIES, What do European Consumers Really
Think about GM Foods?, EUROPABIO,
http://www.europabio.org/sites/default/files/facts/what do european consumersreally
-think aboutgm foods.pdf (last accessed May 22, 2014).
226. See, e.g., CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION (Thomas Princen et al., eds., 2002); JULIE
GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM
(2011).
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Nutritional science has been and still is developing its understanding of the
significant connection between food and health, so consumers often find the
old adage, "you are what you eat" still resonates with them. Thus, access to
information about and control over food choices becomes ever more
important to consumers. Consumers have exhibited heightened awareness of
food sensitivities and allergies, as well as the environmental impacts of their
food choices. Many with the means and time to do so have made efforts to
opt out of the current food system in the U.S. (e.g., growing popularity of
farmers markets; growth in sales of Organic, Fair Trade, and Kosher labeled
foods). These shifts indicate a public that feels it deserves to see how it would
be benefitted by new developments.
B. Mechanisms for Forward Motion
The current U.S. approach to food technologies has been largely ad hoc
and has resulted in consumer uncertainty and distrust. Some may say that
these developing technologies are all so different from each other that no
adequate alternative exists. Regardless of the diversity of concerns or
technologies at issue, however, keeping in mind Ropeike's assessment of
risk may prove instructive. 27 He claims that sound decisions regarding new,
evolving, or difficult-to-characterize risks demand accurate and careful
communication of the magnitude of the risks as best understood, even if they
are uncertain."'
Industry actors can respond to consumer discontent by making their
cases for the use of new technologies in foods, showing that the technologies
are not benefitting companies at the expense of consumer values. Regulators
can insist on sharing information and facilitate meaningful consumer input.
Food-applicable technologies will only develop and proliferate, and
government and industry actors may be able to address this by adopting
proactive, communicative regimes for development and regulation of new
technologies used in food. These regimes should involve both information
communicated to consumers and facilitation of meaningful consumer input.
Descriptions of several suggested components follow.
227. George M. Gray and David P. Ropeik, Dealing With The Dangers Of Fear: The
Role Of Risk Communication, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 106, 115.
228. Id.
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1. Invigorate GRAS Implementation by Enabling Pre-Market Notice and
Review
While pharmaceutical products must pass pre-market FDA review,
food products are not generally subject to such scrutiny. However, in 1958
Congress responded to consumer concerns regarding increased additive use
in foods by enacting the Food Additives Amendment.229 It requires approval
of "substances used in packaging, transport, processing, preparation, and
other processes that might either affect or migrate into food." 23 Some
commentators argue that GRAS, one of the exceptions to this rule, has made
the rule all but ineffective.
A substance is GRAS if "generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate [their] safety...
to be safe under the conditions of [their] intended use." '231 The FDA has
implemented GRAS using various procedures since its enactment, but
currently a food producer who wishes to assert that an additive is GRAS is
not even required to alert the FDA-the process is voluntary.232 This means
that new additives, whether used in the food, its packaging, or elsewhere,
may not even be on the FDA's radar, much less approved for use or evaluated
according to the statutory exception's requirements.
While the FDA began a comprehensive review of GRAS substances in
1970, this halted due to lack of resources.233 Now the FDA reviews GRAS
substances only when specific issues are raised.234 With some food additive
petitions taking over a decade to complete the petition process, food
companies have every incentive to identify an additive as GRAS if any
argument can be made that it meets this vague standard. Facing possible
penalties down the road can make much more business sense than submitting
to an uncertain approval process that can take over half of the patent
length.235 Mitigating or removing this perverse incentive should be a primary
goal of food system reform. Requiring mandatory pre-market notice and
publication of claimed GRAS status seems to be a reasonable start.236 Even
229. Laurie J. Beyranevand, Generally Recognized As Safe?: Analyzing Flaws in the
FDA 's Approach to GRAS Additives, 37 VT. L. REV. 887, 894 (2013).
230. Id.
231. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012).
232. Beyranevand, supra note 133, at 906.
233. Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 449 (2008).
234. Id.
235. Peter Barton Hutt, Regulation of Food Additives in the United States, in FOOD
ADDITIVES 199, 205 (A. Larry Branen et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
236. As a corollary, the food additive approval process may also require reform to
become a viable option.
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a published notice requirement would provide a foothold for consumer
awareness and response.
2. Labeling New Technologies is a Minimum Threshold
Foods containing, processed with, or packaged using new technologies
should be labeled in order to facilitate consumer awareness and traceability
in the case of unforeseen consequences. Those who oppose increased
labeling requirements argue that required information labels can become de
facto warning labels, which may cause unwarranted negative responses. On
the other side, voluntary labeling statements have caused just as much, if not
more, confusion to consumers. Consumers make purchases based on the
information available to them regarding safety, nutrition, and environmental
and ethical concerns. This is the case even if that information is unregulated
or implied, and very few consumers are aware of which statements are
regulated, which are not, and just what that means for their reliability.237 The
case of industrialized egg production provides a salient illustration:
[M]any consumers are paying premiums for eggs adorned
with images of farms without knowing what those
illustrations mean. Other consumers are declining to pay for
eggs with superior nutritional or safety qualities because
they do not have enough information about how eggs are
produced to know that those added qualities are important,
or they do not trust that labeling indicating those qualities is
truthful. Thus, there is a breakdown in the relationship
between consumer preference and the types of eggs
consumers ultimately choose. Such a breakdown indicates a
market failure, because egg prices are not reflecting actual
demand for food qualities, such as increased nutrient
content. Indeed, one may conclude that there is a lower
supply of high-quality food products (e.g., cage-free or free-
range eggs) than there would be if this information
asymmetry were remedied.
238
Without labeling new technologies, packaging implies that the contents are
what they always have been in the past, creating misinformation through
237. See FDA, What is the Meaning of "Natural" on the Label of Food?, supra note
121.
238. Aurora Paulsen, Catching Sight of Credence Attributes: Compelling Production
Method Disclosures on Eggs, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 280, 317 (2011).
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silence and assumptions or through provision of selective information. 239
Ideally, a labeling scheme would involve not just a notation about the new
technology, but also assess its environmental or health impact, or note the
lack of available information, with additional detail available in an online
database or agency publication.24°
3. Facilitate Pre-Market Consumer Input through Consultant Boards
Providing the information consumers need to make informed choices
about their food requires knowing what kind of information consumers look
for when they make purchases, and what their priorities are. It also requires
balancing those interests with regulatory resources, research priorities, and
industry needs. Consumer representative groups-similar to the ECCG-
should be created and required to consult on labeling regimes and regulations
regarding new technologies. Involving an independent board in this arena is
an ideal way to balance the concerns of the industry for privacy and the need
for consumer input-the members of the consultant board can easily abide
by non-disclosure agreements when needed.
An additional and perhaps even more crucial arena for consumer
involvement seems to be in allocating research funding.241  The U.S.
government directs substantial funds to directly and indirectly subsidize
technology development; engaging consumer input regarding the social
utility of funded projects could result in more efficient use of funds and a
239. For a detailed discussion of the potential for food labels to facilitate consumer
choice, including health, environmental, and ethical issues, see J.C. Horvath, How Can
Better Food Labels Contribute To True Choice?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCi. & TECH. 359 (2012)
(this issue also dovetails with discussions regarding mandatory front of pack labeling
limitations).
240. The EWG cosmetic rating system is a relatively easy to use and informative
format that may present a helpful model for noting new food technologies and
communicating risk in a helpful way. It rates each ingredient and product on two levels:
hazard, and data availability. EWG's SKIN DEEP DATABASE COSMETICS DATABASE,
http://www.ewg.org/skindeep/faq/ (last accessed May 22, 2014). Hazard is rated from 0
to 10 and data availability is rated on five levels - ranging from "none" to "robust." Id.
Data availability is reflected by the color that serves as a background to the hazard rating.
Id.
241. See, e.g., European Commission Services, Towards Responsible Research and
Innovation in the Information and Communication Technologies and Security
Technologies Fields, 2011 EURPOEAN RESEARCH, SCI. IN SOC'Y 10 ("In order to
anticipate positive and negative impacts or, whenever possible, define desirable impacts
of research and innovation both in terms of impact on consumers and communities.
Setting of research priorities with their anticipated impacts needs to be subject to a
societal review. This implies broadening the review of research proposals beyond
scientific excellence and includes societal impacts.").
[VOL. 10
2014] LET'S STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE TRANSPARENCY 277
stimulation of research that would result in new food products responding
directly to consumer needs or concerns. European studies looking at how to
assess technology have already been conducted and could inform U.S.
efforts.242
4. Reconsider International Trade Policies on Food Technologies
Agriculture and food-related intellectual property ("IP") issues have
formed some of the most contested areas in current trade agreement
negotiations. With WTO stagnation came an emphasis on bilateral
agreements as the primary vehicle by which powerful trading entities like
the U.S. and EU implement increased IP protections.2 43 The U.S. is now
negotiating two massive trade agreements: Trans Pacific Partnership
("TPP") and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") /
Transatlantic Free Trade Area ("TAFTA"). 2' These negotiations involve
non-tariff barriers, which some fear will include bargaining away regulations
and standards that consumers view as protections.2 45 Domestic consumer
organizations claim that leaked negotiation materials show TAFTA
negotiations include efforts by each party to weaken protections.2 46 Similar
concerns were anticipated regarding TPP, whose chief agricultural
negotiator is a former lobbyist for pesticide and agribusiness firms.2 47
242. See, e.g., BRIDGES BETWEEN SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND POLICY (Michael Decker and
Miltos Ladikas eds., 2004).
243. See Kaitlin Mara, Stronger IP Enforcement Finds A Home In Bilateral Trade
Agreements, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (APRIL 21, 2009, 12:09 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2009/04/21/stronger-ip-enforcement-finds-home-in-bilateral-,
trade-agreements/.
244. For a comparison, see Ulli Jamitzky, TAFTA/TTIP and TPP in Comparison:
Similar Interests, Unknown Outcomes, in THE TRANSATLANTIC COLLOSSUs 44, 44
(Daniel Cardoso et al. eds., 2013).
245. Glyn Moody, TAFTA/TTIP: What Are The Benefits? What Are The Costs?, TECH
DIRT (Apr. 18, 2014, 12:04 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140417/09391926947/taftattip-what-are-benefits-
what-are-costs.shtml.
246. Debbie Barker, Trade Matters, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (May 2014),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfs-tradematters_76070.pdf; TAFTA COULD
MAKE You SICK. A BACKDOOR FOR FOOD CONTAMINATION, PUBLIC CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/TAFTA-food-factsheet.pdf (last accessed May 22,
2014).
247. Marian Burros, Agriculture Nomination Steams Greens, POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2009,
4:47 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28722.html. Almost 100 groups
wrote to the Senate to protest his nomination. Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, 98 Organizations
Oppose Obama's Monsanto Man, Islam Siddiqui, for US Agricultural Trade
Representative, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION (Feb. 22, 2010),
http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_20276.cfm; see also Trans-Pacific
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While international trade is perhaps the most inaccessible forum for
consumers, it is arguably the most influential and should be a priority in any
effort to address consumer concerns. International trade negotiations are
anything but transparent, and some see them as a way for government and
industry to enact rules that would never appeal to the public but present a
potential profit opportunity.248 These negotiations can include trade lobbyists
but rarely involve consumer representatives or even Senators.249To remedy
this imbalance a consumer group should be included anywhere industry
lobbyists are included.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through this discussion of current trends and potential improvements
to involving consumers in the development of food technologies, a
significant disconnect has emerged. U.S. food technology policies operate
on a largely voluntary basis in the ostensible belief that market forces will
adequately safeguard consumers. However, this review has shown that
industry actors continue to advance legal actions, lobbying campaigns, and
initiatives that seek to expand their ability to avoid market downsides, to in
effect alter the market. This should come as no great surprise, as 78% of
surveyed managers admit that steady earnings from quarter to quarter and
year to year are their primary motivation, even at the risk of long-term
negative consequences.25 ° It also underscores the importance of establishing
institutions and processes that will involve consumer voices and values in
the development of new technology applications to food.
Many commentators see consumer preference as an opposing force to
technology in the food system. Discussions often focus on a specific issue,
such as constitutional rights, then analyze whether consumers or industry
have, or should have, the upper hand in that isolated context. However, as
theories of profitable consumer engagement develop in the social media age,
Partnership (TPP): Fast Track to a Gusher of Imported Fish, FOOD & WATER WATCH
(April 2014), http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/TPPImported Fish.pdf;
Fast-Tracking Corporate Power: Investor-State Dispute Resolution and the TPP, FOOD
& WATER WATCH (Jan. 2014),
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Fast TrackingCorporate Power.pdf.
248. David Brodwin, Op-Ed, Obama's Pacific Trade Deal Is No Deal At All, US NEWS




250. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 1-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10550, 2004).
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it seems increasingly likely that engaging consumers will improve a
21company's bottom line.
Decisions in this arena should not, however, rely solely on market
vitality. While transparency brings benefits, they may be insufficient
motivation for some. Best efforts to be responsive to consumers in a world
of fast changing technologies must include mandatory measures
incorporating consumer input.
251. See, e.g., V. KUMAR, PROFITABLE CUSTOMER ENGAGEMENT: CONCEPT, METRICS
AND STRATEGIES (2013).
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I. INTRODUCTION
When is the last time you ventured through the drive-thru of a fast food
establishment? Maybe last night when it was just easier than taking the time
to cook dinner, or maybe last weekend on your way home from vacation, or
maybe when you were running low on funds and needed a cheap meal?
Given the busy, fast-paced lives Americans lead, it is no wonder that many
rely on the fast food industry, even though most would not care to admit it.
In 2013, 64 percent of U.S. consumers did, in fact, admit to eating at a
fast food restaurant within the past month.' Needless to say, fast food is
something upon which this consumer nation relies, and is both a luxury and
convenience to the people who take advantage of this service. The
hamburger segment of the fast food industry was found to be the most
popular.2 Specifically, McDonald's was determined the most popular brand
in the business as of 2013 in a survey by Judith Karbstein.3
* J.D. Candidate, Spring 2015, University of Arkansas School of Law. Ms. Hodges
would like to thank her friends and family for their support, and Professor Mary Beth
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People may not think about how frequently they take advantage of
these outlets, but what if suddenly fast food restaurants were gone? The
effects of litigation such as Pelman v. McDonald's could mean higher prices
and other barriers, making this a possibility for some consumers.4 Such
lawsuits are lengthy, expensive, and could have a significant impact on the
fast food industry as a whole. The allegation in Pelman was that McDonald's
had caused the plaintiffs' obesity, together with associated health related
problems.' More specifically, plaintiffs alleged McDonald's advertising was
false and misleading in that it failed to warn of the consequences of
consuming its food and led consumers to believe the food was actually
healthy.6 Reliance on these representations led to over-consumption, and
thus weight oriented health issues.7 After nine years of litigation, the suit was
finally voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.8 Whether the parties settled
remains unknown to the general public. The main obstacle to the plaintiffs'
success appears to have been proving the necessary causation.9 Plaintiffs
were not able to prove the direct relation between the food consumed and
resulting health problems; mainly because each individual is unique and a
number of different considerations can affect one's health. 0
These types of lawsuits threaten the food industry as a whole, not just
the fast food segment, and it is likely that courts will see more of such obesity
suits in the future. Causation is one of the necessary elements of the
plaintiffs' cause of action, and without hard evidence, it is unlikely that
future suits will be successful. As a result of the litigation threat, beginning
with Pelman in 2003, members of Congress attempted to stop such frivolous
suits by means of a bill introduced in the Senate in 2003.11 The bill, known
as the Commonsense Consumption Act ("CCA"), 12 will be examined in
depth later in this article. In general, the bill prohibited civil litigation against
all food outlets, manufacturers, distributors, marketers, etc. based on a claim
of weight-gain, obesity, or any other health condition related to obesity or
4. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F.Supp.2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter
Pelman I], refiled as 2003 WL 22052778 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Pelman
I], vacated in part as 396 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Pelman II], remanded
396 F.Supp.2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Pelman IV], denied in part 452
F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Pelman V], denied in part 272 F.R.D. 82
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Pelman VI].
5. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 512.
6. Id. at 520.
7. Id. at 522.
8. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
12. Id.
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weight gain. 3 The bill was introduced again in 2005, 2007, and once more
in 2009.14 However, it has yet to pass.
15
This article will analyze the claims, arguments, relief, and
consequences of the Pelman case. Based on that analysis, a strong argument
can be made in favor of passing the Commonsense Consumption Act on the
federal level. However, its passage may raise some concerns that Congress
should first resolve. This article will first analyze the stages of Pelman in
detail, to serve as an example of what such litigation is like, and then proceed
to examine the effects of such lawsuits. Next, the article will take a look not
only at the federal government's efforts to address such litigation, but also
what individual states have done in response to obesity-related fast food
litigation. After a look at both litigation and legislative alternatives, this
article will summarize the pros and cons of each of these methods, along
with suggesting which option may be the best alternative.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Original Suit: Pelman I
This case was originally filed by two minors, Ashley Pelman by her
mother Roberta Pelman, and Jazlyn Bradley by her father, Israel Bradley.16
Both parents also made individual claims. 7 The named defendants were
McDonald's of New York, a New York corporation with its principal place
of business in New York, and McDonald's Corporation, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois.18 Plaintiffs
claimed to have consumed food from the Bruckner Boulevard outlet and the
Jerome Avenue outlet, both of which are entities controlled by both
McDonald's of New York and McDonald's Corporation.19 This is because
the two entities work together in dictating ingredients and the quality and
quantity of the food provided to make sure that the product sold in a given
location is identical to the product sold throughout the rest of the country,
13. Id.
14. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 111th Cong. (2009);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007); Commonsense
Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
15. Id.
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and also because all advertisements and promotions are authorized by both
entities.
20
All of the plaintiffs had previously purchased and consumed
McDonald's food and claimed that this consumption caused them to suffer
health problems, namely weight gain and other negative health effects such
as diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. 2' The
gist of their allegations was that had it not been for McDonald's conduct and
business practices they would not have consumed the food in such large
quantities and would not have been injured.
1. Federal Court
Plaintiffs originally filed suit in August of 2002 in the state supreme
court of New York, Bronx County.23 However, the defendants then moved
to remove the case to federal court in the Southern District of New York in
September 2002, on the basis of diversity, alleging that the plaintiffs had
fraudulently joined parties to destroy diversity jurisdiction-meaning that
their intention for joining McDonald's of New York was to destroy diversity
and any hope for removal to federal court.24 Defendants further moved to
dismiss the complaint, while the plaintiffs cross-moved to remand back to
state court.25
The defendants McDonald's Corporation and McDonald's of New
York alleged that there was diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332, which in sum says that to constitute diversity jurisdiction, the matter
in controversy must exceed $75,000 and the parties must be citizens of
different states.26 In Pelman I, complete diversity did not exist because one
of the defendants, McDonald's of New York, shared citizenship with the
plaintiffs, also from New York, unless the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined
the defendants to overcome diversity jurisdiction. 27 To prove fraud injoining
a non-diverse party, the burden is on the alleging defendant to show that by
clear and convincing evidence, there was fraud in the plaintiffs' pleadings or
there is no reasonable basis for liability against the non-diverse party in light
of the alleged claims.28
20. Id.
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The court ultimately found that the central issue was over-consumption
of products created, produced, distributed, and advertised at a national
level.29 The court concluded that the food would be the same at one outlet as
at another.3" Therefore, plaintiffs' cause of action is based on the national
menu and policies of McDonald's.3 As the court described it, "the plaintiffs'
real beef is with McDonald's Corporation."32 Therefore, McDonald's of
New York was released from the lawsuit, the plaintiffs' motion to remand
was denied, and the case remained in federal court.33
2. Analyzing the Plaintiffs' Claims
The court was then required to address the defendant's motion to
dismiss.34 In doing so, the court considered each of the five counts alleged in
the plaintiffs' complaint.35 Ultimately, the court dismissed all counts.36
a. Count I
Count I of the complaint alleged a violation of the New York Consumer
Protection Act by "deceptively advertising their food as not unhealthful and
failing to provide consumers with nutritional information."37 Section 349 of
the New York statute specifically makes it unlawful to use "deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce, or in the
furnishing of any service in this state." 38 Section 350 of the statute makes
illegal "any false advertising in the conduct of any business." 39 In order to
properly state a claim under either section, precedent required the plaintiffs
to show that: 1) the act was consumer oriented, 2) the act was misleading in
a material aspect, and 3) that plaintiff was injured as a result.4"
Count I specifically alleged that the New York Consumer Protection
Act was violated by both acts of commission, e.g., claiming the food was
healthy, encouraging larger "supersize" meals without revealing the negative
29. Id. at 523.
30. Id.
31. Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d at 523.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 524.
35. Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
36. Id. at 512.
37. Id. at 524.
38. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §349(a) (McKinney 2012); Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 524.
39. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §350 (McKinney 2012); Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d at 524-
525.
40. Pelman I, 237 F.Supp.2d at 525.
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hazards, and by acts of omission, e.g., by not providing nutritional
information to consumers.4 Count I relating to both commission and
omission was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead a particular
deceptive act.42 The court found that an omission in failing to provide
nutritional information was clearly pled, but held that the plaintiffs had failed
to show why it was deceptive.43
b. Count II
The second claim again alleged violations of the New York Consumer
Protection Act, particularly by inducing minors to eat at McDonald's
establishments through utilizing deceptive marketing tactics.44 This claim
was dismissed for the same reasons as Count I-namely a lack of
specificity.45 The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show any one
deceptive advertisement directed specifically at minors, and thus dismissal
was the appropriate action.4 6
c. Count III
The court characterized the next three counts, Counts III, IV, and V, as
based on common law negligence. 47 The elements of a negligence claim
consist of: a duty to conform to a standard of conduct for the protection of
others, a breach of that duty, a causal connection between the conduct and
the alleged injury, generally referred to as legal cause or proximate cause,
and a resulting actual injury.48 Count III specifically alleged that the foods
provided by McDonald's were inherently dangerous because they contained
ingredients such as cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar in large levels.49
To properly state a claim for negligence, the plaintiffs must be able to
show that the food consumed was so unhealthy that it would be outside the
reasonable contemplation of consumers, or so unhealthy that it was
dangerous for its intended purpose." The court reasoned that it was common
knowledge that fast food contains such ingredients and that those ingredients
41. Id, at 527.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 529.
44. Id. at 524.
45. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
46. Id
47. Id. at 530.
48. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed., West Publishing Co. 1984).
49. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 531.
50. Id. at 532.
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are not necessarily good for the consumer.5 The court also noted that if a
person knows or should know of the probable consequence, it is not up to
the law to protect that person from that freely made choice.52
The court further stated that it would be nearly impossible to find the
required causal connection here without "wild speculation."53 The causal
connection referred to by the court was that McDonald's conduct in using
such ingredients substantially caused the plaintiffs' injury of weight gain and
related health problems.54 The court's decision to dismiss was based on the
lack of specificity in the plaintiffs' complaint, particularly in failing to
address such factors as the frequency of consumption and other health
considerations besides diet.55
Because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the hazards of consuming
such ingredients in large quantities was not well-known, and failed to show
some sort of proximate cause, Count III of the complaint was dismissed.56
d. Count IV
Count IV alleged a failure to warn of the unhealthy attributes of the
food McDonald's produced.57 A seller can be liable for negligence in failing
to warn if the seller failed to warn in general, or failed to give an adequate
warning of a risk inherent in the product's design that is related to the
intended uses of the product or related to the foreseeable uses of the
product.58
The question of whether a proper warning was given focuses on
whether the manufacturer, or producer, had a duty to warn in the first place.
5 9
The court noted that New York law dictates that obviousness and a
knowledgeable user will prohibit a finding of proximate cause, which is a
necessary element in proving negligence in failure to warn cases.6" The court
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that McDonald's food product
was any more dangerous than what would be known to the typical,
reasonable McDonald's food consumer.61 Because the possible dangers of
51. Id.
52. Id. at 533.
53. Id. at 538.
54. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d 512, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
55. Id. at 538-39.
56. Id. at 539-40.
57. Id. at 540.
58. PROSSER AND KEETON, Supra note 48 at 685.
59. Pelman 1, 237 F.Supp.2d at 540.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 541.
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consuming such food would be known to a reasonable consumer, the court
found that there was no duty and Count IV was also dismissed.
62
e. Count V
The plaintiffs' final claim alleged that McDonald's sold addictive
products.63 However, the District Court concluded that the claim was
unclear.' The court found the claim could be interpreted to allege that the
addictive attributes of the food made it inherently dangerous, or that there
was a failure to warn that the food was addictive in general. 65 The claim was
categorized as vague because the plaintiffs failed to specify the
characteristics that made the food addictive, i.e., whether it was it the
combination of typical ingredients, or some other additive, and also whether
McDonald's intentionally produced addictive food.66 In the absence of such
specificity, Count V was also dismissed.67 In summary, the entire complaint
was dismissed with leave to amend.68
B. The Amended Complaint: Pelman II
Within the year, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint listing
McDonald's Corporation alone as the defendant.69 The plaintiffs narrowed
their allegations to only three causes of action, all of which were based on
violations of the New York Consumer Protection Act, as first raised in
Pelman L7 The defendant again moved to dismiss, and the District Court
was required to determine the merits of the amended counts.7"
1. Allegations in the Amended Complaint
a. Count 1
The first claim alleged that McDonald's violated the N.Y. Consumer
Protection Act through misleading publicity and advertising, which indicated
62. Id.
63. Id. at 542.




68. Id. at 543.
69. Pelman I1, No.02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778, at I (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 1.
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that the food that it produced was consistent with a nutritional, healthy
lifestyle if consumed daily.72
b. Count II
Plaintiffs' next claim alleged that McDonald's violated the N.Y.
Consumer Protection Act by failing to disclose the unhealthy attributes of its
food."
c. Count III
The final claim alleged that McDonald's practiced unfair and deceptive
acts by representing to the public that it provided nutritional information at
every outlet when in fact it did not.74
2. Statute of Limitations Defense
McDonald's, for the first time, raised a statute of limitations defense to
the allegations, based on the fact that the advertisements specified as the
basis for the complaint were the same advertisements used in the late 1980's
for which the New York State Attorney General had already taken action
against McDonald's.75 The plaintiffs were made aware that they could use
these advertisements to assist in making a claim, but any claim based on
these advertisements specifically would likely be barred by the three-year
statute of limitations for deceptive act actions.76
3. Dismissal
All three counts were dismissed for failure to state a claim.77 However,
in regard to the claims of the minors, the court held that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until they reach the age ofmajority, eighteen
years old.78 The court therefore found that the claims of the two minors were
not barred by the statute of limitations, but the parent, adult claimants were
barred.79
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. Pelman 11, 2003 WL 22052778 at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. Pelman II, No. 02 Civ. 7821, 2003 WL 22052778 at 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
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Dismissal was again based on the failure to adequately plead
causation. 80 As stated previously, the plaintiffs must plead that the deceptive
act allegedly caused their injury.8 The court in Pelman II indicated that the
plaintiffs did sufficiently plead a causal connection between the deceptive
advertisements and their decision to consume McDonald's food, but failed
to show a connection between the consumption and their injuries. 82 Although
the plaintiffs' allegations were more specifically made in the amended
complaint, which addressed how much and how often the plaintiffs ate at
McDonald's, the complaint failed to consider many other factors that
contribute to obesity and their other health related injuries.
83
The court further stated that regardless of causation, the plaintiffs also
failed to show how the advertisements were objectively misleading, as
required by the statute.84 Although the plaintiffs relied upon several
advertisements, the complaint made no allegations as to the representations
about the effects of the food.85 The court reasoned that the effects of food
and types of food are different, and thus the advertisements could not be
found to be deceptive, based on the allegations laid out in the complaint.8 6
Because the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege causation and the
objectively deceptive nature of the advertisements, the complaint was
dismissed in its entirety.87 This time, the dismissal was with prejudice, so the
plaintiffs had no leave to re-plead.88
C. Appeal to the Second Circuit: Pelman III
The plaintiffs proceeded to appeal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.89 However, the plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of the claims
under the Consumer Protection Act §350, so those claims were deemed to
be abandoned.90 Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of the claims based on
§349.91 The Second Circuit found that §349, as laid out in Pelman I, was
broader than a typical common law fraud claim, and therefore, did not
80. id at 8.
81. id.
82. Id. at 8-9.
83. Id. at 9-10.
84. Pelman 11, 2003 WL 22052778 at 10.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 11-12.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id.
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require proof of the exact elements of fraud, such as reliance.92 The statute
specifically states that "deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state
are hereby declared unlawful."93 The court felt that the complaint alleged
more than enough to meet the requirements of the statute at such an early
time in the pleading process.94 Therefore, the District Court's judgment was
vacated and the case was remanded back to District Court.95
D. Remand to District Court: Pelman IV
After the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently
alleged deceptive and misleading acts pursuant to §349, the District Court
was left with two issues to decide: i) whether the complaint was too
unintelligible for McDonald's to properly respond, and ii) if that was found
to be true, what additions to the complaint were necessary for McDonald's
to adequately respond.96 The court was required to address these issues as a
consequence of McDonald's motion requesting a more definite statement.97
Once again, the court recognized that in order to state a claim under
§349, the plaintiffs must show: i) the act was consumer oriented, ii) the
alleged act was materially misleading, and iii) the plaintiff was injured as a
result.98 The court recognized that the complaint sufficiently laid out these
elements, but went on to say that sometimes one may lay out an adequate
legal theory, which may still not be sufficient to enable a defendant to
reasonably respond.9 9 The court found such to be the case in Pelman IV.'00
Before getting to the merits of the motion for a more definite statement,
the court noted that since the case was still at the pleading stage, the motion
would only be granted as to the portions where required information was not
provided, making the complaint unintelligible."l '
92. Id.
93. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §349(a) (McKinney 2012).
94. Pelman 1II, 396 F.3d at 512.
95. Id.
96. Pelman IV, 396 F.Supp.2d 439, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
97. Id. at 439.
98. Id. at 444.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Pelman IV, 396 F.Supp.2d at 445.
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1. McDonald's First Request
The court first addressed McDonald's request for a specific
identification of each of the allegedly deceptive advertisements. 102 The court
reasoned that although under §349 a general statement of deception is
enough, without knowing which representations allegedly injured the
plaintiffs, McDonald's could not in good faith admit or deny a violation. °3
McDonald's motion was thus granted with respect to this detail. 
104
2. McDonald's Second Request
The second detail requested was a description of why the
advertisements were materially deceptive, and as to this request, the motion
was also granted. 10 5 The court felt that a general allegation that
advertisements are objectively deceptive was vague.10 6 The court further
stated that McDonald's could not admit or deny the allegations without
knowing what made them objectively deceptive.'0 7
3. McDonald's Third Request
The third detail McDonald's requested was a confirmation that the
plaintiffs saw or heard each advertisement in New York, but this was not so
easily granted.'0 8 The court believed that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
causation under §349.109 Plaintiffs need not show reliance here, only that the
representation was objectively misleading and that they suffered an injury
because of being so misled."0 In order to show injury "by reason of' a
defendant's deceptive act, the plaintiffs must only briefly explain how they
were aware of the acts."' Therefore, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to only
provide a brief explanation of how they were made aware of these alleged
deceptive schemes, and they were not required to go into such extensive










111. Pelman IV, 396 F.Supp.2d at 446.
112. Id.
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4. McDonald's Final Request
McDonald's lastly requested a description of how exactly the
advertisements allegedly injured the plaintiffs.113 Because the Second Circuit
held that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs need not provide an explanation of how the advertisements injured
them, plaintiffs must only outline the injuries suffered "by reason of'
McDonald's conduct. 1 4 In summary, McDonald's motion was granted,
giving the plaintiffs the opportunity to provide these explanations.115
E. The Second Amended Complaint: Pelman V
Plaintiffs next filed an amended complaint and McDonald's moved to
strike and dismiss.1 16 In response to the order for a more definite statement,
the court found that the plaintiffs properly identified several allegedly
deceptive advertisements, and explained why those advertisements were
objectively deceptive. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that they became aware of the
alleged deceptive schemes from exposure to mass media outlets, such as
television, radio, magazines, posters, etc. in New York from 1985-2002.118
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that their beliefs about the nutritional value
of the food were also influenced by other misled third parties.11 9 The
complaint went on to provide a list of injuries the plaintiffs suffered,
including obesity, high cholesterol, increased factors of coronary heart
disease, pediatric diabetes, high blood pressure, and other adverse health
effects or diseases causally connected to long-term consumption of
McDonald's food products.120
The District Court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently detailed
how they were made aware of the alleged deceptive schemes. 21 The court
noted that the plaintiffs need not have seen or heard each advertisement, but
just plead that they were exposed to them in some form or fashion. 
122
Also, contrary to McDonald's beliefs, the second amended complaint's




116. Pelman V, 452 F.Supp.2d 320, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).




121. Pelman V, 452 F.Supp.2d at 324.
122. Id.
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for McDonald's to respond. 23 The 2dAC went on to outline portions of the
food consumed, frequency of consumption of specific food items, and the
time frame of the consumption of the food. 124 The 2dAC also included
allegations that the plaintiffs' body weight exceeded the Body Mass Index,
which would classify them as obese. 125 The court deemed this to be a
sufficient outline of the injuries suffered.
126
The 2dAC identified forty specific, allegedly deceptive advertisements,
along with a statement of intention to include other advertisements at a later
date. 127 However, this inclusion of the possibility of other unidentified
advertisements to be later introduced, would lead McDonald's unable to
fully respond to the complaint. 28 Therefore, the complaint was limited to
those forty advertisements with leave to amend other advertisements only
with good cause shown. 129 The 2dAC also mentioned a french fry
advertisement in which McDonald's claimed that its french fries were
"cholesterol free" or contained no cholesterol; however the court deemed
this specific advertisement to be objectively non-deceptive. 3 ° The court
reasoned that this was similar to its former ruling that a McDonald's Mighty
Kids Meal is merely puffery and cannot constitute a claim that it makes
children mightier, therefore this representation was stricken from the
2dAC.' 3' McDonald's motion to dismiss was denied and McDonald's was
ordered to respond. 1
3 2
F. An Attempt at Class Certification: Pelman VI
The plaintiffs next filed a motion for class certification.' 33 Class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) was found to be
inapplicable to this case because questions of law and fact, which would be
common to class members, would not predominate over questions as to
individual class members.' 34 Certification under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(4) was also deemed inappropriate because the pleadings did
123. Id. at 326.
124. Id.
125. Id.




130. Id. at 327.
131. Pelman V, 452 F.Supp.2d 320, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
132. Id. at 328.
133. Pelman VI, 272 F.R.D. 82, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
134. Id. at 85.
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not sufficiently identify a class of persons with identical claims and identical
injuries, as those claimed by the plaintiffs. 
1 35
Additionally, the court found that because counts 1, 11, and III claimed
identical injuries resulting from the exact same allegedly deceptive
marketing scheme, the three counts amounted to a single cause of action
under §349.136
1. Failing to Meet the Predominance Requirement of FRCP 23(b)(3)
Under §349 deception itself cannot be the injury. 137 The only injuries
the plaintiffs may claim under the statute are those related to the development
of the named medical conditions.13 8 However, proving the necessary causal
connection between consumption and injury would depend largely on factors
or characteristics unique to the individual. 139 Predominate inquiries as to
consumption and energy expenditure requires particular and individualized
inquiries into each individual's lifestyle.' Although there may be common
issues as to the allegedly deceptive marketing scheme, individual causation
issues would overwhelm those common issues and ultimately take
priority. 1 4 '
2. Class Certification under FRCP 23(c)(4) is also Not Available
The question of material deception is evaluated by an objective
standard.142 Such allegations may be common to the class who claim
exposure and injury.143 Although this may seem to apply to the case at bar,
the plaintiffs failed to provide the identities of other persons of the same age,
exposure, and consumption regimens that suffered the same medical
conditions in the pleadings.' The court must at least be able to infer that a
class does exist. 45 Because the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the




136. Id. at 89-90.
137. Id. at 92.
138. Pelman VI, 272 F.R.D. at 93.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 94.
141. Id. at 95.
142. Id. at 96.
143. Pelman VI, 272 F.R.D. 82, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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Therefore, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification
because the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a class satisfying the
requirements of FRCP 23.147 Shortly afterwards, in February 2011, the
plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the action, which was granted by the
court-but with prejudice. 48
III. THE EFFECTS OF PELMAN
Now that the stages of Pelman have been examined, it is important to
take note of some of the effects of the suit. First, this section will identify
similar cases, and indicate how possible plaintiffs might be chosen. Next,
there will be a discussion of the obstacles to success that obesity-related fast
food litigation must overcome. A somewhat controversial litigation
alternative will also be mentioned in this section. Finally, there will be an
examination of Pelman as a defense strategy.
A. Similar Cases
During the same time frame as Pelman, a few similar lawsuits were
brought which alleged deceptive nutritional marketing schemes; some also
claimed obesity or weight gain to be the injury.
1. Klein v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc.
In 2002, in the case of Klein v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc.,
plaintiffs sued a producer of snack foods alleging fraud and violations of
New York Consumer Protection Act, §349 and §350.141 One of the injuries
for which the plaintiffs sought damages was weight gain. 5 The case was
settled for $3.5 million in discount coupons and $790,000 in attorney fees,
but the settlement was rejected on appeal in 2006 because the appellate court
found that the trial court failed to consider whether class certification was
147. Id. at 100.
148. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02-7821 (S.D.N.Y. stipulation filed Feb. 25,
2011).
149. Holly E. Loiseau et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22 In-
House Litigator 1 (2007); Klein v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc., 808 N.Y.S.2d
766 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
150. Holly E. Loiseau et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22 In-
House Litigator 1 (2007).
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proper. 51 The case was remanded back to the trial court, and there has been
no further action to date.
1 52
2. Reyes v. McDonald's Corp.
In 2006, the plaintiffs in Reyes v. McDonald's Corp. alleged violations
of Illinois and New York Consumer Fraud Protection statutes. 153 The court
ultimately allowed the plaintiffs to move forward with the case, on the
premise of seeking to enforce FDA regulations, but the plaintiffs were
restricted from arguing for the imposition of stricter FDA regulations. 
154
This case illustrates that the food industry has had some experience
with these Pelman-type lawsuits. However, it is important to note that a court
has yet to rule on the causal connection of obesity or weight-gain being
induced by a food distributor's fraud or misrepresentation.
3. The Original Pelman Plaintiff, Cesar Barber
Prior to Pelman I, in 2002, Cesar Barber brought what has been
characterized as the first "tobacco-style" litigation lawsuit against the food
industry in New York state court, in which he alleged that McDonald's and
other fast food outlets were responsible for his ill-health and that of the
consumer population he represented.' 55 "Tobacco-style" lawsuits are
designed to take losses early on in litigation in the hopes that more cases will
lead to further discovery, and will ultimately result in a high-payout.
15 6
Barber was a fifty-six year old maintenance worker, who ate fast food several
times a week for over twenty-five years and weighed two hundred and
seventy pounds.' 57 Since he was not the most sympathetic plaintiff, Barber's
attorney halted the proceedings, arguably because of the looming fear of a
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Holly E. Loiseau, et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22
In-House Litigator 1 (2007); Reyes v. McDonald's Corp., 2006 WL 3253579 (N.D. ILL.
Eastern Division, 2006).
154. Holly E. Loiseau, et al., Super-Size Lessons from the "Big Food" Lawsuits, 22
In-House Litigator 1-2 (2007).
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Id.; Saul Wilensky, et al., Where's The Beej?-The Challenges of Obesity
Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG ( July 18, 2013), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-
contributions/wheres-the-beef-the-challenges-of-obesity-lawsuits/; Barber v.
McDonald's Corp., KFC Corp., Wendy's Int'l Inc., No. 23145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx
County 2002).
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bad public reaction. 58 Barber's lawyer then went in search of a more
sympathetic plaintiff.'59 That same attorney thereafter filed Pelman v.
McDonald's Corp., making it the first real "tobacco-style" lawsuit against
the food industry. 6 '
B. Obstacles to Successful Litigation
The central question of these lawsuits remains: is the fast food industry
really a primary cause of the nation's obesity epidemic? The fear that
attorneys may bring these lawsuits with the goal of achieving a high payout
for their individual benefit is a disturbing thought. Although these lawyers
may be prepared for the struggle ahead, they may fail to take into
consideration that the success of tobacco litigation was hard-won and did not
come until scientific evidence established the causal connection between the
effects of smoking and health damage.' 6 ' It is unlikely that success in
litigation against the food industry would be much different than tobacco
litigation, based on the cases that have been brought thus far.
Particularly, success with tobacco litigation did not occur until it was
discovered that the tobacco industry had purposely concealed nicotine's
addictive components and harmful consequences.'62 This is much like the
difficulties plaintiffs currently face in suing the food industry-namely
difficulty in establishing a causal connection between fast food's advertising
and production of unhealthy food items and their obesity or other related
health problems.
The lack of evidence of harmful components of such food is just one
hurdle plaintiffs must overcome. Another is proving that such advertising
schemes employed by food outlets are objectively deceptive or misleading.
One last issue plaintiffs must address, which is somewhat dissimilar to the
legal issues, is the argument in favor of personal choice. Critics of fast food
litigation argue that choosing to eat a particular meal, however many times
a week, is a personal choice. For example, Representative John Schwarz,
while supporting the bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, made the
argument that obesity could only be controlled by taking personal
responsibility and that being in control of one's weight is a person's
158. Loiseau, supra note 154 at 2-3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Bonnie Hershberger, Supersized America: Are Lawsuits the Right Remedy?, 4 J.
Food L. & Pol'y 71, 89 (2008).
162. Id.
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individual responsibility.'63 Such statements suggest that mass-marketed
food is harmful to one's health only if one allows it to be. Plaintiffs must
take into consideration that a jury might feel the same way.
C. An Alternative to Litigation
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg attempted to address the
nation's rise in obesity by proposing a ban on sugary drinks, specifically a
city-wide ban on sodas larger than sixteen ounces. 164 The Manhattan
Supreme Court and a four-judge panel of the appellate division rejected the
soda ban, reasoning that this action encroached on the separation of powers,
and that such a ban should be dealt with by the legislature.'65 The panel
further said that such a ban went beyond basic health concerns and
manipulated the choices of consumers.'66
D. Defense Strategies
Opponents of fast food litigation view Pelman and similar cases as a
roadmap for defense. By looking at the flaws of previous cases, a defendant
may be able to create a strategy not only for an ultimate defense, but perhaps
for a favorable outcome early in the proceedings.
1. Divide and Conquer'
67
The first of these defenses might be best described as the theory of
"divide and conquer," which involves focusing on the unique issues of
individual plaintiffs to avoid class certification. 68 As noted previously, when
dealing with the injury of obesity, common questions of law and fact
typically will not predominate over individual inquiries into the health and
163. Jennifer Pomeranz and Lainie Rutkow, Efforts to Immunize Food Manufacturers
from Obesity-Related Lawsuits: A Challenge for Public Health, CORPS. & HEALTH
WATCH, (Aug. 17, 2011), http://corporationsandhealth.org/2011/08/17/efforts-to-
immunize-food-manufacturers-from-obesity-related-lawsuits-a-challenge-for-public-
health/.
164. Nin-Hai Tseng, Soda War's Greatest Irony: Big Gulps are Safe,
FINANCE.FORTUNE.CNN.COM, (March 13, 2013, 2:58PM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/13/soda-war-big-gulp/.
165. Julia Marsh, Appeals Court Upholds Ruling Slapping Down Mayor Bloomberg 's
Soda Ban, N.Y. POST, (July 30, 2013 3:29PM), http://nypost.com/2013/07/30/appeals-
court-upholds-ruling-slapping-down-mayor-bloombergs-soda-ban.
166. Id.
167. Loiseau, supra note 154 at 4.
168. Id.
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habits of each plaintiff.169 Therefore, this is often an effective strategy to get
the case dismissed early in the proceedings.
2. Attacking Causation
17 °
A second defense theory is labeled "attacking causation."'' The major
weakness of these cases seems to be the plaintiffs inability to prove that food
consumption actually played a role, much less a significant one, in causing
obesity or weight gain. 1
72
3. Exploiting Consumer Knowledge
17 3
"Exploiting consumer knowledge" has also been named as a defense
strategy. 14 In these types of fraud or deception-based lawsuits, the
knowledge of the plaintiffs is a defense.' 75 Because deception is measured
by an objectively reasonable consumer standard, the strategy is to prove that
consumers were aware of the risk.'76 Therefore, if such a consumer would
have known of the risk, so should the plaintiff.'77
While each of these may seem to be strong defense tactics for defeating
a plaintiff's case early in the proceedings, protectors of the fast food industry
argue that a stronger, more effective defense strategy is necessary. As this
time, the fast food litigation cases have apparent weaknesses, and are almost
guaranteed to remain in litigation for years. Until scientific knowledge
specifically links the consumption of certain food products to obesity, these
lawsuits will continue to be lacking in evidentiary support of causation.
Many commentators therefore believe these suits to be frivolous, and urge
Congress and state legislatures to step in to prevent them. Such persons thus









177. Loiseau, supra note 154 at 4.
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IV. THE COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT
This section will next examine proposed federal legislation as an option
to put an end to fast food litigation. The analysis will address each
introduction of the bill, discuss the bills' strengths and weaknesses, and
analyze the arguments for and against such legislation.
A. First Introduction - 2003
Over the years, the Commonsense Consumption Act (the "Act" or
"CCA"), also known as the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption
Act, has been introduced in Congress multiple times.17 The bill was first
introduced in the House of Representatives in 2003 by Congressman Keller
of Florida.'79 Its purpose was "to prevent frivolous lawsuits against
manufacturers, distributors, or sellers of food or non-alcoholic beverage
products that comply with applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements." ' The bill was then introduced in the Senate by Senator
McConnell of Kentucky. 8' The Senate bill was similar to the House bill,
except that it specifically prevented lawsuits against those entities when the
relief or damages sought was related to obesity. 8 2 Specifically the Senate
bill excluded any: "damages or injunctive relief for claims of injury resulting
from a person's weight gain, obesity, or any health condition related to
weight gain or obesity."' 1 3 The House passed the bill with a vote of two-
hundred and seventy-six "yeas" and one-hundred and thirty-nine "nays,"' 184
and the bill was then placed on the Senate legislative calendar.'85 In the
Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary who then
referred it to the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
178. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 111 th Cong. (2009);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 11 0th Cong. (2007); Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005); Commonsense
Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act of 2003, H.R.339, 108th Cong. (2003).
179. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2003, H.R. 339, 108th Cong.
(2003).
180. Id.
181. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 54, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (March 10, 2004),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/rol1054.xml.
185. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 339, 108th Congr. (2003-2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00339:@@@L&summ2=m&.
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needless to say the bills remained tied up in the Senate and neither came into
effect.
18 6
The bill's sponsor, Senator McConnell, spoke of the proposed bill as a
type of tort reform.'87 Senator McConnell noted that most people take
responsibility for the amount and kinds of food they eat, and thus the
consequences that go along with those decisions.'88 He also mentioned in his
introduction that these sorts of lawsuits show "the erosion of personal
responsibility in America."' 89 Senator McConnell pointed out that the bill
would not provide complete immunity for the food industry, but only granted
immunity against "abusive lawsuits."' 9 ° The bill would not bar suits alleging
knowing or willful violations of federal or state statutes, breach of contract
or express warranty, or claims relating to adulterated food. 9 ' Senator
McConnell further stated: "The lawyers are not really interested in
consumers, they are looking for a settlement, a big settlement."' 92 In a
memorable closing Senator McConnell mentioned that: "Making your own
decisions is what freedom is all about. And with freedom comes
responsibility."' 93
B. Second Introduction - 2005
The fight for the passage of the bill was not over so easily. The Personal
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act was introduced in the House of
Representatives once again in 2005.'9' The bill's language was exactly the
same as the Act introduced in the Senate in 2003.115 This time the bill passed
by a vote of three-hundred and six "yeas" and one-hundred and twenty
"nays,"' 96 and was once again placed on the Senate legislative calendar,
where it remained un-enacted.' 9
186. Bill Summary & Status, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003-2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 08:SNO1428:@@@L&summ2=m&.








194. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong.
(2005).
195. Id.
196. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 533, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/rol1533.xml.
197. Bill Summary & Status, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005-2006),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 109:HROO554:@@@L&summ2=m&.
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The Senate also saw the comeback of the bill in the form of the
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005.'98 However, this time the bill
addressed its purpose from a much different perspective. This seems
somewhat odd, since the House had just reformed its bill to the same
language as the Senate's previous attempt. 99 Senator McConnell introduced
the bill once again, but this time the stated purpose was "to allow Congress,
State legislatures, and regulatory agencies to determine appropriate laws,
rules, and regulations to address the problems of weight gain, obesity, and
health conditions associated with weight gain or obesity.-
200
In opposition to the bill, Senator Leahy of Vermont argued that the Act
was "legislation to limit the rights of consumers. 20' Senator Leahy was
concerned that the Act would result in a blanket ban on lawsuits against the
food industry, and further expressed concern that a heightened burden on
plaintiffs to prove intent, along with the conduct itself, went too far.202
Although the Senate's bill would perhaps have been a better alternative
to address the rising incidence of obesity, rather than implementing a sort of
tort reform, the Senate's bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
upon introduction, and there was no further action on either proposed bill.20 3
C. Third Introduction - 2007
The Commonsense Consumption Act was introduced in both the House
and the Senate in May of 2007.24 This time both bills were introduced with
the same title, and both used the same language as the original bill introduced
in the Senate in 2003.205 However, once again, neither of these bills
passed.20 6
198. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
199. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong.
(2005).
200. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2005, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005).
201. 109 CONG. REC. S6056 (daily ed. June 19, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
202. Id.
203. Bill Summary & Status, S. 908, 109th Cong. (2005-2006),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 09:SN00908:@@@L&summ2=m&.
204. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, H.R. 2183, 1 10th Cong. (2007);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007).
205. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, H.R. 2183, 110th Cong. (2007);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2007, S. 1323, 110th Cong. (2007).
206. There was no roll call vote on the House bill and last action on the bill was its
recommendation to the Subcommittee on Commercial & Administrative Law. See
Cosponsors, H.R. 2183,110th Cong. (2007-2008), http:/ibeta.congress.gov/bill/l 10gh-
congress/house-bill/2183/cosponsors; Bill Summary & Status, S. 1323, 11 0th Cong.
(2007-2008),
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D. The Final Introduction - 2009
The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives a final time as
the Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009.207 The bill included the same
scope and language as the bill previously introduced in 2007.28 This bill also
failed to be enacted.20 9
V. OPPOSITION TO THE COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT
Why did the Act fail to pass? One reason is that several public interests
groups expressed concern about the consequences of the Commonsense
Consumption Act. Some of these concerns were specifically expressed in a
letter signed in opposition to the Act by several public interest group
leaders. 210 Those leaders were concerned that the bill provided blanket
coverage against liability to the food industry, and that too high a standard
of proof would be placed on plaintiffs.2 ' However, the letter went on to say
that "suits like the McDonald's obesity case do not exist."'2 12 While some of
their concerns may be legitimate, these leaders seem to have been
misinformed about the existence of such lawsuits, since at least a few of these
lawsuits were already active at the time of this letter.
VI. STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Besides federal legislation, there is another alternative to putting an end
to fast food lawsuits-state legislation. State legislatures are taking matters
into their own hands by finding a way to address the problems at the heart of
the fast food litigation.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SNO1323:@@@L&summ2=m&, (in the
Senate the bill was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where
there has been no further action).
207. Commonsense Consumption Act of 2009, H.R. 812, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
208. Id.
209. There was no roll call vote in the House, and the bill was last referred to the
Subcommittee on Commercial & Administrative Law, where there has been no further
action. See Bill & Summary Status, H.R. 812, 111th Cong. (2003-2004),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 111 :HROO812 :@@@X.
210. Letter from Laura MacCleery, et al., Director, Congress Watch, Public Citizen, to
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Thus far twenty-six states have enacted Commonsense Consumption
Acts of their own.213 Each state has tailored the Act to fit the states'
individual interests, although for the most part, the state bills still accomplish
the same goals as a federal Act, if ever enacted.2 14 The majority of the state
enacted Acts offer civil immunity to almost every division of the food
industry against claims of obesity or other health related injuries from long-
term consumption of certain food products.2 5 Some states go further in their
Acts in order to protect government authority when enforcing certain laws
related to food.216 There are even some state Acts that impose hardline
procedural barriers for filing such civil action suits.
217
VII. THE MOST RECENT STATE COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT
By way of example, let us examine the most recent state enactment. In
2013, North Carolina became the twenty-sixth state to enact a Commonsense
Consumption Act ("NCCCA"), and these acts continue to be introduced in
various state legislatures.21 8
Those in favor of North Carolina's CCA argued that it would help
protect the state's small businesses from frivolous and expensive lawsuits.1 9
The NCCCA's primary sponsor, State Representative Ramsey, stated "It's
not their fault that I'm overweight," and further, ". . . we can't blame others
for the choices we make., 220 The NCCCA sponsors seemed to emphasize
personal responsibility as grounds for passage of the NCCCA. For example,
the bill's co-sponsor, State Representative Shepard stated that: "I think
you're responsible and accountable for your own self."
221
Opponents of the NCCCA included a few statewide public interest
groups.222 Such opponents argued that instead of protecting people, the bill
213. Posts Tagged 'common sense consumption acts,' Study of State Cheeseburger







219. The Commonsense Consumption Act, NCHOUSEl17.cOM, (July 11, 2013),
http://nchouse 117.com/the-commonsense-consumption-act/.
220. Id.
221. Holly West, "Big Gulp" Bill Going Down Slow in General Assembly, N.C.
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protected companies, and further worried that the bill would not allow
municipalities to adequately fight obesity.
223
North Carolina's CCA passed both Houses with an overwhelming
majority. 224 North Carolina's version of the CCA protects the same entities
as proposed by the federal CCA, against claims arising from obesity, weight-
gain, and other related health conditions, but only on the condition that they
"comply with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. '225 The
North Carolina CCA also included a specific provision relating to soft
drinks; in order to "to clarify that local governments may not regulate the
size of soft drinks offered for sale.
226
VIII. CONCLUSION
After considering the effects and consequences of both litigation and
legislation as it relates to obesity-related lawsuits against the food industry,
there is still no clear answer as to an effective solution--or even as to who
is on the right side of the battle.
A. Litigation
At this time, litigation seems to be a lost cause. Without current
scientific evidence linking long-term consumption of a food item or its
attributes to obesity, an adequate legal claim is difficult to accomplish.
Furthermore, a claimed injury of obesity requires such specific individual
inquiry into all sorts of unique lifestyle factors, that it is unlikely that a class
action lawsuit will ever be appropriate. Until plaintiffs have more concrete
scientific evidence establishing the causal connection between a particular
food and their individual weight gain or health problem, these types of
lawsuits are not likely to be successful. As noted previously, cases such as
Pelman outline a roadmap for a defense rather than victory.
In addition, if the concerns about settlement-hungry plaintiff attorneys
are true, a plaintiff unaware of the realities of this type of obesity-related fast
food litigation could be involved in a lawsuit for years with little chance of
success. Protection of plaintiffs from this type of risk is another argument in
favor of a legislative solution.
Due to the fact that these lawsuits currently lack a plausible legal
theory, they will continue to be burdensome, rather than beneficial, to all
parties involved. As Pelman illustrates, obesity-related fast food lawsuits are
223. Id.
224. The Commonsense Consumption Act, supra note 219.
225. H.R. 683, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 2013-309.
226. Id.
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expensive, time consuming, and exhaustive on resources, not only to the
parties involved, but on the judiciary as well. From this perspective, some
sort of legislative prohibition may seem like the answer; however, there are
some important, albeit dissimilar, concerns that accompany such an
approach.
B. Legislation
Now that the impacts of litigation have been discussed, it is necessary
to examine the alternative-legislation. A federal CCA would effectively bar
civil liability actions claiming obesity injuries against the fast food industry.
Therefore, cases lacking a causal connection linking obesity to specific food
consumption would no longer burden the court system, and what may appear
to be innocent fast food defendants. A federally instated CCA would also
provide uniformity. With a total of twenty-six states that have enacted their
own versions of the CCA, it is only a matter of time before there is confusion
about who can sue, where one can sue and what is prohibited. Such issues
will undoubtedly be left up to the courts to decipher, which could be
especially problematic for federal courts when having to interpret different
state laws. But if Congress were to enact a federal CCA, the results would
be uniform across the country.
The potential problem with such a definite ban is if at some future date
scientific evidence is discovered proving the causal link, injured plaintiffs
deserve their day in court. The current language of the most recently
proposed CCA would bar plaintiffs from filing suit, even if they successfully
established a causal link. Additionally, what if the food industry decides to
take advantage of this protection in a negative way, like including addictive
components to food products knowing there will be no consequences? While
this may seem unlikely and somewhat reckless, it is a possibility.
Furthermore, if such lawsuits are barred, there will not be much incentive to
conduct research on fast food consumptions' relation to obesity. If in fact
such a link ever comes into existence, it is possible that it may never be
discovered. Namely, this is because no one would be at the forefront of
litigation making such research and discovery relevant or even offering
adequate compensation for conducting this type of research. For example, if
tobacco had been protected by stringent, tort reform legislation the general
public might not have ever known about the health consequences of
smoking, and injured plaintiffs might never have been compensated
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C. Where is the Balance?
The fact is that neither litigation nor legislation provides a perfect
means for dealing with obesity-related fast food lawsuits; currently litigation
is to the point of being frivolous and the CCA might provide too much
protection to the food industry. So where is the balance?
At this time the passage of a federal CCA provides the most efficient
means for putting an end to such lawsuits. While implementing a complete
bar on obesity lawsuits against the food industry may seem extreme, there
are ways around the prohibition should a scientifically proven causal
connection be found. For instance, the CCA may be repealed at any time. It
seems that if a link was discovered Congress would have few qualms about
repealing the Act to protect the public and compensate potential injured
plaintiffs. Another option would be to include a "sunset clause" in the Act.
Such a clause puts an expiration date on an Act and when the date arises, the
law automatically terminates and must be voted on again to be reinstated. If
the CCA was no longer appropriate, the expiration would provide a simple
way for the Act to be set aside, thus allowing plaintiffs to file suit, or if the
Act were still necessary it could easily be re-enacted. Not to mention, it is
much less stringent than an indefinite bar on a specific type of lawsuit.
Based on these avenues allowing plaintiffs a possible outlet to the
courts, the CCA does not seem as restrictive. Although there are concerns,
most of these are answered when one considers the options for getting around
the CCA. Therefore, at this time while it is not perfect, the CCA is the best
solution to prevent obesity-related fast food litigation that lacks a valid cause
of action.
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